The Dominion. THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1018. AMERICA AND THE AIR WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 304, 12 September 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1018. AMERICA AND THE AIR WAR

iSoim rather depressing stories about t-lio development, of the American aerial programme have found their way over the cables H1 recent days. It has been sajcly amongst other things) that the Liberty motor is "still in smite degree impevfeet," and that America has spent millions on aviation without result, Stleh assertions rest on no particular authority, and are in themselves. little enough calculated to inspire belief. It is certainly not easy to believe that the nation which has so wonderfully exceeded expectations in the matter of raising, training, and transporting troops, in mercantile and naval shipbuilding, and in many other avenues of war effort has failed to make good in dealing with the problems of aerial development, There is no need, to rely upon indirect evidence in this matter. Statements which have been made with .authority definitely establish the fact'that America has made far moro rapid progress in developing the aerial arm than some pessimistic reports on the subject which have recently found currency would imply. It is true that the American Government, has - issued no detailed and comprehensive statement of .what,has been accomplished to date in building aeroplanes and engines and training aviators. Precisely the same might, be said, however, of Britain and France. It is all the more difficult to arrive at an accurate idea of tho, progress of the United, States aviation programme since in this matter as in others, its efforts are co-ordiimted _ with those • of the Allies. For instance, it was stated & few days ago that America- was understood to bo still, dependent upon the Allies for aeroplanes. In itself this does not sound encouraging, but the explanation offers itself that. America is supplying the Allies with aeroplane ehgines and obtaining _ from . them aeroplanes which she is able to'equip with enMajor Baikd, Parliamcntary t Secretary to tho British Air Ministry, informed a questioner in the House of Commons iiofc.lpng ago that Britain had a i considerable number of aeroplanes in store waiting for engines, but that it was anticipated that all these -machines would bo fitted with engines before long. _ Co-ordination on tho lines here indicated is an incidental, though not unimportant, feature in tho complex programme of aerial development. Britain and America aro individually producing both aeroplanes and aeroplane engines in large numbers, but measures of coordination make it possible to increase the aggregate output, and the scheme of co-ordination extends, of course, to other Allied P.owers. Early in July a comprehensive, though not_ detailed, • statement of what America had accomplished to that date in the construction of aircraft was made by Mil. J. D. Ryan, Director of Aircraft •Production in tho United States, speaking on the occasion of - the initial flight of tho first bombing' aeroplane completely manufactured in America, Mb. Ryan said:— ' Behind this 'plnno arc thousands of others already under way. They vero produced by an. American workshop, which during 'May and June last produced as many Liberty motors as Great Britain produced, engines during tho entire year of 1915, at the close of which .England had been seventeen months, at war. Including other types of aircraft engines more motors were produced in our shops in June alone than Great Britain produced during the whole year 1015, ami this is not said in disparagement of Great Britain. Facilities for the manufacture of' aircraft engines and aeroplanes are now being developed with all speed. America has entered a production stage which means quantity production. Our country and its Allies will soon realise tho benefit of such a lighting air force as will satisfy our people and our Allies, and bring consternation to our enemies. ■British authorities may also be quoted as bearing witness to what America has done and is doing to reinforce the Allied aerial forces. In a speech delivered some weeks ago, Sir William Weir, Secretary to the British Air Ministry, observed that in aerial warfare tho assistance tho United States had already rendered in the way of personnel was very great, and that so far as f personnel was concerned he and_ his colleagues had the fullest in the future success of tho American air force. He added that with regard to material Ave might now begin to speak with equal confidence. In particular the results of experiments pjaccd the latest American engine in tho very first line of aero motors. The- fact that official reticence in regard to the progress of the American aviation programme does not cover failure or disappointment, but, is observed as a matter of policy, is emphasised by a correspondent who was recently permitted to review the activities of the United States Bureau of Military Aeronautics, which is headed by BrigadierGenerai, W. L. Kenly. Notwithstanding the brilliant prospects ahead of tho air .service (tho correspondent remarks), General Kenly and his associates ore making no promises or boasts. They prefer, in true regular army style, to "shoot, first, unci explain afterwards." Tho Production Board, composed of civilians, and the military ! section, both are convinced that the best I answer they can givo tho country is results, and both are striving (o that end. Tho former unfortunate boasting of this country about its air programme) has, it luis already been demonstrated, served lo inspire Germany lo redoubled energy in ! solf-dcl'cnce. .For that reason some strong cards now held up tho Allied sleevo will not bo announced until Germany has felt their sting. . .. It is impossible lo escape . . . tho impression of complete co-ordination of all activities with those of tho Allies, each of whom has a representation and an olliee within a fow feet of General lvenly's door. With such facts to go upon it cannot bo doubted that America is making good fipeed in the organisation of a powerful aerial reinforcement. It is impossible to say in so many words what such an addition to their existing air forces as they .have of receiving from tho Unitecl States in the near future will mean lo the Allies, but it is safe to say that the value of this reinforcement will be more than proportioned to the additional numbers of aircraft and' fighting airmen. Absolute command of the' air is still an aspiration, and even a full tide of American assistance will not bring it into near or immediate prospect. So long as Germany remains an organised military power she will always be able to build aeroplanes and train airmen, and no matter how badly her air squadrons may bo outnumbered

| and outclassed she will continue in some degree to dispute the admiralty of the air. Various theories have licen advaiicccl as to the .manlier iii which air power may determine the fa to of the war. "Somo ■people," as an English writc-i- observed recently, "look to the wholesale bombing of great cities creating an overwhelming peace .movement from tho civil population j others picture the achievement of so nearly complete a mastery of the air by one side that the armies of tho enemy would be deprived of the all-imuortant a.criah observation, and, as a consequence, quickly suffer defeat-; another line of reasoning calculates on the paralysing by aircraft of lines of communication so completely that the side weak .in aircraft. would be powerless to striko p.nd helpless in ' defence." Splendidly as the Allied airmen have acquitted themselves from the outset of the war, q.nd great as is tho part they (played and are playing in tho critical campaign which is now drawing to an end, it cannot yet be said that an easy or obvious way to victory is open by any one of the methods just outlined. But though the Allies have not yet gained the decisive command of the air which would bring victory into near prospect, ithey have established a marked superiority in every department of aerial warfare. Aerial forces already play a great part in swaying, though hardly yet in determining, the fate of battles. The development of air power holds in any case indefinite nossibilites. In certain eventualities, as, for instance, if tho Germans attcmjpt a protracted defence of the shortest available line in the Western theatre, tho factor of air power will almost certainly assume supreme and decisive importance. To the enemy his inferiority in tho air is thus in a real sense an earnest of defeat. His worst handicap in aerial warfare is tho knowledge that he is inferior and that his* inferiority will bo intensified as time goes fln. Any possibility of doubt tin this _ point is eliminated by the rapid development of the American aerial programme. Tho development falls, perhaps, a long way short of the extravagant anticipations formed when America became a belligerent, but there is every rea-son to believe that it will add enormously to tho strength of tho Allied aerial forces at a time when aerial forces aro very (possibly _ destined to play a decisive part in tho war.