URVEY OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 42, 13 November 1918, Page 10

URVEY OF THE WAR

f ■* . . te-BY MR. LLOYD GEORGE RITAIN'S EFFORT ON LAND !'. AND SEA !" ' !•: — in interesting survey of the war was j|e' by Mr. Lloyd George in the jrse of a speech in the House of mtionsLon August; 7 -last. In bold bkes he gave: a graphio account of jtainls-wonderful. effort on liind .anil (. "•aiid the'. tremendous ' difficulties ich she had to overcome. It is, cf Irse, quite impossible "within the 'its at our disposal to write a hisy of the warj or even to deal adeitely with its main features; but

L Lloyd George's .speech indicates j spirit in which the British peoples ied their tremendous task, the s'plen--1 courage and endurance of tlio my and Navy, and the way in which obstacles were overcome and vieiy finally achieved. Mr. Lloyd orge said: "Four years ago the itish Empire 'decided to throw the .ole of • its might into the ?ate'st war that this world has ever tnessed. It did so not because ,itish soil was invaded or even threattd with invasion, but because of ah trage upon international right. Had 'not taken that decision the whok iirso of the war would have been difi'ent. The history of the-world for Derations to come would have taken 'different courso. Ido not wish to aggerate in the least .the part which e British Empire tobk in that conit, but ii mere glance at the events ' the last four years will show how eat and how decisive its influence has en upon the turn "of these events, lien the war began we had the most iverful Navy in the. world. J{ : was , powerful as the three, next navies the world, and when unity of com-, and is taken info account it was are powerful than the three next ivies. But we had the smallest fmy of any Great Power in Europe. 6 had a compact with Franco that if e wore wantonly attacked the TJniti Kingdom would come to her suuirt. There was no compact as to hat force-we should bring .into Ihe ena. In.anv discussions that ever pk place, either in this country or itside, there was no- idea that we' iould ever be able to employ a greater 'rce than six divisions. When there jis a discussion in this Houso about te British Expeditionary Force the Maximum was the six-divisions limit, ["hatever-. arrangement was come to, i lliink history will say l we have mora (an kept faith.

Navy's Crim Struggle. rThe struggle on the vast wilderness I the sea—over hundreds of thoumds of square miles, with no one to itness it or describe it, except those ho take part in . the grim is been prolonged for four years ithout a break. No darkness arrests ;; ho weather, 110 winter stops it. be Navy never goes into winter quarts. When the war began the British : avy was then the largest in the orld, representing a tonnage of 2} ■illions. Now it is eight million. That (eludes the auxiliary fleet, and were ■ not for that increase the seas might 8 barred to the commerce of the orld." What is its task? Every trade mte in the world is patrolled by its pips.; Take its functions—take the loekade. alone. From Shetland to jreeiiland, from Greenland' to Iceland, i'om, Iceland to the, coast of Norway, fie:most savage waters in the world, lways - angry, resenting the intrusion f man by every device known to Nafour years these seas have pen incessantly patrolled by the Britsh'Navy. They have set up an imenetrable -barrier -to Germany. Else■here our.-British'ships-have been' conoyiiig, patrolling, mine-laying, mineweeping, escorting,"-chasing submar:es "over vast /.and ; ..tractless areas, 'hey have'destroyed at least one Jiuuired and fifty of these: ocean pests (the übmarines), more than, half' in the lourse of last'year.'' T will give one .gure which indicatesthe gigantic character of "the work dohe by the British fary. In the month of June alone British ships of tbe. Navy steamed eight nillion miles. To that must be added she efforts of the .mercantile marine, rhich bas now become, a part and 'ranch of the British Navy—and - is ! acing tbe same dangers with the same Jaring, carrying for. the Allies as well is for ..our selves; most.of the American jroops that have so valiantly acquitted themselves in France;, in 'recent con!icts'"were'; carried' in British ships. - The Sea Offensive. i Ths;'Germans during, the last two fears'have made two definite,, attempts to force a decision, one at sea and one Dn land. They attempted the land offensive because the sea offensive failed? Why,? Because; they knew the sea. offensive, would have been the-more final; of. the two. Tho land offensive was dangerous; the sea offensive deadly,; The land offensive might have been disastrous; the other, if it had succeeded, would have been final. If the submarines had succeeded, our Army in France would have withered away. Jio .Americans could have oome over to assist the French troops, and munitions could not have been sent across. |Wo. could not have sent across the necessary coal and material to enable France and Italy to manufacture/munitions. France, Italy, and Britain jwould not have starved, because tho ;war would have been over before tliat ?tage was reached. I mention these facts in no spirit of boastfulness ;about the British Fleet, although its achievements fill us with'a national ipride; and I am certainly not minimising in the least the great assistance :Tendered by the fleets of America, of France, of Italy, and certainly of i Japan. . But the British Fleet is so inicomparably greater and its operations ; are on a scale of so much greater magnitude that I dwell specially on this j because it is desirable that the imimensity of- its efforts and its importlance in the war should be icalised. Un- . less the Allies had been completely trirUmphanfa at the outset of the war at ; sea no efforts oil land would have, saved j them;' The British Fleet is mainly re- : sponsible for. that complete triumph. (Cheers.) It could not have been se- ; cured and maintained without the gigantic efforts in men and material. . ' Our Efforts on Land. Now I should like,.to say a few words about our efforts on land. What was - the problem that 'confronted us when, j,we .'came to tho Army? We had the greatest Navy, we had tho greatest 1 : mercantile marine, and the maintenance : of these two were the first charge upon : the resources of this country. Then I there were essential supplies of coal ; and other commodities which we alono i Supplied to the Allies, and our military : efforts had to be subject to this first ; obligation upon our resources in men ; and material. AVe had other diffisulj ties to confront. Wo were rot a mili- ; .tary nation in the sense the nations ; of the Continent all were. Britain had i not since a remote poriod in her his- • itory had anything like military service i :for the whole of her population. Wo ! .were. unaccustomed to the idea of uniI ,versa! military service./ Even the Unified States of Amerioa within' living : memory has had conscription. That is not true of this country.. British soil I iwas not invaded; it was not threaten-.

