IN THE DARK DAYS OF MARCH

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 88, 8 January 1919, Page 6

IN THE DARK DAYS OF MARCH

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S STORY OF THE GREAT CRISIS THE TRAGEDY OF THE FIFTH ARMY Sir Dougliw Haig's dispatch describing the operations of March and April last was published Borne weeks ago. It filled 27 pages of the "London Gazette," and, says tho '-.Westminster Gazelte" in a crisp, lucid precis in narrative form, "it tells a noble story of the British Army in the face of disaster and in victory. How near the Germans enme to reaching their goal they probably never realised. The situation was saved by the grim tenacity of. men who went straight from one battlefield to another, and who held their positions to the last. Well may Sir Douglas Haig write, as he approaches the end of the story: "The splendid qualities displayed by .all ranks and services throughout the Sowme and Lys battles make it possible to view with confidence whatever further tests the future may bring."' There, is not space ihere to recount tho , various movements in the battles of the Somme aJid the Lys, of. which Sir Douglas Haig gives a full narrative. A 4 first question, is, why the break took 'place, and upon.that point the dispatch gives us much light. The disappearance of Russia from the fight ■ had enabled Germany to transfer forty-six divisions from "East, to W.est between November,' 1917, and March,. 1918. Germany had then available 192 divisions in -France and Flanders. ILn face of that situation, the Allies had, early in the winter, decided upon a defensive' rather than 1 an offensive, policy. The : Americane .were not expected to be available, and without them the Allies were gravely outnumbered. Sir Douglas Haig, "pursuant to a decision taken by the British Government," took ovciv.Mn. January , twentyeight miles of the French front, and at the.same time "the French forces which had co-operated.' 60 successfully on • the left of the British in Flanders had been withdrawn." The taking over of this twenty-eight miles left the British only 6even weeks in which to organise the defences of a position in which "old systems had to De , remodelled -and new p iteina created." The time was riot eulficient, but "a large portion of the work was in fact completed before. the enemy launched his great attack." The Commander's Difficulty. Sir Douglas Haig was in a quintuple difficulty.:—... j ' (1) The strenuous efforts made by the ■British forces during 1917 had left the Army at a low ebb in regard both to training and numbers: (2) Training had hitherto been primarily devoted to preparation for offensive operations. ,'■..;.: (3) There bad not. been time , and .labour for the proper preparation of rear-line eystems of defence.. . ■' ' (4) "Under instructions from the Army Council the reorganisation of divisions from a 13-battalion to a 10-battalioa basis" involved a reduction both in fighting strength and in fighting efficiency. (5) The large reserves of the enemy "enabled him to 'carry out extensive training with, units completed to establishment." ' Pliins were worked out in detail with ! the French to meet the various, possibili- j ties of enemy attack, and these included a hostile offensive: on the line of- the Somme River. i Distribution of Foroes. Such was the position in March, when there were all tUe indications, of a German offensive onithe Somme; In distributing his forces Sir' Douglas Haig had i regard'to three considerations:— v (i), In the northern portion of the British'area lie the northern Channel .ports of Dunkirk, Calais, aud'Boulogne, the security of which necessitated the maintenance of- sufficient troops in the neighbourhood. Little or no ground could be given up on this front, and j therefore tlie necessary reserves must be kept in close proximity. (ii) In the_bentral portion lie the northern collieries of France and v certain important tactical features which cover our lateral Communications. Here also little or no ground, could be given up, except in the Lys .Valley itself. (iii) In the southern portion of the British area south-east.of Arras, in contrast to the central and northern portions, ground could be given up under great pressure without; serious. consequences, the forward area-of thia ecctpr consisting "chiefly of a'wido expanse of territory devastated '. by the enemy last spring in hie withdrawal. . When the German offensive began, the Fifth Army, under General Gough, which linked up with the French, behind defences wihich were not completed, consisted ; of fourteen divisions and three cavalry divisions. The latter, with three infantry divisions, were in reserve, and the disposition "only allowed of an average of one division to some G750 yards of front." The Third Army had eight divisions in line, with seven in reserve, and each division covered 4700 yards of front. The total force of the British on' the original battle front was thirty-two ■divisions and against these the Germans employed sixty-four divisions on the first day of the offensive. ■ Using tho Reserves, ' Once the main attack had developed, Sir Douglas Haig , collected eight divisions from the reserves behind the line in the north. These were put in before the end of March, ami by April 9 another four, divisions had been brought in. British divisions in all were used in the Somme battle. Before these reinforcements could , arrive Sir Douglas Haig had discussed the situation on several occasions 'with the French Commander, and after the afternoon of March 23 "arrangements were, made as. rapidly as possible for the French to tRKeo ver tn'e front held by' the Fifth Army south of' Peronne." How critical were the decisions.that Sir Douglas Haig had to ma!|o at tUs timo ie emphasised by the account of the Lys battle. An at-' tauk had been foreseen on the Lys before March 21. It was delivered when Sir Douglas Haig had. ' already ; engaged in the Somme battle fortysix out of hie total force . of fifty-eight divisions. In the Lys, battle the Germans used forty-two divisions, while tho British had only twenty-five divisions, seventeen of which had already, c.omi> through the terrible experiences of the Somme front. • ■ In the six weeks of almost constant fighting, from March 21 to April 30, a to tar of fifty-five British infantry divisions was emploj-ed on s the battle fronts' against a force of 109 different German divisions. During this period a total of 141 different German divisions were engaged • against the combined British and French forces. Numbers Too Weak. That is the essence of what lias eometimes seemed the inexplicable story of tho greatest disastor to the Allies and the greatest heroism of the war in France. Sir Douglas Haig was in. a position whore "the extent of our front made it inipossible, with the forces under my command, to have adequate reserves at all points threatened." His front hud been 'greatly extended, the strength of his divisions had been re- - dUced, and their fighting efficiency had been more than correspondingly lowered. The Fifth Army was simply too weak in numbers to hold the front assigned to it, and upon the Fifth Army fell the heaviest weight of tho Gorman blow. Everywhere along the line the British forces were outnumbered. Thoy were outnumbered most heavily, at the point whero' the first blow fell.