PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 12, 9 October 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

As information stands the latest French victory in the Champagne has resulted in a maximum advance of ten miles on a front of thirty miles. Something is atfia about the retirement improving the enemy's line, but this is subject to the qualification that if .he had been able to retain the lull positions north and easfc of Reims, from which be was so swiftly dislodged, the Allies would have been seriously cramped and hampered in further developing their offensive. Ihe enemy has evacuated a broad salient and straightened his line, but the position now reached is that the French and Americans are far advanced in an attack which will outflank the whole enemy front west of Verdun if it is driven home before the enemy carries out an extended retreat. On the front ofnearly sixty miles, between Reims and the Mcusc, north of Verdun, tho Allies in less than a fortnight have advanced in places to a aepth of ten miles, and nowhere much less than eight miles. Practically the whole of this great tract of territory was heavily , organised for defence,, and although it r is stated that the French and Americans are still faced by formidable lines the enemy evidently has-poor grounds for beinfr confident about the security of his vital flank. , »

Apart from the tremendous leverage exerted by the French, and Americans in the Champagne and further east affairs on the CambraiSfc. Quentin front arc now in such a state that an enemy retreat towards Lc Gateau, 14 miles cast of Cambrai, seems likely to be undertaken at any time, A retreat on this scale would connote the evacuation of the whole south-western area of the enemy salient in France—the area in which Laon junction, supporting the enemy front, is covered on the west by the fortified barrier of the St. Gobain massif. Unofficial reports that the Germans are burning towns on the whole front from Lille to Reims, Laon_ amongst the number, carry an obvious suggestion that a general retreat is under wa-y. If they are accurate these reports at the same time emphasise the necessity of the policy of reprisals in which France is inviting general Allied support.

Some interesting facts are brought out in semi-official advices from Sofia regarding the- conditions of the Bulgarian armistice. One such fact is that although the Bulgarian Army is to be demobilised, three divisions of infantry and four regiments df cavalry are to remain under arms. What employment is designed for these troops is not stated. Since, howover, there is no immediate prospect of the Allies employing Bulgars in the ordinary way in an offensive campaign, it seems not unlikely that the divisions mentioned will be detailed to see that Austro-German contingents in Bulgarian territory retire under the conditions agreed upon and without destroying or interfering with transport facilities. This is a matter in which Allied interests and those of Bulgaria are identical, and it therefore seems probable that this is the actual explanation of the exceptions to the general demobilisation. The stipulation that Turkish troops in Bulgaria shall be allowed to remain is also suggestive. It seems likely in this case that the permission amounts to a command.

Recent ropbrts have made it plain that tanks now take a very important place in.the Allied attacking organisation. An interesting account of the conditions under which they are being ernployed was given by an English writer in mid-August. He observed that the momentous success of the new tactical use of tanks (in the opening attack south of the Somme) would have a vital influence upon the later stages of the campaign. "It was not only that the sudden onslaught of the massed tanks completely demoralised . the Germans in the trenches," he added, "so that their machine-gunners put up a far feebler defence than ever before. When the tanks were through they enabled us to widen the wedge of penetration and to keep it wide, thus overcoming what , has always been the chief difficulty,—that of preventing the formation of a dwindling salient, which tends m time to dwindle, to, nothing. This, as everyone knows, is what has happened in many British offensives. It seems to be impossible to employ a sufficiently powerful and sufficiently extended artillery fire to do what tho tanks accomplished from north of the Somme to south of Montdidicr — namely, quickly to widen out the area of attack. Another notable result of the use of tanks in the battle was a wonderful economy, in infantry, on our Bide, with 1 a high rate of

destruction among the German infantry. The total of the Allied casualties is in all probability loss than the total of German prisoners taken, and that is now put at round about 33,000. The new combined training of tanks, infantry, and aircraft produce'd excellent results. The nests of machine-gunners which tried to hold up our advance by hiding in the fields were quickly spotted by the airmen, who summoned the tanks to deal with them. The result was that the advance went on unchecked for twenty-four hours. The new method employed of bringing up great numbers of tanks at the last moment by train was also a brilliant success in springing a complete surprise on tho Germans. It is now known that the Germans lost more heavily iu proportion to the Allies- than in any previous battle of the war."