PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 305, 13 September 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

In Paris, to judge by a message which was published as lato news yesterday, it is token for granted that the present lull on tho West front is' temporary, and that the Allies will vigorously continue their offensive until winter compels them to call a halt. Well-informed opinion, tho message- not credit Marshal Foch with the intention of endeavouring to reduce the Hindenburg line by direct frontal attack. But it was added that all Paris was on tip-toe with expectation as to his next move, and that while many were closely watching General Mangin'k operations around the St. Gobain Forest, others were looking for events beyond Reims, and even beyond Verdun. No attempt was made to show that the opinions thus expressed carry official sanction, but they are obviously in accord with reason and common sense. A belief that the Allies will continuo to strike with all possible forco until the weather breaks for the year is not in any way identified with distempered anticipations of early victory, in the sense of the decisive defeat of the German armies. It of course suits the enemy to suggest that the Allies 'arc as definitely tied to time as ho was in the offensive which opened in March and collapsed disastrously in July. In one of today's cablegrams it is stated that Riotze, tho German Chancellor, and Burian, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, have agreed not to begin peace overtures until Foch's offensive has ended—evidently they are under no delusion that it has already ended for the year. It is added that both the enemy Ministers are convinced that the Allies will fail to break through, and that it will take years of fighting to crush Germany. Tho picture thus called up has little enough reference to the facts, but no doubt every effort will bo made to. popularise, the idea in Germany and Austria that in the present campaign the Allies are faced by. a vanishing opportunity, and that if they fail to win complete victory this year they will be faced by tho prospect of indefinite', stalemate.

Such an outlook conveniently ignores all-important factors—on ono hand the rapidly expanding strength' of the Allies, and on the other tho declining strength and moral of Germany and her vassals. But it is natural that the enemy rulers should now make every effort to convince the people under them that the war is approaching conditions of stalemate, and that fact in itself supplies the Allies with a strong incentive to make tho best possible use of what campaigning weather remains available. To anticipate this year tho , "breakthrough," about which enemy Ministers- aro talking, would be much the same thing as asking for tho moon. _ But though tho Allies have no visible prospect of breaking and rolling up tho German armies during the next few weeks, much may be accomplished short of that achievement whicli will serve to emphasise the enemy's defeat and accentuate both his military and , political problems and difficulties. If the enemy contrives to maintain his stand on tho Hindcnburg line until winter ho may be able to convince his ciyil population for tho time being- that although his aggressive plans have been defeated ho is capablo of indefinitely repelling attack. At the same time, his military problems would be simplified. He would be enabled to make elaborate ' preparations for an orderly and methodical retirement early next year. On the other hand, if he is compelled to make an early withdrawal from the Hindcnburg. line, or even if his hold upon it is further seriously weakened—it is already weakened, by the British conquest of the switch line east of Arras—the menace of the Allied offensive will become much more clearly apparent to all sections in Germany and her vassal States, and whatever plans of defence and orderly retirement the enemy may frame" will be thrown-.moro or less seriously out of gear. Inflicting further defeats upon the enemy tho Allies would cut clown the task to be faced next year; they would increase his difficulties in steadying his armies and civil population during the winter, nntl give him J:lic worst possible conditions in winch to develop his projected peaco offensive. In light of these facts and considerations it may bo taken for granted that tho i Allies will spare no effort to ouv.