Ed, and we were not afraid of it. Therefore wo had not the same visible, dirooL appeal to sacrifice which always arouses the manhood of any country whoso soil is threatened with invasion. We had a small Army. What have we accomplished? Sineo August, 191-I, including those who were already with the colours, this country has raised for the Army and the Xavy in Groat Britain alone G£ millions vf men. Most of them were raised by voluntary recruiting,, the most unexampled ••feat in the history of any country in 'tlio world. I mot to-day a distinguished statesman from an Allied country, and ho was telling 111 c what an impression that had made and how there was nothing in the history of any' laud wlirh would bear comparison with the great voluntary effort made in the first tiro years of the war in this country. Fll order to (jive an idea what this means.'if the United Stairs .nf America were to call to the colours- the same number of men in proportion to population it would mean very nearly j.0,000,000 men. The Dominions have contributed 1,000,000. Tndio has raised 11 millions of men since the beginning of. this war.

Position in March., What was the position on March -1 after the peace of Brest-],itovsk ? Ti:o enemy had brought; Ins best divisions from the East, and he was combing out the best liien from ihc liumaniari divisions and bringing them to the West. Most of tlieoe men had enjoyed a long rest 011 the Eastern front and had devoted their. time, to training, and preparing . specially for the great blow which was to be directed against the Allied Armies. On March 21 we had in front of us the flower of the (Herman Army which had been resting. Our troops were tired ,by a. prolonged offensive under tlio-most exhausting conditions aiiy troo'ps'i ever fouglit under. PractiI eally tile whole of the 'British front was new ground which -had been won from the enemy. Considerable American forces had been expected by the spring. As a matter of fact,.oll March 21 there was only one American division in the line. There were'three or four divisions behind the lines. The weather conditions wore most favourable for the enemy. The united Command was net an accomplished fact, in spite of' ali endeavours to achieve it; and each General was, mainly concerned with the affairs of his own front When the great blow came the reserves of the Allied Armies as a whole were not available to meet it where it fell. The object of the blow was to obtain<a military decision, this year, before the American Army could come up. That was to be achieved, lirst, by severing the English and French Armies by driving a wedge between them, find then, having separated the two forces, to overwhelm the British Army and afterwards deal at their, leisure villi the French Army. .If these objects had been attained the American forces could not have arrived in time to savo' the French Army That was the German calculation, and let us not forget, in the light of what haupened._ that it was not such an impossible estimate. There has been four and a half months of such fighting as has never been seen 011 the face of this-globe. What happened? Anxious Moments.

