PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 15, 12 October 1918, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Even by the standards the Allied armies have set since they resumed the offensive in July the British drive on Lc Cateau is a phenomenal achievement. Whatever the enemy's plans may be, and even if he had determined before the British attack opened upon an early retirement to a line south from Antwerp, or from the Dutch frontier, he had every possible motive for offering a firm and determined resistance on the approaches to Lc Cateau. It was imperatively necessary from his point of view that Le Cateau should be retained by a good margin. His utter failure to offer such a resistance as the case demanded is the most striking indication yet afforded of the extent to which his organisation has deteriorated under the shattering blows and constantlyrising pressure of the Allied offensive. It was shown yesterday that the German armies on the front covering Lc, Cateau bad suffered an overwhelming defeat, but the sequel appears to have been a state of affairs not far removed from a (rout. 'In their initial onset the British armies had to overcome the resistance of twenty-three German divibut the stages of the battle described in to-day's reports werc not an attack, but a swift pursuit. The latest report from Sir Douglas Haig which is in hand at time of writing states _ that the British troops are within two miles of Le Cateau.- This means an advance 'of twelve' miles from, the front on which the attack opened on Tuesday and .in an area which .the Germans had the best possible reasons for contesting- foot' by. foot. Such an advance was only made possible by a disastrous failure and collapse of the enemy's defensive organisation.

■.- M. Mabcel Hutin is credited today with the statement that owing to the rapidity of the Allied attack completely upsetting' the arrangements for the .withdrawal large numbers of Germans, for the first time during the, war, threw down their .arms., The exact meaning of these observations is not _ quite clear. The surrender of considerable bodies of German troops, cut off from their main body' ■ b'j; Allied attacking .forces, or sacrificed as rearguards, is'not,''.of course, a new feature. But there is a very material difference between the surrender of troops cut off or. deliberately, sacrificed in the course'of a retreat and the voluntary surrender of troops who arc in a position if they so desire to go on fighting.' It seems likely that. M. Hu'tin is referring to surrenders in'the fatter category when he speaks/about large numbers of German .troops "for the first time during the war" throwing clown their 'arms. "If'it is true that after the enemy's initial' defeat on the front west of Lc Gateau any large proportion -of • his • troops refused to continue, the struggle the fact puts his prospects in an even darker light than the dangerous invasion of his main communications which is the obvious and immediate result of tho battle. Any. plans of retreat to a shortened line that LunENnoiiFF may form will count for little if the ; rank and file of the German armies show an increasing disposition to seek .the shelter of the Allied lines.

It is plain in any case that the splendid'.thrust of the British armies is calculated to compel the enemy to undertake an immediate retreat in France and Flanders, and also that it • seriously impairs his prospects of carrying out such a movement in unbroken array. Looking at the map which .appears on another page to-day it will he seen that the attack in which the British "have .so closely approached Le Gateau lias driven a broad and hold wedge into the_ enemy front cast of the Cambrai-St. Qucntin area. North and south of this wedge the German defensive line is exceedingly strong. Although it is outflanked and menaced on the north as well as on the south, the salient which turns round Lille and Douai is protected by elaborate field fortifications supplemented in places by marshy river valleys, which constitute serious obtaclcs to attack. Below St. Qucntin also the German line is of formidable strength. It is covered in part by the flooded valley of the Oisc, and includes' the formidable

St. .Gobaiii (south of La Fere), which is regarded as practically impregnable to frontal attack. But now that a great breach has been opened in the enemy's front to the vicinity of Lc Gateau, the Lille salient and the southern salient, which turns round the St. Gobain ■massif are capable of becoming mere death-traps. As compared with the conditions that.existed at the beginning, of the week the enemy's front has . been greatly lengthened and the strength of his positions north and south of the area into which the wedge has been driven counts for little in view of the imminent clanger of their being attacked in flank and rear.

This danger is particularly apparent at the moment in the case of the St. Gobain massif and other sections of the German front'based on Laon. . Seconding, the British attack further north, the. French, "in the St. . Quc'ntin - area are pushing forward east of that-centre. As news stands they are five miles cast of St. Quentin and little more than two miles distant from_ llibcmont, a railway junction which has an important place in the communications supplying the enemy front further south. "In view'of the pace at which events arc moving the threat to the northern 'flank of his present front along the.Oise and'o'rt the St. Gobain massif is one the enemy can hardly afford to disregard. ,'. ' . ' ..

The danger of flank attack on north and south to which the enemy is exposed.as .a result of the British drive on Le Cateau, .-js, of course, liable, to be seriously intensified by an extension of the drive beyond its present limits. At the moment reports speak of a stiffening resistance on the Lc Cateau front, but it is doubtful at least whether -the enemy's utmost efforts will enable him to stabilise his line-in this region for more than a very brief period. One correspondent states .that airmen report a remarkable confusion of troops and. transport moving eastward from Le Cateau, and it seems distinctly probable that the present results of .the British stroke, impressive' as they are, are only an instalment' of greater things'to follow in the near future.

. The prospects '.of the German armies do not look brighter when account is taken of the trend- of the campaign in the region of the Aisne and along' the front eastward to the Meuse valley. Here, as_ in the north, the enemy is defending vital communications by a narrow margin, and though the French and American armies are meeting a stubborn resistance, they are steadily' fighting their way forward. The Germans have lost almost their last foothold in the Argonne Forest, and are being driven back "both east and west of the Mouse, while further west _ the French are day by clay establishing new . bridgeheads north of the rivers on .which the enemy is attempting a defensive stand.