"BEARD SINGEING"

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 292, 29 August 1918, Page 6

"BEARD SINGEING"

MANY HISTORIC "SIDE-SHOWS"

THE ZEEBRUGGE RAID, AND OTHERS

(By Hector C. By water, in "The ' Navy.")

Some of tlio mosfc fascinating pages of nayal history are those recording 1 minor operations which, may bo Massed ' as "side-shows." Every schoolboy lias ' been thrilled by the exploits of Drake, ' Nelson, and "Cochrane the Dauntless," all of whom planned and oxccr.ted, not | with unfailing success, daring raids into heavily-fortified enemy strongholds. Cochrane, particularly, had a perfect genius for this sort of warfare. He ; spent his leisure, devising new methods of outwitting the foe. He was a past- . master in the art of handling small ' ciaft, and probably would have chosen a-frigate command, in place of that of | n line-of-battle ship. .Give him a fast and well-armed frigate, or for thelmat- ' ter of that a handy brig, and a few i fireships, and 110 could always be de--1 pendeu upon to make things uncom- [ monly lively tfor his opponents. Were Cochrane alivo to-day he would un- • doubtedly bo one of the best cruiser or destroyer leaders, and a torpedo ; expert to boot. And we can easily imagine him sitting down to map out . divers schemes for administering pain--1 ful prods to the Germans behind their ; "impregnable" batteries and rnine- - fields. Drake had the eamo charac- . teristics. He laughed at elaborate . shore defences, and repeatedly demonstrated that no land fortifications could | keep him out of a harbour which sheltered some tempting prize or other. Nelson, too, had a marked fondness for operations of the "beard singeing" variety. But it cannot be said tliat' fortune smiled upon those enterprises of his, and in tlie end ho came lound to'tho orthodox view that ships wero built to fight ships, not forts, and that i.aval detachments cannot do the work of armies. If Nelson were a modern British admiral, 1 do not think lie would be an adherent of the "diggingout 1 ' school. Cutting-out Exploits. The recent blocking operations against German naval bases on the lnanders coast have naturally evoked comparisons with the cut ting-out exploits in days of old. But, in truth, there is scarcely any ground for such a comparison. Conditions have altered fundamentally since the Nebonian era. War ill those days, at sea and on' land, was dominated almost completely by the human element. Mechanics entered 'into it scarcely at all. The weapons were -uniformly primitive. Firearms had mado little progress for three centuries, and in the British Navy, at all events,- boarding wa s still tho favourite method of deciding a sea battle. There was no menace under water or overhead, and the heaviest |?uns were impotent at more than a mile. Remembering these things we can see at oneo how difficult it is to find a satisfactory parallel to the recent blocking enterprise at Zeebruggo and Ostend, where both the attack and defenco were conducted with all the aids which _ modern science has placed at the "fighting man's disposal. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that we cannot do full justice to the wonderful pieco of work accomplished on the Belgian coast unless we recall the three famous exploits of tho lust groat war which resembled this operation tho most closely. Tho-three examples are, of course, Nelson's raids on Tenerilfe and Boulogne, both unqualified failures; and Cochrane's work with the fireships in Basque Roads, which was brilliantly successful. Toneriffe. It was in July, 1797, that Nelson's squadron of sevou vessels (including threo "seventy-lours") arrived off Tencrifle with tho object of seizing that island. Tho key position was the liieb ground commanding tho fort of Vera Cruz. The original plan was to laud under coyer of night a body of seamen and marines, who were to storm- the heights and thus make the fort untenable. But a heavy sui'f foiled this project, and as the day broke, revealing tiie presence of the squadron to the Spaniards, all hopes of a surDriso were at an end. Nelson, however, refused to abandon the expedition, and on tha following night the boats of 'tho fleet, manned by about a thousand men, rowed silently for the mole. Alison tells what followed in graphic detail. The boats were discovered when just half a gun-shot from the molo head, "here they were to land. A tremendous lire was opened upon them from forty guns .and thousands of muskets. Nelson and Fremantle, with five boats, gained the mole, liinded with great rapidity, drove back the garrison, and spiked tho guus. But the mole was swept by a murderous fusillade, which struck down most of tho landing party, including Nelson himself, whose right arm was so mangled that it had.to'be amputated. One ol the boats was sunk, and tho remainder were compelled to withdraw without bavin" achieved anything of value. Tivo other boats, under Troubridge and Waller, tailed to find the mole, but managed to get ashore near .the citadel. As all their powder had' boon soaked by the surf, cutlasses were their sole effcctivo weapons. }et these 340 gallant men pushed on till they reached tho great square of the town, the appointed rendezvous ior all tho storming parties. For two hours they waited in vain for the other columns who were to como by way of the mole. Aftoi' a heroic but manifestly futile attempt to storm tne citadol, JTrcinaiitlo forcoci to capitulate. The Spanish Governor allowed them to re-embark upon a pledge being given that no further attack would be made on the Canary Islands. The Spaniards behaved 'with t-iit; utmost chivalry on this occasion, and Southey records how a Spauish youth stripped himself of his shirt to make bandages for (lie English wounded. Thoi'e w'ero 250 casualties in this ■attack, which was candidly acknowledged to have ended iu disaster. Nelson arid Boulogne. Four years later, in, August, 1801, the British Governmei.t decided io attempt something against the flotilla of gunboats aiid Hat-bottomed boats which Napoleon had collected in the Scheldt and at Dunkirk ami Boulogne for the invasion of England. Accordingly a powerful fleet of boats and light vessels was made ready iu the Downs, and the command of the expedition v.as given to Lord Nelson, lie himself was in favour cf an attack at Flushing, but he was overruled by the Cabinet, who insisted on making Boulogne the objective. Much ' against his inclination. Nelson complied. Following a reconnaissance the main assault was delivered at nightfall on Augustus. Hut the French, guessing what was in the wind, had i taken every possible' measure to resist < tile attack. Kvery vessel had an outboard boom of iron spikes, nettings were 1 braced op to their lower yards, they were firmly moored head to stern i across the in.,nth of the harbour, an- i cliorcd to ground moorings, and to one another, and 'very vessel had a special ' guard of a hundi-d each uf I .whom was supplied wii'i il-reo mux- < kets. Besides all this, ill" ilotilla w'as : covered by strong shore batteries,, and ; the headlands were crowned with artil- i lery. Four divisions of boats began ( tie attack at midnight, hut owing" to i tho darkness' aim rapid tide, only one i division (Captain Parker's) came into l action at tV appointed time. Ho and 1

