PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 303, 11 September 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

For the moment' the pace of tho Allied offensive in the Western theatre has slowed. No big movement _is reported officially at time of writing. A New York message which speaks of rapid progress by the- British north of the Arras-Cam-brai road lacks confirmation—possibly "north" has been substituted for "south" by an error in cabling. At all events the only British advance recorded in available official news has been made in tho vicinity of Gouzeacourt, about ten miles 'south-west of Cambrai, and therefore considerably south of tho Arra-s-Cambrai road.. The British troopß have captured Gouzeacourt Wood and a ridge standing within a mile or two or the Hindenburg line.Further south, between St. Quentin and La Fore, the French have extended their foothold east of tnc Orozat' Canal, and have crossed it at a new point. It is stated that their patrols have closely approached .La which, apart from its importance in other 1 respects, marks the northern flank of the St. Gobain massif, and arc within four miles of St. Quentin. The only other events of any > importance reported at time of writing are heavy coun-ter-attacks by the Germans between the Oiso and the Aisne, and moro especially between the Ailotte and tho Aisne, that is to say, on tho front across tho heights of the Aisne .where the French adva-nco' threatens the flank of the Chemin des Dames ridge, and Laon. On many parts of tho front the Germans in recent days have been hastily withdrawing their artillery out of harm's way. South-west of Laon they are opposing massed batteries and also heavy concentrations of troops to _ the French advance, and aro now vigorously counter-attacking. The motivo of these tactics is obvious. On this part of the front they have no margin of territory to come and go upon—at all events while retaining and Laon is vital to tho stability of a great part of their front to the north and to tho cast. As reports stand the German counter-attacks havo uniformly failed, bjut in itself the problem of _ breaking .through tho defences which'immediately cover Laon is formidable, n # * « The contrast between 'the. conditions now', in ovidence and those which have obtained in recent weeks is of course due mainly to the fact that tho retreating German armies have now in most places reached a zone of prepared defences. Another factor is mentioned to-day by Me. Philip Gibbs. "As wc approach the Hindenburg line," he- observes, "the enemy is drawing thence strong reinforcements of fresh troops to replace tho tired retreating divisions, which largely accounts for his stiffened resistance." Although this factor is no doubt important, it is evident that if the enemy had any really large body of reserves at disposal ho would before now have turned them to some bet/ter account than that of i mercly_ taking the strain from his retiring divisions as they reach a defensivo line. It obviously must count for a good deal •in the ensuing stage of the campaign that the enemy, after being pushed back rapidly through a belt of country in which he had no opportunity of constructing serviceable defensivo positions,! has reached a line of defences elaborately planned and completed at leisure. As matters stand thisidiange in conditions applies to a long stretch of battlcfront, from west of Cambrai to the Aisne. Along practically the whole of this front the Germans are now resisting in or near the old Allied trenches opposite tiie Hindenburg line'. It docs not by any means_ follow, however, that they have terminated their retreat on a secure defensive line, or that there i 6 bound to be a long break in the Allied offensive.

Such a break, if it lasted for any length of time, would mean that the Allied offensive had reached its culminating point so far as this year's campaign is concerned. But the Germans arc by no means assured of a respite. All that is demonstrated as matters stand is that they arc now in a position to check tho widespread pursuit which during the last few weeks has swept them irresistibly eastward. Tho Allies w r ill hardly sweep over tho unbroken sections of the Hindenburg lino in the light and mobile array in which they nave lately been advancing, aud no doubt even in the areas in which his main defences havo been dangerously, penetrated—notably on the approaches to Douai and Cambrai—the enemy is capable of offering such a resistance as could only be overcome by organised and powerful attack's. But although the Allies' pursuit is at an end for the time being, the possibility is still quite open that they may contrive in the weeks of fine weather that remain available to break up the enemy's defensive organisation once more and compel him to undertake a further retreat.

The main question at stake is whether the Allies are so far superior to the enemy in resources and initiative as to be able, to continue tho

staggering blows which thus far havo told upon him with ever-increasing elfcct. The question will only he definitely answered by events, but available evidence distinctly warrants a hopeful outlook. Plain evidence of the enemy's relative weakness and of tho derangement of his plans is afforded in the course of the offensive to its present stage. Not only has he been dislodged from nearly all the territory west of his best available defensive line, but the lino itself has been penetrated in an area where its firm defence was essential to the security of his main communications. Admittedly he is still able .to offer a formidable resistance at any point where he anticipates and is prepared to meet attack, but whether he is capable of maintaining his present defensive line, as a whole to the end of his present campaign is another question. Political and military considerations, alike impel him to make every effort to stem the Allied offensive in the positions to which he has now withdrawn, but assuming that the Allies have considerable reserves at disposal, they should have reasonably good prospoets of extending their offensive well beyond its.present stage before winter descends. Tho enemy is bound to concentrate heavily in defence of such- threatened sections of his line as the approaches to Douai and Cambrai, and the area south-west of 1 JLaon. Tho Allies, on the other hand, have a fairly wide freedom of choico in selecting points of attack, and corresponding opportunities of reaping the benefits of surprise. One very important factor is the weather. An unusually early arrival of bad weather might creato a far moro serious obstacle to the further development of tho Allied offensivo than the Hindenburg line. But under normal conditions from four to six weeks of good weather should still be in prospect. So much granted, the offensive should still havo a considerable course to run before tho Allies arc perforce brought to a halt. * # * * A French ■communique just received reports a very considerable advance cast of the Crozat Canal, on the approaches to St. Quentin. and La Fere. At Hill 103, south and slightly west of St. Quentin, the attacking troops are little more than three miles distant from St. Quentin. Further south, at Bed Farm, they are within two miles .of La Fere. The French arc on tho crest of the western part of one of a series of ridges covering the area between _ St. Quentin and tho Oisc, and their advance a-s a whole in this region threatens tho northern flank of the St. Gobain mtssij and Laon. The Germans, however, are still west of the Hindenburg line in this region, and along a considerable part. of tho front the flooded valley of> the Oise constitutes a serious obstacle.