The Dominion. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1918. GERMANY'S FALLEN IDOLS

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 8, 4 October 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. FRIDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1918. GERMANY'S FALLEN IDOLS

One result of the later events of the war will bo to -clear up all remaining doubts even in Germany in regard to the> respective, merits of Allied and German generalship. It was part of the myth of invincibility which persisted so long in Germany that her military leaders overtopped and dwarfed those 1 of the Allied nations. This idea, industriously fostered, led to Hindenburg and Ludendorff being rated by their countrymen rather as demigods than as ordinary mortals. It will be interesting to note the effect upon the German people of the unmistakable demonstration now afforded that their idols have feet of clay. That the awakening will be painful is not in_ doubt. Until very recently, certainly until the collapso of the enemy offensive in July, the German people were taught.to repose unquestioning faith in tho allegedly superior genius of their commanders. In the early part of July, tho German Press devoted a ; prreafc deal of space to'attacks and'slighting comments on Foch and the Allied Command in general, and to eulogies upon the, corresponding German organisation. . It was asserted that Foch .was neither an intellectual giant' nor a dominating character, that English critics had described him as "the commander without initiative," and that he lacked an organised Staff. German readers were assured that the Allied unity of command was made useless bv internal rivalries. The Lolcal Av:eir/cr concluded a long article in which it laboured to show that Foch was playintc "the game. of the unlucky gambler" by making the following ambitious claims:—

It is we, however, who since the beerinning of the offensive have dictated to Foch where he shall attack. Ho is no longer master of his decision. When our advanced wedges threaten vulnerable points wo see Foch directing counterattacks against these wedges, protected and secured by which tiie further plans of our Army Command are ripening in spite of the enemy assault.

Bombast, of this nature obtained widespread credence in Germany, and the fact, is suggestive as indicating the probable effect of the plain proof now given that Hindenburg and Luden'ooiut arc hopelessly outclassed by the foremost Allied strategists?. L The proof is conclusive and its effects are bound to be far-reaching. To tho unreflecting multitude in enemy countries, rapidly developing and overwhelming defeat will tell its own story. In the case of those' who arc able to look deeper into the facts the disillusionment and the destruction of confidence it entails will bo even greater. Indeed, _ although events will sneak plainly enough to the multitude, only thoso who are capable of examining and weighing the facts of tho war will realise how hopelessly tho German military leaders have been outclassed and- how badly they have failed. It does not improve -their case that Germany is now being weakened by the loss of allies, and that-her armies (ire now giving way under tho attacks of superior and expanding enemy forces. Even now the odds of force against her are hardly greater than those tho Allies faced and overcame in the perilous early months of the war. A liberal allowance is of course to bo made for the moral factor. The Allied lations and fighting forcc have been wonderfully sustained • from tho outset by the consciousness of a just cause and the knowledge that they aro defending all' that they hold most dear, and against the spirit born of this consciousness and this knowledge Ger,many has been able to set nothing better than a mechanical discipline. But when all such allowances have been made it remains true that defective leadership is in a very large measure responsible for Germany's present disasters and tho assured prospect of her decisive defeat. As events are. shaping on the West front and elsewhere it is obvious enough that tho German commanders are falling far short _of the standards sot by the Allies in their defensive campaigns and that Foch and his subordinates arc making infinitely better use of existing opportunities than the German_ commanders made of opportunities as good or nearly as good in earlier stages of the wai\ But the men who have successively controlled German military policy during the war period arc open also to the much more damaging charge that but for their blunders and waste of opportunities the Allies need never have been permitted to pass from defenco to attack, at all events in existing theatres of war.

It would bo absurdly untrue to say that German military efficiency is wholly a myth, but it is within the facts to say that what is efficient in Germany's military organisation rather emphasises than modifies tho humiliating failure of her principal commanders. There ' is point in an observation lately niado on this subject by Geherai. Maurice: "The successes which Germany has won have not in fact linen due to generalship, tho leading of troops in the field, so much as to careful and thorough planning in the oflice." Germany begun the war elaborately prepared against opponents who were unprepared. She had all tho. advantages of surprise on ia colossal scale. Yet she failed in one groat stage of the war after another to turn her unexampled opportunities and advantages to account. AVhcn her opportunities were renewed by tho- collapso of Russia her military leaders still proved unequal to tho demands made upon them. Their failure is not palliated by the fact that questions of statecraft as well as the organisation of fighting fronts and the conduct of battles were relegat-

cd to their control. It is generally agreed that the division of authority between politicians and soldiers in democratic countries is rather a hindrance than a help in war, and that the principal distinction to bo drawn between Germany and the Allied nations in this connection is that her commanders have at all times had a freer hand and more open opportunities than the soldiers by whom they aro opposed. General Maurics gives adequate expression to the failure of tho Gorman military leaders and the consequences it entails in a passage which is worth quoting:

Germany has had, in fact, a. very fine niuchine directed by very ordinary men, and onco she realises that lier heroes aro no better than other mortals tho whole fabric of confidence, which has enabled her to endure, will begin to crumble. That Hinclonburg and Ludendorff have, failed ill the flame way as Moltke failed is amongst the most pregnant of the events of this war.

This is a rational verdict on the facts, and probably it docs not exaggerate the significance of the proof now afforded the German people that their military leaders arc hopelessly inferior to those who direct the Allied armies. Nothing is better calculated than this revelation to wean tte German nation from the doctrine of brute force— the doctrine upon which Prussian militarism is based.