FOCH'S PHILOSOPHY OF VICTORY

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 292, 29 August 1918, Page 5

FOCH'S PHILOSOPHY OF VICTORY

SECRETS OF HIS STRATEGY

MORAL EFFECT DECIDES

(By .Charles Whibloy, in "Blackwood's Magazine.") In what consists tho combination of qualities which ensures victory? Is.it in the losses which we inflict upon tho enemy? Or is it in moro and better guns, in the sniperiprity of the ma- ' terials of war? General Foch savs tho battle is won by none of theso tilings. ' "Ninety thousand conquered men,retire before ninety thousand conquering men only because tlioy have had enough, because they are demoralised, at tho end of their moral resistance." For General Foch it is a question of "moral" alone. He quotes with approval tile memorable saying of Joseph do Maistre: "A battle lost is a battle which the army believes to be lost, for a battle cannot bo lost materially. 1 ' Therefore it is morally that it is lost. But then it is also morally that it is gained, and we can prolong tho aphorism thus: A battlo gained is a battle in which tho army refuses to admit itself beaten. All the evidence goes to prove the capital importance of "moral" in war. Cardot, von der Goltz, Bugeaud (with his "0, Moral Power, thou art the queen of armies!"), are of one opinion. "To conquei' is to advance," said Frederick, and Joseph de Maistre, accepting the statement, asks: "But who is lie who advances? It is he ■whoso conscience and countenance makes tho other side retreat.'' And General Foch gives it mathematical expression: War equals ' department of moral force. Victory equals moral superiority in the conqueror; moral depression in the conquered. Battle equals the straggle of two wills." Moral Superiority. For our army to be victorious, then, it must have a "moral" superior to that of its adversary, or the high command must impart it. The will to conquer is tho first condition of victoryy and therefore tho first duty of the soldier, and it is with this supremo resolution that the commander mustinspire his men. Thence follows the importance of the Generalissimo, the man who has the gifts of inspiration and command. And, as always,' General Foch' quotes Napoleon to his purpose. "It was not tho Roman legions which conquered Gaul," wroto the Emperor, "but Caesar. Jt was not the Carthaginian soldiers who. made Rome tremble, but Hannibal. It was not the Macedonian phalanx which penetrated India, but Alexander. It was not the French Army which reached the Weser and tho Inn, but: Turenne. . It was riot the Prussian soldiers who defended their country for seven years against the three most formidable Powers in Europe; it was Frederick the Great."-

And .history does no less than justice when it gives. the praise of victory, the blame of defeat, to the generals who have commanded their armies in the

field. For it is in the influence of the command, in the enthusiasm communicated by it; that wo must seek and find an explanation for the unconscious movements of masses of men, in these solemn moments when, in General Foch's admirable phrase, "an army in the field/ without' knowing why. feels itself carried forward as though it were gliding on an inclined plane." We can only hope that such a solemn moment may come presently to the armies of the Allies, that General Foch's influence and enthusiasm, communicat-' ed to them all, will move thorn unconsciously to the goal of victory. Force of soulin the commander, a high "moral" in tho soldier —without these no army can hope to ■ conquer. Or, as General Foch sums it up: "No victory is possible without a vigorou? command, greedy cf responsibilities and I'eady for h'oth fenterpriscs, possessing and inspiring in all tho energy and ix-solution to. go to tho very end, without personal action rendered in good will, without judgment, without freedam of spirit (in the midst of danger) —gifts natural in tho highly-endowed' man,_ in tho general born, advantages acquired by work and reflection in tho ordinary maii." But horo General Focli _ speaks tho necessary word of warning. A good general does not fight for the sake of fighting! "Tf the will to conquer is necessary to engage a battle with _ any chance of success, the Generalissimo is criminal to engage oraccept, it without the superior ■ will\whieh gives to all direction and impulsion. And if the battle i s imposed upon him by inevitable circumstances, he must decide to fight and to conquer all tho same." For let it be remembered that in success or .'failure we reap the reward of our qualities or pay the penalty of our faults. For li: reality, as General Focli concludes, "the great events of history, the disasters which it, records in some of its pages, such as the destruction of the French power in 1870, are 1 never accidents, but rather the results of superior and general causes, such as the forgetfulness of the commonest moral and intellectual truths, or tho abandonment of the activity o',f mind and body which constitute tho life and health of armies." That conclusion all will approve; by that test—superior activity of iiimd and body—we are content to be tried, and we await the issuo cf the conflict with Germany in tranquil confidence of spirit. Lsssens from Xenophon. And since it is essential.to demoralise |tho enemy, how, asks General Foch, shall this be achieved P A passage from Xenophon, whom he constantly cites with respect, helps to solvo the problom. "Whatever is," says the Greek writer, "the less clearly it is forseen, ■tho moro it causes pleasure or fear. Nowhere is this more plainly evident than in war, where surpriso strikes with terror even those who aro by far tlio Stronger"—strikes them with" that cold terror which descends upon the stcut'est heart, freezes it, and persuades it that it is vanquished. And surprise is fatal to au enemy, bccausc.it robs him of the possibility of reflection and of discussion. Now tho development of the idea of surpriso may appear in scv'eral forms and shapes. A new weapon of war may ensure it, though new weapons are hard to come by. Or a sudden appearance of a,force larger than tlio adversary's may. do the work, or a concentration of forces upon a point at which the adversary is not ready instantaneously to parry the blow. " But if the method bo various, its aim is al!wiiys to produce, the samo moral effect upon the enemy : terror, by creating in him, at the swift apparition of unexpected and incontestably powerful lueans, the sentiment of impotence, the roiiyiction that lie cannot conouer— that is to sa.v, that he is conquered. And this supreme blow of unexpected vk'our need not lie directed upon the whole of the enemy's army. For an army fs an animate and organised heme;. But who savs organism snys a collection oF organs, of which the hea'tli and well-being are neeessnrv to the life of the individual, and of which the lor's, even/ of a single one, leads to death. Thus'we arrive at tho necessity of a supreme blow delivered at one point, since, as Napoleon said, "it S'lllieeii for victory to bo stronger at a given point at a given moment"; or, a; General J'ocli sums up the battle, "a, vrt'j which aims at the ,'olion, intentional, resolute, sudden, jnd energetic, of masses of troops upon a chosen ' point." 1 Thus General Focli beliefs that the fasue of war depends rather upon : Imoral and spiritual than upon mater- '

ial forces. TJic genius -'if tho commander, uuited to tho soldiers' will to win, makes victory certain. That whi?h ho has taught in his booits lie has illustrated upon the field of battle. He is 110 armchair soldier, canto it with mere knowledge and doctrine. Rather lie is a Gcncraliss.no who Knows that the lessons which are profitable to-day must bo learned in tho history of the past. And his own actions justify his method.What lie did at tho Battle of the Mariio will nover bo forgotten, and with such skill did he apply Jiis theory of manoeuvre about fixed.points at tho Yscr, that lie attacked tho enemy ivith six army corps against thirteen, and brought off the victory. Such is tho mail into whose wise hands the destinies of Jiuropo and the world have been placed, ami wo know that wlion the moment comes to strike the final blow, to plan the surprise which shall strike terror into a demoralised foo, ho will triumphantly deliver wit!i all simplicity, brutality, and vigour the decisive attack, which, says he,'"is the supremo argument of the modern battle—a strugglo of nations, fighting for their lives, their independence, or some less noble interest—fighing on each side with nil tlioir means, with all their passions, masses of men and nf passions which it is our business to defeat and to destroy."