The Dominion. SATURDAY, AUGUST 31, 1918. GERMANY'S EASTERN ' SCHEMES

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 294, 31 August 1918, Page 6

The Dominion. SATURDAY, AUGUST 31, 1918. GERMANY'S EASTERN ' SCHEMES

How .far Germany's schemes of Eastern expansion have been affected, or are likely to be, by her developing - defeat in the Western theatre it is impossible at present to say. It is a matter not 'open to doubt, however, that the Allies will' not succeed in establishing the Stable world-peace at which they aim unless at theend of the war they are in a position to dictate conditions of settlement not only in Western Europe, but in Eastern Europe and Asia as well. Even while Germany still had high hopes of an overwhelming military victory in France and Flanders, it was freely recognised by-many protagonists of Prussian militarism that such a victory would not in itself give her the _ world dominion to which she aspires. With the British armies driven out of France, and France .herself beaten to her knees-, it would still _ remain to fine! an answer to British and American sea. power. That answer it was hoped by men who have a big part, in shaping German policy. and action would ho found partly in the exploitation of Russia, but to a more important degree in a conquering march to the East which would give Germany assured access .to the undeveloped rogions of Central Asia and to the near neighbourhood of the frontiers of India. In reply' to widely-ex-pressed fears that no German victories on land could break-the naval blockade and. give Germany access to the sources of raw materials; ; t was contended that she would stillbo able "to strike successfully at Egypt on the one hand, and, on the . other hand, through Persia, and Afghanistan at India." A compact statement of'the - new doctrine was made- by Dr. Paw, Rohkbach in an article -in-the- Deutsche-Politic He pictured: England as complacently contemplating the complete' overthrow of France and Italv in the belief, that she could still" win the war by naval and economic blockade, but added that there was a big hole in the English calculation. ■

, llmhple [he continued] is in the'.East. •• • .Tho English,.who want to frighten us with their calculation of what would Happen in the event of the withdrawal ot tho English, troops from Franco, behave as if conditions in the East would remain as they are to-day if tho Continental war'were to cease for us;' But !t willnot ,1C so >" on the contrary, everything m the East will undergo a rapid and thorough change in our favour, and to the detriment of England, if even a l>avt of the gigantic technical resources winch are now employed in the European theatre of war can be transferred to the East. . . . There must be a complete reversal of tho situation on the Euphrates and in Palestine as soon as we can effect J; Kreat increase in our strength there. ■Hie English may 'accumulate iu Ejypt whatever they like; they are lost as soon as we come to the. help of the Turks with.nil our strength.''. . . Tl'erewo have in. any case, and especially if the war in Europo ceases for us, the possibility of realising peace through tho. Western direction of our aims. These aims, as we know, are .the bursting, of the geographical prison in which England confines ns by her blocking position in tho North Sea.

Since these words were penned the. war has passed through a short but crucial phase in which Germany has been going rapidly downhill. Wc may now with some confidence rulo out of account the possibility of Germany going to. tlic "help" of Turkey with all her strength. Not only is Germany in process of defeat in the decisive theatre, but the war is developing under conditions which go far to preclude the possibility of a stalemate which would enable her to detach big forces from the- West front with a view to active aggression in Asia. Marshal Fqch's attacking armies are doing not a little to shatter the German dreams which crystallise in the phrase: "Hamburg to Herat." It does not by any means follow, however, that the Allies can now afford to regard Germany's schemes of Eastern penetration and conquest with indifference. Although it is no longer likely, that-she will be able to send large military forces into Asia, the problem of defeating her Eastern designs still has its serious aspects. Already, in conjunction with' her Ottoman Allies, she has gained an extended foothold m the Caucasus, and the Turks arc established also in the north-west-ern confines of Persia. From this' point_ it would have been a comparatively simple matter for Germany, had no obstacle been thrown in her way, to penetrate into Turkestan, and through Persia to Afghanistan and Baluchistani Military force is not her only instrument in developing this enterprise; Her agents have long been working amongst such of the Mohammedan tribes of Asia as they have been i able to reach, and in various ways conducting an insidious propaganda. Had nothing been done to till the place that Russia left vacant when .she abandoned the Caucasian front it is very probable that Germany might have gained by such methods a position of influence in Persia and the regions beyond the Caspian Sea from which it would have been difficult to dislodge her by any treaty of peace. Of late, however, it has been demonstrated that the Allies arc by no means blind to the dangers involved in Germany's new eastward drive. British forces are operating in North-western Persia, in the region extending westward from the south-western extremity of the Caspian Sea, and'a comparatively small- part of Persia is left open to Turco-German penetration. An advanced British detachment is assisting to hold Baku, the eastern terminal of the Trans-Caucasian railway. Necessarily the forces employed in this way are small, and they are operating at the end of enormously extended lines of communication traversing difficult country. But it is probable, all • the more so in view of Germany's increasing difficulties in the Westerntheatre, that the enemy action to be countered is nearly ;is much political as military, and that comparatively small British detachments may contrive to raise an effective barrier to enemy penetration in North-western Persia, if not in the Caucasus. At all events Britain is plainly called upon to make whatever efforts arc necessary to safeguard the integrity and independence of Persia and other buffer States on the approaches to .Ihdiat Even in view of the. engrossing calls that are being made upon Gcr-

man energy and resources in the Western theatre, the task would bo lUOrc formidable than it is but for the dissensions that have arisen between Germany and Turkey. As affairs are shaping, it is upon Turkey that Germany must chiefly rely to forward her schemes of Eastern penetration, but Turkey lias shown an inconvenient disposition to assert her own claims to a position of commanding influence on the Black Sea. German newspapers have lately been informing her in plain terms that she must not venture to stand in the way of German ambitions. The Kreuz ZcUitnr/, for instance, asserted recently that Turkey coveted the Crimea and its ports at the expense of the Ukraine, and desired to have the Caucasus as a barrier ' against Russia and a safeguard of her communications with Persia. All this, the German journal bluntly observed, did not suit German •iutorests. Germany wishes to employ Turkey in opening the new'road to the East upon which she has set her.mind, but she has no thought of allowing Turkey to gain a position of power and influence as keeper of the gate. A continued absenco of events in the Baku ', region and in North-western Persia suggests that these dissensions arc tending to paralyse enemy action. It is perhaps the most promising feature of the Eastern situation that Turkey, after her disastrous defeats in Palestine and Mesopotamia, and her expulsion from Hejaz, has been shown as plainlyas possible that she is regarded by Germany simply as a tool to be used and cast aside when its usefulness has denarteol.