THE SUBMARINE

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 42, 13 November 1918, Page 10

THE SUBMARINE

ITS WAR RECORD

GERMAN U-BOAT PIRACY

Heforo the war a good deal had been heard about the submarine as a coming forco in naval war, and one authority of note (Admiral Sir Percy Scott) had gouo tio lar as to declare that "the introduction of vessels that swim under water had entirely ddna away with the utility of t'he ships that swim ou the top ol; the water." The experience of the war has not substantiated this bold prediction, but it is not on this account possible' to say that the submarine has been definitely and finally relegated to a positiou of inferiority. So far as legitimate warfaro is concerned, the submarjno has not been tried out. Wonderful things were done by British submarines in the) Dardanelles and the Sea of Jlannora,. and • also , against German navai craft, transports, and supply ships in t'he Baltic. .At times, cliiclly in the . earlier stages' of the war, some legitimate successes against British wanships were scored. also by-enemy underwater craft. Hut, on the who!?, the submarine has taken a very limited part in naval war ils distinct from illegal commerce destruction. Submarines tabs :io effective part-in any of the impoftairi sea battles of the war, and their failure to do so does not seem to be wholly accounted for by the- fact that they have . ]io£- yet developed the speed that would f nable' them 'to manoeuvre with battle Jlcets. An ■ Instrument of .Piracy. . The submarine became a really big factor in the war not as a legitimate weapon, but as an instrument of piracy and murder, used in Hat defiance'-of the> laws' of humanity and the lav of nations; By disregarding the limitations imposed by law'and usage on naval warfare, . by committing- barbarous crimes involving the wholesale murder oi ;ioncombatants—men. women, and children— with an equal disregard of Allied at;d neutral rights, Gerniany\ was enabled tV develop an attack upon' tha Allied sea) communications which for a time threatened to attain decisive results. Tlie Üboat peril -was at its worst in the second quarter of 1917. lly opening her "unrestricted" campaign at the beginning of that year, Germany took the step which brought the United States into ttiDi war. Her hope was that tho TJ-boats would force a decision beforeAmerica could effectively''reinforce the-' Allies, olid it did not at. once appear ■thnt her hope was vain. It has been said, that if the losses of -British and Allied merchant steamers lir submarine attacks had continued' at the rate recorded for April, May, and .I«ne of 1917,. the Germans would have won the war before that year had closed. But tho Xavy rose as magnificently to the demand thus imposed as to all others mad« upon its ;■■<! devotion. "Very lapVy, when one considers th» fstraordinary difficulty of protecting merchant: vessels, from submarines anil of se-c-king out and destroying (he subinarinc.s themselves in the open sea, the Navy got to stins with t!i» U-boat peril, and much .reduced. its effectiveness." ' The Navy's Problem, Rapidly,as submarines'were destroyedl in the. later stages of .the war, and much--11 as shipping, losses were, brought' l down from. tne high figiires recorded in • the , second' quarter of., 1917, .the problciu ,' of dealing with' the. piratical U- : boat was'-formidable to the- endIn Api h and .May this year British at-' ■ tacks or; Zeebrugge . and Osteiid—ueeds which for all time will fill a glorious 1 page i:i navaMiistory—made the enemy's ' b?st am' most convenient submarine ; bases useless in his hands. It, was thet : llster.d and Steelirngge flotillas—mainly short-distance boats which operated inv the North S-f.l and the Channel and as far aP.elu as the.south of Ireland—that 'wsi-e most, dangerous when (he underwater riimpaign was at its height. With the seating up of Zcebnigge and' Ostein?, these flotillas were practically driven from the sra-. But,tlie problem of defending American trn nsporU, suppj? ships, and other vessels on tho Atlantic, route, against long-distance submarines ftill ci»istituted a serious. problem and' iiunoscd heavy .demands upon the energy ■ nnd devoticn of the British Xavv even when it had been '.irnverfiilly reiuforcsd. ' by Urnicd States squadrons and flotilh-.s. .'No (ic.ibt I'omprehenMve information in regard to the numb"',' of enemy subinari",cs destroyed will soon be made' publi":. Mr. ftloyd George stated inAuvnsl thai "at least l.iO of lhe>o. ocean pesls liad bp?!! 'destroyed," seventy-Hvo or tb";n in the past year. Information of lat pilblication shows thai the torn mentioned by the' British . Prime MinisiiT w.i.-,-well below.the .mark. The total b? named did not exhaust the of German U-boats destroyed, and it too.v no acuiunt of Austrian submarines, of which a rminbei were disposed of. Thedestrudion of enemy submarines, of 'coursei continind until those that survived were finally recalled to their liases, nnd Germany's total losses, apart fr»m those o f Austria, must very considerably exceed 130.

Statistics of the Campaign. Some idea of the magnitude of the long: grim struggU-.with th" fi-boats is given in thf figurei- of British and foreign shippinu losses during the war period. These figures, together with statistics ot new construction and- some . particu.ar* of enem.i shipping captured, are sum-' marisec! b?iow> The figures of • ■ British and foreign losses cover losses, from ail cans?.-.' but the U-lwafs, of course,' aceounti"! for the greater pari. i The position at the end of 1911. eleven montU nfver the opening of the German. "unrestricted 1, campaign, is summarised in thi following table:— .. . British. Foreign. World. Tons. Tons. ' Tons. T.OSHH 7,079,102 4,748,050 11,827,572 liains—New construc- . ' tion 3,031,335 3,57-!,720 0,60(1,275 Hnemy tonturVi 750,000 I.SOMOO 2,559,003 Total gains .1,81 K333 3,Mi1,720 9,195.273 >.'c f h"« (world' ' 2,K8,297 By the end of Sepicmber last losses had increased to:—: Tons. 5.905.820 Foreign - i.501.561 Tnlal for the world 14,810,790 Available particulars of replacements are incomplete at the moment, but the position as a whole is very much better than it was at the end of 1917. The net loss of shipping shown at that time lias been much reduced, since in the interval losses have substantially declined, and the construction of new shipping lias been very greatly expandrd and accelerated. So far as total output is concerned; Allied and neutral shipyards began early in 1918 to' outpace and neutralise the destruction ot' shipping by submarines. During the three months which ended on July 31. WIS, new construction exceeded losses 1.-v approximately WW tons or 1011,000 tons per month. Diini'R I lie three months to. the end of October last new ("oistruclion exceeded losses by nearly half a million tons.