THE GERMAN ARMY'S COLLAPSE

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 152, 22 March 1919, Page 7

THE GERMAN ARMY'S COLLAPSE

A NEW LIGHT LUDENDORFF'S TROUBLES . By TeleE'raph—Press Association-Copyright (liec. March 21, 11.20 p.m.) Paris, March 15. A German oilicer, writing to a prisoner' of war, throws a light upon the collapse of the Senium Army, lie elates that tho collapse was not due to the revolution. Discipline had considerably deteriorated during the last year of the war, especially among the troops on tho Eastern front'. .These went unwillingly to tho Western front. Headquarters ho ionser had any influence at the War Office. so Ludendorlf, after much disputing, took matters into liis own. hands from top to bottom. Thcro was also a lack of fresh battalion leaders, and war we'ariness was constantly root with. The lirst great mistake Germany made was to underrate the Englishmen as land fighters, Mid .secondly to underrate America's capacity to .build ships and raise an army. The writer says: "We got false information from our Navy, which was thoroughly spoilt by the great fuss made over it from tho Kaiser downwards, and by injudicious distribution of distinctions made to submarine commanders, who reported lnrger sinkings than was the case. Thus Arai.v and the '.Half worked on a wrong basis."

"The Entente Powers never lost their stubbornness. The revolution was not tho cause but the result of'our defeat. While tho American leaflets undermined our confidence, tho uso of the tanks completely broke it down. Order is entirely lacking in the German finances, ahd there is nomoney to spare for' the efficient preparation of a world war. Tho organisation of tho revolution began' a year prior to November last, without the help of Ttussiaa Bolshevik capital, but later, when the Kiel mutiny occurred, a largo portion of tho troops at the front and at homo was already infected.. .Our Navy was unable to disturb the American transports, and when this truth was realised wo had to take tho offensive earlier than we had planned, and before the Army was sufficiently trained. As a result we. lost 180.000 in the first offensive, and Germany had scattered her troops in every theatre of war instead of. having every. man _at the decisive point. Our offensives at Soisssons, Keinmel, and Eeims were miserableattempts. After the failure at Eeims Ludendorlf lost his nerve, and risked all upo i a throw. Then followed the fight of despair. The moment to try for peaco j had, .now slipped by."—Aue.-N.Z. Cable Assni '