PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 292, 29 August 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

It is the pith of to-day's news, from tho Western theatre that the Germans arc now plainly committed to a rearguard uattle along the whole front between Arras and tho Aisne. The conditions of their retirement are, of course, in the greatest possible contrast to thoso of the retreat tbey made in the early part of 1917. Last year they drew baek comparatively at leisure, methodically removing guns and useful material of all kinds as they went. In their present retirement they arc under the necessity oi fighting constant rearguard actions in order to gain time for the removal of artillery and material. They arc losing heavily day by day, and their, difficulties are increasing as tho battle proceeds. That the Allies are making good use of their opportunities is to be seen not only in the broad results of tho conflict, but in somo of its detail features. For instance, the latest reports show that although the Allies have made a further considerable advance on various parts- of the front—east of Arras, north of Bapaume, north and south of the Somme, and in the region of Eoye—the enemy elsewhere is offering a particularly stubborn resistance. If the present line of contact is traccd on a fairly largo scale-map it will, be seen that at nearly every point north of the Somme at which the enemy is holding out in this fashion _he is defending an acutc salient, which invites converging attack and is of necessity exposed to a murderous concentration of fire. The British advance towards Plouvain has created one, such salient at Roeux, east of Arras. There is another at Croisilles, another at Bapaume, and still another at Lopgucval, a few miles north of tho Somme. To the fact that thus far the enemy has been closely followed up and severely hustled by tho Allies at every step of his retirement, it must bo added that where he is standing and fighting to gain time he finds himself compelled to s do so under the worst possible conditions. '

There is a still more striking contrast between the general conditions of the enemy's present retirement and those which marked* his retreat in 1917. It is particularly noteworthy that the Germans have already been dislodged from some of the strong positions east of Arras on which their retirement pivoted in 1917. At Roeux and Monchy-le-Prcux, on this part of the front, the enemy has once again been driven, out of ground which he defended tenaciously after he had ended his voluntary retirement in 1917. At Bapaume the Allies are approximately halfway between the lino on which the onemy stood before the Battle of the Somme in 1916 and that to which ho retired in March of last year. South of the Somme, on tho other hand, the Germans are still in places west of the line they held prior to tho Battle of the Somme, and in the region of Roye they are only a few miles east of this line. For tho reason that they cover a comparatively short line of approach to his vital communications, the enemy's positions east of Arras take as important a place in his present schemo of retirement as they, did in the retreat of 1917. The progress already made in reducing these positions is correspondingly important. . » * * With these pivot positions shaken and imperilled, and tho retreat which is now imperative hardly begun in the south, tho enemy's situation 'is obviously precarious. It. is all the moro ' precarious aince the great bulge he occupies in the Somme region is ■ menaced not only on its northern flank, but also on the south, where General Mangin has driven a deep wedge into the area between the Oise-Ailette line and the Aisnc. Meantime the threat offered by this advance to the German line along the Aisne and the Vesle is in no way modified. It

is, on the contrary, accentuated in view of the unrelieved failure of the powerful efforts the enemy, has rnado within the last few days to stem the advance of General Mangin's army and compel it to retire.

Such a situation opens blac. prospects for the German Westeri armies. _ Its worst clangers, fron their point 'of view, arise, from th> fact that it offers the Allies a widi 'rceclom of choice and considerabL atitiule in regard to the lines 01 vhich they arc to develop thei: iffensivc, and correspondingly wid cope for developing tactics of aur wise. The Germans, of course lave no assurance that attacks wil ic confined to the battlefronts nov tctive. On tho contrary, the pos ibility that they may presently havi o cope with an onslaught in somi lew sector, perhaps in Flanders o: n Alsacc, must acutely'intensify tin u'oblems with which they aro nov ;rappling. It is to be observed lowever, that •circumstanccs arc like y to set definite limits to the oxer rise of tho Allied initiative, wid< incl free as it undoubtedly is. Fo: nstance, one of yesterday's cable ;rams spoke of "a cryptic message rom Paris" which stated that in cresting events might be oxpcctct n tho Vosges and Lorraine, liu tdded that "tho hour has not ye itruck." Tho possibility raised i; ntercating, but it cannot bo over ooked that some important factor; end to dissuade tho Allies for thi iinie beinjj from undertaking sucl in enterprise as is hinted at. Ir .heir offensive they aro operating m exterior lines around tho gigan ic salient held by the cnomy ir ?ranco and Flanders. Even in hi: n'esent disarray the enemy enjoy; t material advantage in his intone ines of communication, and thi Ulics might give him dangerou; ipenincs if they attempted t< iperato on a big scale from end t< ;nd of their front. The aclvantagi )f interior as compared witl ixtcrior lines of communica lion has been repeatedly demon itratod in tho Western theatre, aw vas strikingly illustrated on tlv Vustrn-Italian front on the oceasioi if the last Austrian offensive jiiNERAr, Diaz profited to a materia ixtent by his short and convenien ominunications in repelling th ncniy onslaught, while the. Austriai lommandcr-in-Ghief was serious]; landicapped by, _ the- circuitou ateral communications on cxterio; ines over which he had to transfei roops and material from point tc mint. It is, of course, not imlossible that the Alliesiua-y discover ipenings for attack in Alsaco or

Lorraine; but they would face a somewhat serious initial handicap in undertaking operations on an unduly extended front.

One thing which seems reasonably certain is that the enemy has not yet felt by any means tho full w6ight of the offensive the Allies are capable of developing before the northern winter setfc in. Even if it were assumed that the French and British armies were fully extended, and such an opinion is not warranted, there would still be tho to reckon with. Just what attacking strength the, Americans are capable of developing this year is not known and is not likely to be known until the information is supplied in battle. There aic obvious advantages in maintaining all possible secrecy on the point for tho time being. The concrete facts upon' which a general opinion may be based are, liowevcr, impressive. They are in brief that 1,500,000 American soldiers have already been transported across the Atlantic, that others are following at the rate of 300,000 a month, and that some weeks aL'o American troops in an aggregate strength of about a quarter of a million played a formidable part in some of tho most heavily-contested battles of the campaign. Adding Lo this that Gbkpkal msmuo has been engaged upon his task of organisation for more than a ycai, it does not seem unreasonable to assume 1 hat half a million Amcncan troops will play an active pait in the concluding stages of this year s offensive. In light _of the difliculties into which lie is already cast the prospect of such an addition to the Allied attacking strength is certainly not one the enemy can afford to regard with unconcern.

A remarkable development of the British advance east of Arras is reported in a late message from biR Douglas Haiq. The attacking front lias been extended north to the area opposite'the Viroy Ridge, and here the British troops have closely approached tho maximum line of advance reached in 1917.. Further soilth this line has been passed by a considerable margin, notably at Vis-en-Artois, a village on the ArrasCambrai high road, nearly two miles and a half south-east of Monchy-le-Preux. At Vis-en-Artois tho British are eight miles south-cast of Arras and & little over thirteen miles from Cambrai.' Further south Croisilles is now so enclosed that its fall is evidently imminent. That event will bring _ the attacking troops into immediate touch with Bullecourt. In its total results, and in view of the formidable and strategically important positions which have been mastered, the latest British advance stands out as one of tho most brilliant achievements nf 'the offensive. Meantime affairs are going well on other parts of tho front. A further advance north of Bapaume has narrowed the salient the enemy is holding at that point. An unofficial report that thoFrench have captured: Roye awaits' confirmation at time of writing.