The Dominion WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 1919. THE ANXIETY OF FRANCE

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 161, 2 April 1919, Page 6

The Dominion WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 1919. THE ANXIETY OF FRANCE

Thb concern which is being shown by the French Press regarding the progress and attitude ui the Feaee Conference is no new development. From an early stage of the discussions public opinion in France has been full of misgivings. The French cannot understand the attitude of President Wilson. They feci that in his concern for the establishment of a, League of Nations he is inclined to undervalue the importance of the claims to juste and reparation put forward by the nations which suffered so terribly through Germany's war aggression, and they distrust his idealism as to the, future. American newspaper correspondents in Paris have very freely circulated these Frenchopinions through tho columns of the American Press. Phemiei;_Clembnceau and some of his associates, according to these correspondents, fee! that the League hicks "teeth" with which to enforce its will, and that if the Allied nations rely too blindly upon international idealism the result may prove disastrous. The French have learned from bitter ex-, perience to have no illusions where Germany is concerned, and many of their political leaders see a newmenace in the possibility of Russia and Germany coming together. The French Premier early in February gave utterance to what is referred to as a specially significant remark. "While the war has been won," he said, "it would perhaps be more accurate to say that there is a lull in the storm."* It is clear from his subsequent comment that what ho had in mind was that the chaotic state of Russia might bo turned to account by the Teutons. _ Tho correspondent of the Xew York Tribune points out that there are 250,000,000 in the Teuton countries and Russia, and unless the League of Nations' can protect the rest of Europe from these vast numbers, France must be the first country upon which the blow must fall in the event of any. new aggression from this quarter. It is because France is very vividly alive to these facts, and because her leaders fear that tho League of Nations will not go the lengths necessary to deprive the Central Powers of tho capacity to renew their policy of aggression in the not distant future, that desperate appeals to President Wilson and Mu. Lloyd George are again finding prominence in the French Press.

It may be argued, and with some truth, that the French people have shown a tendency to regard the attitude of the Peace Conference from an extreme and alarmist point of .view. But who can blame them on that account? They more than any other of the Allied nations _ have been the victims of Germany's insensate ambitions; they more than any other nation stand at the point of greatest danger should the Peace Conference and the League of Nations fail to so act as to deprive Germany of the power of future aggression. The editor of the Paris Figaro, after urging that as we had fought the war to a finish so must Germany be shown that the Allies intend to make peace to the finish, voiced a very widely held opinion as to the doubts which have been given birth by the attitude and ideals of President Wilson. "It is the international ambiguity around President Wilson," he proceeds, "which fatally brings these thoughts. Ambiguity is the only word for it. It consists in this, that our vanquished enemies appeal to his idea to contest the reality of our victory, and to-morrow will evoke his name to refuse its fruits.''' In other words, it is urged .thafc President Wilson's ideas arc capable of being twisted and used by Germany as a justification_ for refusing the Allies the just fruits of victory and those future safeguards which President Wilson himself recognises to be necessary. It does not follow that Germany will be permitted to profit by these ambiguities, but it is not unreasonable on the part of the French people that they should view the possibilities for differences of opinion which they open up with concern and even alarm.

The situation to-day is aggravated I by the action of Hungary in setting | the Allies at defiance and joining up with'the Bolsheviks of Russia. Franco has not hesitated to express* her disapproval of the rapid demobilisation of the Allied forces while the peace terms still remain undecided and the practical value and powers of tho proposed League of Nations still remain in doubt. Germany they fear will be emboldened by the easy-going methods of the Allies to come to the Peace Conference not as a conquered nation, but as an unbeaten country making vociferous claims for "rights" and "immunities" which France is determined she shall not have. It must be conceded that if Germany were to be judged by her talk there is very good ground for these fears. Almost from the date of the armistice her rulers have blustered and threatened over each step tho Allies have taken, but when the final pinch j has come they have yielded to the demands made. One of 'the latest instances of their bluster, however, has yet to be tested. This is their refusal to allow the Allies to land troops at Danzig. To all appear- , ances they are determined to hold out on this point at all costs. Tho, fact that they dare to take this .stand might reasonably lead others than the French to infer that the political leaders in Germany have linen encouraged by recent events to hold the Allies cheap. Perhaps they have, but the real test will come, when they present their reply to the ultimatum which Marshal Foch on behalf of the Allies is about to present. The French nation has passed through so terrible an ordeal and the issues' now at stake are so vital to the whole future security of France, that it is not surprising to find the people more thiin ordinarily distrustful and an easy prey to doubts and fears. Nothing that has vet transpired,' however, aJtords foundation for the fears which appear to lie behind the appeals of tho French Press mentioned in to-day s cable news. On the contrary, recent events in Hungary and the attitude of Germany over the Danzig proposal seem'likcly to have the effect ■of further hardening u.p the Allies and of causing them to force the pace on lines fully in accord with French sentiment. I