At first the German Army achieved a. considerable success. We had anxious, moments, and those who knew the most wero the most anxious. The losses were' considerable in men, 1 regret to say, and ir. material. In a fortnight's time 265,0C0' men were thrown across the Channel—one of the most- remarkable o&'orts of British shipping and of the organisation of British transport, and, let me say, of the War Office. In a month's time iioo.OOO men had tieen thrown across the Channel, and a fresh gun had been sent back for every gun that was lost. At this moment there are more guns and more machine-guns at the front than, the Army in France ever had. It was the first German miscalculation. They calculated that we could not do it. The enemy hit in the south, in the centre, and in the north, where they thought they could destroy the British Army. In six weeks they were hurled back and fought to a standstill by the British Army. They wero defeated in two or throe of- the most sanguinary battles of the war. They were left with unhealthy salients under the fire of our guns, with extended lines. This was one of the finest instances of tenacious valour in the whole story of the British Army. We took a step which only the emergency could have justified. We sent lade of eighteen and a half years of age, who i had received five or six months' training, into the' lines. These lads were no sooner in France than they had to facte veteran and victorious troops. ■ No veterans ever fought with greater courage mid steadiness than these lads did. They hurled back these legions that had vowed to destroy the British Army, and we must- all be proud of the boys who so upheld the honour of their native land and helped to save the. cause of tho. Allies from disaster. Let me recognise the assistance we had from our gallant Allies, both on the Somme and in Flanders. No one knows better than those who took part in that conflict how invaluable was tbe aid received from the gallant French Army. Foch's Counter-Stroke, After May 1 they turned off and attacked the French. There never has been, since March 21. an offensive conducted by forces of the same magnitude. That was the biggest attack that has been made up to the present in numbers, forces, and in concentration. Here, again, they won a preliminary success on. a considerable scale. What has*happened since then? Not merely have they been fought to a standstill, but Marshal Focli,'by his counter-stroke, which is one. of the most brilliant in the annals of war, has driven the enemy back. The enemy, who avowed that he was to capture Calais, perhaps Paris, by dates which varied according to the temperament of the prophets from May till August, August bein£ the. latest, who was to capture Pariß, destroy the British Army, and overwhelm the French, is now retreating. Amerioa's Achievements. Soon after the blow of March 21 tlic British Government made a special appeal to President Wilson to send men over, even if they wero not formed in divisions, so that they could bo brigaded into British and French formations.- President Wilson responded by return. It was prompt, it was decisive, hut he stipulated that we should do our part of the carrying. It was true that we had no ships to spare, but we impressed upon the Shipping Controller tbe enormous importance of getting every. A mericau soldier over, and we pulled ships out of trades which were quite essential. Do not let anyone imagine that' we had ships to spare. In, order to carry over American troops we have had to sustain a loss of 200,000 tons per month in 'essential cargoes, which means 2,500,000 toils per annum. .-But it .lias been justified by the result—Boo,ooo or !)00,000 troops have been brought over since the date of the battle, mostly in British ships. In the month of Julv 305,000 American troops were brought' over, of which 188,00!) were carried in British ships. That was the -second element in the restoration of tho situation, because everyone knows how valiantly these troops have fought. It is not merely, as I have repeatedly said here, that they have fought with courage. Everyone would have expected that of the American Army; but they have fought with a trained skill which no one had a right to expect. ' The men are brave, but the ofF.ters, who, after all, are not trained o'Bicers in the ordinary sense of the

torn:, have shown n. skill, a knowledge and .a management of men under ti'.vinjr conditions which you could liardIj expect from men who have not had years of training, and' who have not had a gobd deal of experience of war. 'that'is oiuj of tlic• most remarkable facts- in the fighting of the American troops at tlio present .time. Unity of command. What is the other elements tliat ; made, for success I- 1 lam not suro ; ■that I would not almost put this first j —unity of command, at last achieved, I hut after a struck:. The word j "Generalissimo" is a misleading ward. : There is no Oncralissimo in the real | flill sense of tin? .term. A Generalissimo ; is a man who dins complete command : over Ins army, and who appoints gene- < nils, and dismisses generals, wliu eon-| trols not merely the lighting in the | iield, hut ,-the troops heliind the line. ! That, is not tlio position of General j Focli. It is not the position to which ; he aspired. In tlio ordinary sense of i the term that has not been attained, \ and I. am still of tlio opinion that it ! is not desirable that it should bo ;

attained. No one lias claimcd it, no one lias argued for it. What lias tieen established bas been unity ol strategic command, and that lias- answered every purpose, the Germans know too well and to their cot. League of Nations,

1 believe in the League' of N'ations. but_ whether tho League of Nations is going to Lc n. suci-ess or not will depend on the conditions under which it is set up. Some of lis here have boon members.of representative assemblies for a generation. Everyone knows that when there is any great decision to be taken what -really determines it is not so nuic'h what is said in debate as tho fact that there is some power behind that lakes certain views, and has .the power to enforce tli.it- view. It is the electorate here. In the League of Na-' tions let us take 1 euro it is not tho sword. The same thinir inisrht conceivably happen to a League of Nat-ioris'-'iin- • less you start, it under favourable conditions. You mia;ht enter it, the Germans, not sayimr, but saying : it in. their 'actions: "Wo hnve invaded your lands, wo have devastated them, .we have trampled you underfo.it.. You failed 1 to drive us back, you mad"'no impression upon our armies, they were absolutely hit.net when peace was declared. Had it not been-for'our economic difficulties you woild never have won.- We shall take stood care next year that we sh-.1l not h» short of rubber, corn, essentials." Kvevy time you oani" to a decision the Pnisni.'n cvwd would clank on Hie eounr-il table. What is tlie good of 'entering info a Leagu" of Nations of that sort? We all want

peace, but it must bu a peace which is just, it must bt? a peace which is durable. AVc don't want-to put this, generation or the next through the horrors of this War. To he durable it must bn just; it must bo more. There must be a power behind it, a power that can enforce its decrees, and i.ll who enter that conference must know that inside that league such a power does exist; and when we have demonstrated even to the enemy that such a power does exist on earth, peace will then come, but no sooner.