PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 272, 6 August 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Events continue to move apace in tho Western theatre. As the position is outlined at time of writing, the Germans retain no more than a few square miles of territory south of the Soissons-Hcims line. Their speedy retreat from these last fragments of the. salient which at the height of their offensive extended to positions south of the Marne is a ioregone conclusion. Since General Foch launched his counteroffensive on July 18 they have been dislodged from approximately 400 square miles of French territory, but it is safe to say that this gives hut a poor idea of the magnitude and effect of their defeat. From the enemy's standpoint the record of recent weeks is as gloomy as could well be imagined. He set out on July 15 to strike a culminating blow, and from the first fared badly. After he had striven vainly for three days to imoart momentum to his offensive and overcome the unyielding defence of French, British, and American troops, the Allies struck the brilliant counter-blow from the effects of which the enemy has not yet recovered. For nineteen days (counting up to yesterday) he has been concentrating undivided]}' upon the object of withdrawing armies from hopelessly untenable positions. In this task, which has been not merely unproductive but has involved a heavy and disproportionate outlay on his part of lives and material, he has employed eighty or more divisions against much smaller Allied forces. It is admitted that his retreat has been ably conducted, particularly in its later stages, but this docs not alter tlvo fact that in the last three weeks he has been going steadily downhill. The extent to which his outlook is darkened is measured by tho fact that he hoped in three weeks, if not to compass the final defeat of the Allied armies, at least to bring that event into near and visible prospect.

One way of measuring the transformation that lias been cffectecl b.v the valour of the Allied armies and the skill of their Generalissimo is to contrast current German comments on the situation and outlook with those that wore-in vogue a few weeks ago. _ The Frankfurter Zcitwig, for instance, is quoted today as dolefully observing: "We must give up the hope that the summer campaign will end the war. The. enemy will certainly strike additional blows. We must reconcile ourselves to another winter of fighting, and probably another summer, when the Americans will make tho struggle difficult for us." it significantly adds: "The desire for pcacc increases in Germany week by week." Just about five weeks aero the same pa per had this to say: "We can hardly recall a strategic enterprise in this war that has been so rich in possibilities as the battle which is now going on between Soissons aud Reims. It had nia-ny poa-

sibilities even when one considers it only as a part of the strategic structure being erected by the German High Command. After four years* of war the German Command has succeeded in developing a strategic game in which completely new cards are shown, and not only on account of its political and military effectiveness, but also on account of the ideas it contains, this offensive attracts our tense interest in a way no other stage of the war lias done." The Frankfurter Zciiun;/ was' at great pains, in June, to explain that the Allied Generalissimo was faced by impossible problems and was badly puzzled, that his strategic reserves were all but exhausted, and that his main communications weve imminently menaced. No doubt these statements obtained wide spread credence in Germany when they wore made, and the moral effect of the events upon which the Frankfurter Zcitun;/ now comments so gloomily is likely to be so much the more staggering. The battle between Soissons and Reims was indeed rich in possibilities, but even this German oracle is now constrained to admit that the best of the "completely new cards" shown have been played by Font, and with dcadlv effect.

Notakle events arc reported olse- ' where than in what has lately been the main battlcfront. North "of the Soramc the Germans have retired from positions on the western bank of the Ancrc gained many weeks ago in desperate fighting'and at the cost of heavy losses. In this area, on the approaches to Amiens from the north-east, they were clinging to the edge of a fairly extensive area of high ground held by the, Allies, and had the marshy bed of tJ)e_ All ere immediately behind them. Gained initially at heavy cost, these positions were also costly to hold. Their abandonment at this stags after they had been held so long makes it fairly plain that the enemy no longer hopes to prosecute tho offensive towards Amiens.

Further evidence on tlic same point is supplied in a French communique, which reports that the enemy has been driven out of positions' on a front of about six miles extending north from the region of Montdidier. The immediate French objective was a section of railway between Moreuil, '12 miles southeast of Amiens, and Montdidier, a junction of some importance 10 miles farther south. The attacking troops captured .the villages of Braches and Hargicourt, respectivec rco I ) l^cs anc ' six miles south of Moreuil, and reached the outskirts of Courtemanchc, a- mile and a half north-west of Montdidier. ihe aggregate effect of these retirements north and south of the Somme is to appreciably reduce whatever prospects the enemy had of resuming his .advance on Amiens-thc first great objective he set himself to reach when ho opened his offensive in March. Generally speaking, the positions he has lost or given up were on high ground and tacticallv important. They were in themselves difficult to hold, but their possession by the enemy raised a definite threat, to the security of Amiens, ine threat, obviously, is now much rtduced.

I lm P oss 'W° meantime to estimate the full significance of these events. The enemy's retirement between boissons and Meims and his Jess extensive but important change of front north and south of the bomme may be preliminary to a ns * vc on . sonic other part oi the front. It is by no means impossible, however, that as a matter of necessity he is turning from offensive to defcusivc tactics in the Westem theatre.