LUDENDORFF

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 95, 16 January 1919, Page 3

LUDENDORFF

AS A GERMAN NEWSPAPER SEES HIM

The "Frankfurter Zeitung" (6ays the London "Times") has been leading a characteristic Press campaign the object of which is to represent the fnll of Ludendorlf as the end of militarism and to heap as much as possible of the responsibility which belongs to the German Uovcrnment and the German Press upon, the hend of the fallen soldier. Prince Max of Baden Qiiu told us that he "dislikes in tho highest degree" the "Frankfurter Zeitung," much us, on August i, 19U, Hear von Jagow spoke to Sir Edward Goschen of ,the "Berliner Tngeblatt" as the "pestilential 'TagoWatt.'" The be ; haviour of these organs of and German finance is at present particularly unpleasant, aud the character of the anti-Ludendorff campaign is obvious. But tho turxtcd rewriting in such quarters of the history of Germany a war is instructive from many points of view, and there are some interesting passages in an article called "Ludendortt, to which the "Frankfurter Zeitung" devoted a whole page recently Describing Ludendorii as "the greatest militarist that Germany has ever had, the journal says:— Who does not know his picture? Stubborn and resolute to the uttermost. A personage, and with a stamp of genius. This general was great in all the good that he did, but great also in the evil. A never-resting spirit, always ready to ,act and to decide, always full of faith in success, and always strong as long ae this faith remained strong—thus he rose in the intoxication of success to the highest glory, as but few before 'him had done. At 53 he was the master of Germany, the master of a gigantic army, of many millions of soldiers from Flanders to the Caucasus and Mesopotamia, at the same time master of public opinion throughout the Central Powers, more powerful than an Emperor and—while apparently serving the Emperor and lending him to the realisation of his dreams—the master also of this Emperor. With a venom which it has employed in so many other causes, the "Frankfurter Zeitung" piles abuse upon abuse; it is skilful enough to ecatter a few worde of praise, but the gist of "the whole argument is that Ludendorff was responsible for everything, and responsible in the eud for the unwise offer of an armistice. This is the real sttfig— the accusation that the militarists have not only dominated policy and made 'every mistake, but that in the end they failed an undefeated . Germany, which could yet have "negotiated" peace. That is to be the legend behind which tho Prussia-Germany of the "Frankfurter Zeitung" proposes to take refuge. The only real fault which the "Frankfurter Zeitung" finds with the' "Government , and the "people" is that they followed Lvdenclorff too blindly. The Submarine War. ■ The last part of the story is the most interesting, and is worth' quoting at length:— ."" "Coming into power in August, 1916, the new Army Command, with the greatest 'determination and without .troubling about the unfavourable situation in the West-it wns after Verdun !-or the blows of the Russians, threw the German reserves against tho new Eumaninn front; the reward was 'a brilliant victory, which had a decisive influence upon the whole situation. At the samo time Hindenburg and Ludendorff propared to pvil together our itWe defensive strength for tho year 1917, in which it was to De expected that tho attacking strength of our then enemies would reach the climax. This defensive programme rightly proceeded from the idea that, above everything, the production of war materials must be developed to its maximum. So Germany's position was fortified afresh within, while without it was the richer for an impoi-tant victory in Rumania. "Now came the first of the two fateful questions for the Supreme Command. Should the German people honestly hold out its hand for'peace—a peace which would have given victory to none of tho belligerents? Should Germany seek agreement with England and France? Tho test was then the Belgian question. The Supreme Commands with Ludendorff as its political exponent, demanded farreaching military security in Belgium, tho coast of Flanders, and great conquests in the East. German policy, conducted by.Jßethmnnn-Hollwepr, shrank from the decisive battle with this tendency, for it felt itself too weak while the military were at the height of their fame. "The submarine wnr -was made into a military affair, and the peace offer of December,- 1916, was burdened with the divergence of views' of those who proclaimed it. The expert opinions were (presented. ' Holtzendorff promised- tho capitulation of England within six months. Ludendorff's vote was decisive, for the Supreme Command of the Army guaranteed thnt tho war would be decided .before American help could bring a change. That was the first of the two black days of German history. Ludendorff could not persuade himself to leave tho-supposed'trump unplayed, and to seek peace seriously, for he was pursuing the proud picture of imperialist imagination —the overthrow of England and the mastery of the >vorld. Of a trutVMiis wns no "small or. bad belief (sic), but it was a terrible disaster for the nation." Much of this is, of course, untrue; it is notorious, for instance, that the mili- ' tarists had their way because they were warmly supported by statesmen like Herr HelfTefich. And the whole story depends upon- tho fiction that the Allies would in 1917 have agreed to "draw." "Bankruptcy" and "Panic." ■ The "Frankfurter Zeitung" continues to attribute to Ludendorff all that was done in 1917, his chief crime apparently v having been that he did not follow the "Frankfurter Zeitung'e" policy of offering to give up Belgium if the Allies would sell Russi.i to Germany. So we come to last year's campaign, in which Ludendorff "guaranteed Germany victory," and slaked "the gains of three nnd n half years of war, and also the whole existence of the Fatherland, upon a single card." Ludondorff is accused of having miscalculated the strengths in the field just as enemy tonnage had been miscalculated, and tho writer proceeds:—

"The campaign began. The diepositions were masterly, but our troops reached neither Amiens nor Compicgne nor Chalons. The utmost doubt was justified. Heir von Kuhlmann, who expressed it, was disarmed. The German attack became ever more cramped. Ludendorff punished ruthlessly when everything did not go as he wanted. He intervened personally, losing himself ever moro in details. Then came the turn of events, and everything collapsed with terrible violence.

"That was a moment in which even a 6trong man could fail—even a mighty one, whoee disappointment must bo crushing beyond measure. But a Ludendorff ought not to have been stricken with panic. The unintelligible happened; German policy was surprised in a, night by the declaration of bankruptcy. A crime, a madness—and the end.

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