ASPECTS OF THE WORLD WAR

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 42, 13 November 1918, Page 9

ASPECTS OF THE WORLD WAR

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STORY J)F GERMANY'S; CRIME AND

It -will be a long time before the eventa oi the war irliich the Allies have brought triumphantly to ait end so far as, hostilities are' concerned appear in really clear perspective. The one fact which stands out plainly in this great hour is •that the. victory of the .Allied nations is .'lecisivo. in a degree which must be .called, mai'veilous when account ia taken of the-■fearful disadvantage at which they stood!.--in tho opening stages of the con ; "ict. No; doubt it will be the plea of Gp.inan. apologists in yeans to comothat their- nation was'overwhelmed in a 'struggle against, hopeless odds. They mull find superficial support for.their plea in the 'wonts of the final phase of tho war. It is'a phase in'which Germany's ,military. power dwindled and crumbled while that of the Allies expanded apace. !Mal;ing . splendid uso of/ their 'dominant sea power, the Allies, in one mighty blow after another, struck down , Germany's -vassals, 'and, simultaneously hurled back her Western armies- in a ruinous-defeat which threatened to be.iconio at any moment a hopeless debacle. 'These events which we have been following. day by day in recent weeks will no doubt enable those who may attempt ■ hereafter-to colour the. facts of Germaij-y's defeat: to concoct a plausible! story' of' a vain but gallant struggle against impossible odds. A Plea That Will Not Stand. Yet it would-be an absolute perversion of''tho'truth'to .assert, that Germany lost tho war because sho was opposed in superior strength—meaning by that lerui so many men and so much material organised - and developed fot , military ■ends. Germany fought- at odds in' tho ! final battles, but her defeat had become j inevitable before . theao battles were ; fought. She ' lost the war, in actual 1 fact," because during long periods in j which all the odds of numerical anil material strength were heavily in her favour she .found that these factors were mot in. themselves enough to givo her victory. During a great part of the war the Allies for practical purposes were in superior strength only nt sea; and seapower, though it might have given them ultimate victory in any case, would not alono have enabled them to bring -Ger : many to unconditional .surrender after fifty months' of war. The true nature of the victory now being celebrated appears only when full weight is given to tho fact that it is the outcome not' merely of tho magnificent onset in which the Allied armies have lately engaged, but of unfailing valour, devotion and endur-ance,-of,.the, Allied land and naval forces, during-more than four years of war. Tho titanic conflicts of the last month or two were only tho final stage of the test which almost from the first days of the war has searched the warring nations to their depths.' The Foundations of Victory. The Allied assaults which broke the fighting spirit of the German armies and nation were part and parcel of an achievement which dates from the days j 111 which the "British Navy took up its I war stations, and the Belgian, French, j and British Armies faced Germany's in- i vadiiig hosts. Had numerical strength and material, equipment been the deter-, mining factors, Germany, in those dayi, would havo gained a sivift and overwhelming victory. Every advantage of numbers, preparation, and material fitrength • .was in her hands, and it : was due solely to the invincible valour of the relatively- weak, and ill-provided' Allied armic.s and the commanding genius of their leaders that.her apparently irresistible -rush was stemmed and broken. "With the. reservation- .only that the stranglehold, fastened on Germany by the British Navy has been from.first to last a mighty factor making for, Allied victory, the key to all that has followed appears in the qualities of leadership and fighting power which enabled the Allied armies in these early battles to hold their; own. and more than hold their own, when disaster seemed.inevitable. The German Record. .- Demonstrated-.first .At the Marne : and in Flanders, the inability of.the (.ierma'ii anuies and their commanders to approach the standards set ..by the Allies; has become ever more iimiaient at each new stago of the. war.. . They were upon the whole outgeneralled -even in Russia. The Russian retreat of .1915 'ivas enforced less by the enemy.'than., by poverty., of material resources.. When; they had to somg: extent made good .'their- deficiences of equipment, the Russians,'in • 1916, de-. veloped an-offensive which-.until f.his year ranked as one. of tho most brilliant of (he- war. - Tho Russian eollapsi; in 1917 was political and. not .military in .character; -Both in the great and minor theatres Germany and her. vassais were able for a time, their superior numbers and material resources, and aided not- fl little by their .interior land communications, to establish a. delusive appearaneo of-success,".but.all that .they accomplished makes a poor 'enough; showing when set against achievements' in] which Allied armies and generals have earned undying fame. There i» nothing in Germany's, record to. compare with the heroic adventure of Gallipoli, wliich for all tinio will ho a proud.memory to the Allied'nations,; and.nbovo ail to"our own. -Her record is as bare of anything that could bo said to rival tho.brilliant campaigns conducted for Great Britain by Sir Stanley Maude in . .Mesopotamia find by General Allenby in Syiia.