lus mei. valiantly strove to board the hostile ships, but tho nettings baffled thorn, 9nd they were mowed down in scores by the torrent of musketry. One of tho French commanders, with characteristic hailed tho approaching boats in English: "Lot mo advise you, bravo Englishmen, to keep off," he called. "You can do nothing hero; '.o is only shedding the blood of gallant men to attempt it." Tho fight continued, however, for four hours, after which tho boats had to retire with nearly 200 casualties. Nelson, who ought to have been in a position to judgo, declared that "If all tho boats J could havo arrived at their destined ; points at tho periods assigned to them, not all tho chains in France could ' have prevented our men from bringing i off the whole of the vessels." Considering the formidable nature of tho de- ' J onces, one does not find it easy to 1 .share tho great seaman's confidence. ' Cochrane's Exploits. ' Cochrane's wonderful exploit at ' Basque Roads took place in April, 180!), [ i.e., three and a half years after Tra- , fo'g ar. Admiral Villaumcz, having ; eluded the British cruisers off Brest, \ btole out of that port and succeeded in reaching the Basque Road, a protect- . td anchorage in the Isle d'Aix. Thence ho was to sail to relief of Martinique, . which was threatened by the British, j But meanwhile Lord Gambier arrived with eleven sail of the line, and, as . the shoals and batteries made a direct , attack unduly hazardous, he dotermih- , ed to "smoke out" the French admiral . with fireships. The position of the _ French fleet was very strong. On the , one side they were protected by the , batteries of the Isle d'Aix, on the . other l by the guns of Oleron. The , place was infested by shoals, and navi- ' Ration a highly delicate business. [ Twelve fireships having been prepared iu England and sent out, Lord Cochrane was appointed to command the . attack, which' was launched at dusk ' on April 11. Having witnessed tho .i arrival of the fireships, tho French knew | quite well what was in contemplation, i and had prepared a strong defence. A , boom of cables and chains, secured at . each end by five-ton anchors, was stretched • across the lino of the fleet at a distance of some 100 yards. All t tho boats- of tho fleet, numbering 73, lay near the boom in readiness to board and tow away tho fireships. Favoured by a strong breeze blowing in from the, sea the fireships .got under way and bore down rapidly on their vic--1 tims. The leading vessel, commanded 1 by Cochrane in person, had on board 1500 barrels erf powder and 400 shells. It was followed by the "Mediator," which broke through tho boom. At this moment the wind failed, and consequently several of the fireships blew up at a distance which rendered tliem harmless to the enemy. But the intrepid crew of the "Mediator" stuck to their ship until she was almost among the enemy, and were, in fact, blown out o'f her when she exploded. The scene that followed must have been appalling in its grandeur. Through the gap in the boom came other fireships, wrapped in flames. One fell aboard the French flagship, Ooeaii, to which the flames instantly spread. All the ships slipped their cables and promptly drove ashore. At daybreak all but two were hard and fast aground, and it is certain that Yillaumez's squadron would have been totally annihilated had Lord Gambier advanced with his fleet into tho roads. But the British admiral lacked the decision to follow up the blow, and although Cochrane himself, with liis frigate lirpeiieuse and a few gunboats, sailed in and destroyed four of the stranded vessels, the remainder were refloated during the high tides a few days later, and were subsequently warped into a sate anchorage. Owing, therefore, to Gambier'e lack of resolution, Cochrane was unable to reap the full fruits of his gallant and audacious deed. Old and the New. Such, in brief, were the three naval deeds of tho past which have been widely referred to in connection with the blocking raids on Ostend l and Zecbrugge. _ But without in the least disparaging the skill and heroism displayed by the