phasisc and accentuate tho enemy's defeat before the end of tho present year's campaign, and also that they will allow no opportunity of damaging attack upon the'enemy during the winter to pass them by. Ik regard to tho conditions under which attacks may develop during' tho noxt few weeks speculation ranges somewhat widely. It is not unimportant that uncertainty us to the time and place- the Allies will select for attack, should the weather permit .attack, is likely to bo shared in full measure by the enemy. Tho Hindcnburg line admittedly is exceedingly strong, and tho effect of the British penetration of the formidable defences towards its northern flank is modified for tho time being by the fact that a belt of inundated territory now separates the opposing forces in that' locality. But, looking to the possibilities of the campaign as a whole, mobility and the ability to penetrate or anticipate the designs of the opposing command arc factors at least as important as fortifications. Impressive accounts are given of the improvements the Germans; have effected in the Hindenburg line. Railways have been doubled and additional fortifications have been constructed, including concrete shel.tors which are reputed to be, capable of withstanding bombardment by eight and ten-inch guns. Tho niost formidable defences,, however, will avail tho enemy nothing if his line is breached at some vital part. If his flank were turned by an attack from the Champagne or further east all the labour and material expended in strengthening his line from the North Sea to the Aisno would be thrown away. It is natural, in the circumstances, that I the possibilities of attack in the Champagne or in Lorraine should command attention, but it cannot bo overlooked that the eastward extension of the Allied offensive would hold certain dangers: Disastrously as he has fared in the battles of the last two months tho enemy retains tho advantage of operating on tho interior lines of a salient. Operating as they aro on exterior lines the Allies, if they unduly extended thescope of their offensive, might even now lay themselves open to a damaging return blow. * * * * I On the whole, however, prospects are reasonably open, and would be better but for tho continued bad weather which is reported. Thus far, in spite of his advantage in the matter of communications, the enemy-has conspicuously failed to anticipate and defeat the successive surprise blows struck by the Allies. As matters stand he is seriously handicapped, in defending, those parts of his front'which are visibly threatened, by the knowledge that at any moment he may be called upon to meet attacks in some new quarter.

General Maurice and Colonel Hepington are at present strongly urging the necessity of as rapidly as possible building., up the strength of the British armies in the Western theatre. On general grounds their campaign commands approval, but whether General Maurice is right in deprecating any extension of "Eastern enterprises"'lest demands on tho West should go unsatisfied is a somewhat different, question. It is of material import in this connection that there is a, distinct danger that Germany may attempt to combine "Eastern enterprises" with a defensive stand on a short Western line, and the argument of the extreme "Westerners" that the Allies should concentrate all their energies in the Western theatre is in some respects unconvincing. It will not be forgotten that the school which habitually condemns "Eastern •enterprises" iiki resisted and condemned the institution of the unified command. If tticy are as much astray in regard to the Eastern campaigns as they were in regard to the unified command their views are not of much value.

At present, however, the chief interest of General' Maurice's observations is in his assertion that only lack of numbers prevented Sir Douglas Haig following up his victories of August 8, on the Soramo, and September 2, when the switch line was conquered. Whatever the state of the British reserves may be, this comment is open to exception on the ground that it proceeds from an unduly narrow outlook. The British armies have been working to the Allied plan, and if Genejial Maurice is right, not only the particular operations in which the British have- engaged, bufc.th<*| Allied operations as a whole, have been limited by lack of numbers. In a sense, this is no doubt true. The Allies are still considerably short of the strength they have prospects of attaining next year, when the training of the American armies has reached a more advanced stage. But there is no evidence that the Allied offensive as it was' planned has fallen short of expectations owing to lack of numbers', and some evidence *co the contrary. The brilliant results thus far attained aro in plain sight. In addition, it is known that the Allies are holding considerable reserves at disposal. Nothing has been disclosed about the British and French reserves, but in regard to the third great branch of the united Allied army several material facts aro visible. There are now something like 1,500,000 American soldiers in Franco. Some hundreds of thousands, at least, have had battle experience, and their casualties thus far, including the roll of slightly wounded, total about 50,000. Finally, no very large force of Americans has of late been actively engaged. The operations lately entered upon in the area between the Vesle and the Aisne have not yet attained any great magnitude. In sum these facts can 'hardly mean anything else than that a stronst force of American troops is at call and ready to act at any moment.

With tl\e exception of a. forward movement by tho French north of La Fere, no strikingly . important event on the West front is reported at time of writing. According to an unofficial message they havo reached the right bank the Oise north-cast of Travccy. This, however, means that they are still confronted by the flooded* river valley, and the statement tlv' there are indications of a furthr enemy withdrawal awaits confirm. , ' , ' '<. The British further north !.! -■ slightly advanced in places.