GENERAL SIR HENRY WILSON

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 148, 18 March 1919, Page 5

GENERAL SIR HENRY WILSON

THE MAN WHO STOOD BY THE PRIME MINISTER A SOLDIER'S APPRECIATION The name of Marshal Pooh is on everyone's lips, but there is another name which the French Marshal would be the first to couple with his own, that of Sir Henry Wilson, and rightly so, for if he had not stood by Mr. Lloyd George's side in the hour of our supremo danger Marshal Foch would not have been Generalissimo. ' This is not generally understood, but it ought to he, for it was the rally of the British soldier to the British statesman which saved Europe. If Sir Henry-Wilson had joined the mili-tary-political cabal against Mr. Lloyd George tho Prime Minister would have gone tho way of Mr. Asquith before him, tho "Westerners" would have muddled along with their patchwork strategy, and instead of winning tho war wo should have lost it. /

i There were two occasions—November, ■ 1917, and March, 1318—when the late of ' the wnv hung in the balance. On both ■ occasions Mr. Lloyd George came to the [ front, and. Sir Henry Wilson with him. Take November, 1917. One of General Cadorna's armies had suffered a serious defeat, so serious that Italy was in dan>ger of being knocked out of the war, with all the consequences whicli would liavo followed so untoward an event. The Prime Minister saw the danger, and so did Sir Henry Wilson. Without an hour's delay they went to Eapallo, and tho Versailles Council was the result. Sir William BobertsoiV Chief of Hie General Staff, remained at home. He had his Western spectacles on his eyes, and could not take them off. A man of high character and Application, ho had not the gift of imagination necessary for an Imperial strategist. AVhile Mr. Lloyd Georgo was thinking of Italy, Sir AVilliam Eobertson was looking at Flanders. Interdependence? It was nonsenso to talk about it. There was no such word in tho Camborley' curriculum. Clausewitz. never mentioned it. What is Italy to Groat Britain? Let the Italians look to their front, and we to ours. The Army and the Council. Mr. Lloyd George and Sir Henry Wilson both knew better. _ From that day the statesman and soldier went arm-in-arm together along tho path t'o victory. Sir. Willianj Eobertson would have nothing to say to the Versailles Council; nor would his subordinates. Ho and they opposed its creation, not openly, for tho sake of our French allies, but secretly and covertly. When discussion was at its highest an officer of the High Command nt Homo, who lias since left tho Army, told the writer of tliis article that the Versailles Council was nothing more than a "clearing house for v politicians, and that in the view of tho General Staff it was of no military consequence one way or tho other.'" Tho dislike to the Council spread fo the Army in the field, and roached its climax when' sinister efforts were made through a section of the London Press to upset tho arrangement which the Prime Minister was working with "all his might to bring about. The intrigue failed as it deserved to do, and is only referred to here as indicating the obstructive spirit which was then prevalent among officers of the High Command, and which, if it had not been crushed underfoot, would have endangered the continuity of the Alliance. Soldiers and Statesmen, Sir Henry Wilson held aloof froni this cabal. He would have nothing to say to tho intrigues of disgruntled politicians and tho appointed soldiers and sailors. Gifted with brain, ho is also gifted with other qualities of mind and character which gave him strength to live down tho opposition to his appointment when it was first mado at a time of extreme national peril. Tact, respect for constituional rule,, submission to superior direction, loyalty to those both above and below—those are tho salient attributes of success for soldiers as well as for statesmen who aro charged with authority over others, and it is these characteristics which Sir Henry Wilson has shown him-, self to possess in a very high degree. "In all truth," he recently wroto to a friend, "I havo done nothing to win the war." This is the modest opinion of his own services, but it is not tho opinion of thoso behind the scenes who know what ho has done to re-establish friendly working relations between soldiers and • politicians, and by this means enable cflort fo bo wholly concentrated on -winning tho war instead of being diverted into, channels of personal dispute between rival competitors for power. Soldiers cannot too clearly understand that they aro the servants, not the masters, of the Slate. Their busincit; at all times, and under all circumstances, is to support the Government of tho day. If Hie Government goes wrong H is no part of thoir duty to put it right. Tho Constitution provides n. remedy for political wrongdoing, but it is not a military one. The Order-iu-Council of January 27, llllfi, making Sir William Eobertson independent of the War Cabinet, was a. mistake, and the source of all the (roubles hist May. After tho return to Constitutional methods, and the appointment of Sir Henry Wilson as Chief of the General Staff, the conduct of tho war was marked by perfect co-ordination between the civil authorities, who wcro charged with its direction, and the military authorities, who were charged with its execution. AVo owe this to Sir Henry Wilson quite as much as to tho Prime ; Minister, and in tho hour of victory wo ought not to forgot it—London '"Observer."