A Wonderful Year, Germany's in tho art of war have" been finally 'demonstrated ;-n the -year of wonderful events which is iiow drawing to an'end. J''or Germany and licit vassals' the early 'mouths of this year were a time of renewed opportunity. The utter collupso cf Russia and the grave, though temporary, disaster which had overtakon Italy enabled Germany once more to face tho Western Allies in superior numerical and material strength, and to recover the iiiilmtivo on the Franco-Belgian front. The same causes had weakened r.nd endangered the position of tho Allic.s in some of the minor theatres, notably Mesopotamia and the BaUmns. Although -American reinforcement/ already appeared as an important factor, and ono that in time would decisively sway the balance in favour of tho Allies. Germany was undoubtedly faced at the beginning of 1018 by a great opportunity. For tho Allies I ho time was one of nciite anxiety. Tho danger appeared that all they had accomplished in their 1917 offensive on land and in their successful measures against i tho U4)bat at-sea might he.undone, and.l that even worse things might follow. Wo may agree that no conceivable mi/>. cess by the enemy in Franco and Flr/iiders would have given him final victor, bnf. it is equally clear that if he iiad gnccecded in, completing- his occupation

of Northern Prance and had mastered the whole. Channel coast the prospect of such a victory as the Allies have now gained would have been indefinitely postponed. The achievement which, in tho event, the enemy approached, but failed to compass, in his drive on Amiens would have'told nowhere more seriously than in its effect, upon the Allied ,sen ibminuiiications and naval dispositions. Gaining the Channel cop.st,_ Germany would have robbed Britain of the .short transport route across the Straits <|f Dover, which, thanks to the untiring vigilance of the Navy, has been ■ kept practically inviolate throughout the war.* The British communications with the Western theatre; would then hove extended .over n much longer sea route to the west coast, of France.' Enormotw additional demands would thus have been imposed, on Allied shipping and naval forces, and the U-boats would taye gained a new lease of life. Moreover, in these conditions it would have been quite impossible to land- two million American troops in Franco by the end of October this year. To date tho greater proportion, of the American .troops have been transported across the Atlantic in British ships under 'British convoy. ' Britain could' not possibly have continued this service had the enemy gained the Channel ( coast. . Germany's Final Opportunity. 'Enough has ; been said to emphasise the fact .thnl in" the offensive she launched in March'.Germany was playing, for j the greatest (Stakes. It is not too much | to say that, she was faced by a brilliant .opportunity. Her opportunity was i.'ie greater since in the spring of 1018 Hie Allies were still in transition from national to unified command. Overshadowii't: daiigcr iwd made them realise that aalty.'.Vtfj but -their arrangeifloniii wsre inccciplefa. It to not until March 26,'"five days after the Germans | opened, their drive towards Amiens, -that j General Foch, as he then was, became ! Allied .Generalissimo. The retarded dej' velopnient of' this Allied Supremo Comi inand was perhaps the most important ' of all the factors which combined in the | last year' of war to present Germany | wic'i a golnen opportunity of striking, if not for a decision, at least for a position of _a>l vantage and power from which it would Save iake,n the Allies years to dislodge Jwr." We all know the sequel. In (lie. last year of war, as in the first, Germany found that numbers and weight of material were not enough to give her victory. During l'our months - the enemy* onslaught developed formidably, but in retrospect it seems a weak and halting effort: in comparison with the wonderfully sustained and overwhelming offensive by tho Allied armies which has developed with the results that we have seen. As has been said, Germany fought in the final struggle with the odds of strength against her. But even in tho mbst'limited view it must be recognised that her' defeat dates, back to the . time when, with all the odds of numerical and material strength in her favour,, she struck for victory and failed hopelessly to attain it. Her defeat in these days of final opportunity was accounted for by the same root causes as her earlier defeats on ! the Marne, in Flander6, at Verdun, and in other battles-in which she had hoped to reach a decision. . Tho Allied armies were of a firmer temper, a higher and more resolute courage tlxrn her own, and they were directed by a strategist •of commanding ability. It is only in the campaigns of this year that Marshal Yoch's genius has been given free and unhampered play, but first and last superior leadership and superior fighting power have been" tho supremo assets of the Allied armies. It is claimed'for the German armies by the Imperial.'Chancellor that they fought to the last as no army ever fought before. The. truth",' plainly, enough written, for all to sec, is that in general, except where 1 they were opposed by small and weak nations,]'(lie German armies have been outfought from the earliest days of thewar.' Sustained by an unwavering faith the Allied armies were laying sure foundations: of victory in the now distant days-'wheh''victory itself seemed very far away.