British seamen at Teneliffe, Botilogno, and Basque ltoad, I do not think any of those exploits can be placed in the same category as the operations off tho Flanders coast. The development of military science has been such as to favour tho defence more than tho offensive. The progress of artillery has, made almost literally true the Napoleonic axiom: "Un canon a terre vaut un vaisseau a lanier." A single machine-gun, manned by a determined crew, can hold up 'a regiment. A single battery of heavy ccastal guns, well masked and protected, can deny approach to a whole squadron o ! f ironclads. Coiisidev, then, tile tremendous difficulty of" the task that confronted Admiral Keyes.. For threo and a half years tho . Germans had been steadily consolidating their positions on the Flemish seaboard. Not only Ostend and Zeebruggo themselves, but every mile of coast between theso ports, had been fortified and armed with guns of the most powerful description. No fewer than. 160 guns —ranging from the 15-inch monsters which can throw their projectiles a distance of 25 miles, to G-inch quick-firers —were massed along this short stretch ol' coast, while smaller weapons and machine-guns were too numerous to be counted. The channels leading into Ostend and Zeebrugge were thickly sewn with mines, only a narrow passage being left open for the German Üboats and destroyers. And day and night a vigilant watch was kept'at sea by German light craft and aeroplanes. Even without these artificial obstacles it would not have been easy for large ships ty approach the coast, for it is beset with shoals and shifting sands, and tho tortuous fairway is no longer indicated by navigation marks. An Achievement Without Parallel. Notwithstanding the almost incrediblo difficulties and hazards of which they were fully aware, Admiral Keyes and his colleagues conceived the plan of forcing an entrance into tho German bases and. sealing tliem up. Little encouragement was to be derived from a study of previous blocking attempts at Santiago and Port Arthur. The gallant story of Captain Ilobson, and the Merriniac is well known, but it is not so generally known that during the siege of Port Arthur the Japanese made three separate attempts to bottle up tho Russian Fleet, and sank 21 large steamers as block ships, without attaining tho smallest measure of success. At Zeebrugge, where the dofence was infinitely stronger and the navigation difficulties exceptionally severe, two .out of the three bloekships employed gained tfieir objective and were sunk almost precisely in the appointed position. At Ostend, where a fickle wind frustrated tho first, attack, the second attempt was completely successful. Admiral Keyes and the officers associated with him have established a naval precedent. They have done what nine students out-of ton , would have roundly declared to be impossible. ,Next to tho magnificent ■ audacity of the scheme and tho sublime courage with which it wijs executed, tlio perfect scientific co-operation (.f all concerned commands our admiration, "s an example of faultless staff work it- stands unrivalled. Tho huge cloud of artificial fog, under cover of which She bloekships and their escorts advanced unseen; the storming of Zee- ' Irivrtre imi]« by the men from the Vin- | dictive, Iris, and Daffodil, who held the 1 structure -'for nearly two hours under i a tornado of fire at point-blank range; I the demolition of the viaduct by an 1 eld submarine charged with explosives; j and tho withdrawal of the Vindietivo and consorts from what must have | I proved a deathtrap had the Germans j kept their heads—all theso incidents I,

have been vividly described in uie Press, together with the second attack at Ostend. ivhero the Vindictive eaino to a glorious end. The entire aifair was an achievement without i parallel in the naval annals of the world, a veritable masterpiece of seamanship, and as such it will assuredly be treated by future historians. Its immediate eflcct lias been to arouse grave doubts in the enemy's mind as to the safety of the foundations on which his vvholo naval policy is based.