The Dominion THURSDAY, AUGUST 1, 1918. AMERICA AND THE WAITING GAME

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 268, 1 August 1918, Page 4

The Dominion THURSDAY, AUGUST 1, 1918. AMERICA AND THE WAITING GAME

It is now evident to all observers that in the great - battle which has seen the Germans thrown back from tho Marno the Allies struck something less than a full-powered blow, and tlfat in striking they- olected to hokl a great deal in reserve. It is conclusive' evidence on this point that up to the present British divisions have taken a comparativei ly limited part in the operations I since the French broke into tho enemy flank at Soissons. At tho moment when thc_ Allies opened their counter-offensivothe enemy, so far as position went, was undoubtedly in the highest degree vulnerable to attack. Instead of making the utmost of the opportunity thus presented, the Allies went only so far in attack as to force_ a costly German retreat. They did not attempt tho more ambitious achievement of cutting off the enemy armies between the Soissons-Rcims line and the Marrie. As one of to-day's messages observes, there is no need to lament tl»s non-fulfilment of illfounded and extravagant _ hopes based on tho prospect of cutting off the enemy. The fact stands out quite plainly that the.Allies have succeeded brilliantly in'a counter-of-fensive, and since they attempted nothing more it would be absurd to lament their failure to attain results which could only have been attained in a full-powered offensive. The battle and its outcome are admirably summed up by Mr. Secretary Baker in a statement which appears to-day - . "It is fortunate that tho American people accept tho success at its true significance. Tho success is a cause for_ congratulation, but does not justify us in relaxing our efforts; wc must redouble our efforts." This sane verdict all the more commends itself since tho reasons which dictate the Allied policy arc in plain sight. The Allies are so placed that nothing short of the necessity of averting overwhelming defeat would justify them in throwing all their resources into tho scale and forcing or accepting a decisive conflict at the present stage. It is the cnemv's supremo object to bring about a decisive conflict with the least possible delay. From his point of view, as a German authority has said, "the idea underlying the whole of the great battle in France is the annihilation of the enemy reserves." A little over two weeks ago he opened an attack which'he expected to lead up to a decisive battle under his own conditions. He hoped undoubtedly to compel the Allies to rapidly engage the whole of their reserves in a defensive battle in which the odds would be heavily in his favour. Insteadhe has spent nearly two weeks in painfully and at heavy cost extricating bis armies from the untenable salient into which they were rashly thrown. His offensive plans havo been wrecked, and if lie strikes again, as no doubt ho will, he will do so with diminished force and correspondingly diminished prospects. While.husbanding their own resources, the Allies have inflicted heavy loss and damage on the enemy and have seriously delayed and hampered his attack. Looked ' at in true perspective, their' achievement stands out unmistakably as one of the most brilliant of the war. . The last thing needed to justify the_ policy actually adopted by the Allied Generalissimo as against that of making the most at all costs of such openings for attack as appeared when the German, front still extended to the Marnc is <ah assurance that the armies under his command will in good time be so reinforced as to give him ■ a decisive margin of fighting strength. Such an assurance is unquestionably afforded in the splendid progress* that is being made m the transportation and organisation of the American armies. It has been officially stated during the last few days that there are now a million and a quarter American troops _ in France, and that others arc being transported at the rate of three hundred thousand men a month. If this rate is maintained without being increased more than three million American soldiers will have reached France by the end of this year. These' are impressive figures, but in order to realise the full significance of American reinforcement' and how com pletely it justifies the Allies in still for a time playing the waiting game account must be taken also of the vast body of material organisation which in America's war effort goes hand-in-haud with the transportation of men. Obviously, if America were simply rushing men into France while neglecting tho allimportant factors of equipment and supply, her reinforcement would be of doubtful, or, at all events, of limited value. But the truth is that the vast organisation of transport and supply which America has created, in France durimr the Inst twelve months, and is still developing at record speed, is one of the marvels of the war. This is the testimony of those who have been permitted to view the organisation at its present stare. A special correspondent of the London Times, for instance, wrote not long ago that thCAniericans in France arc rapidly pushing to completion the longest, and in many respects the greatest, scheme of communications ever used in .warfare. At the outset America was confronted by'immeasurably more difficult problems of transport organisation than cither France or Britain, As

the correspondent observes, "the A'nerican armies and all their war materials had to be brought thousands of miles from their sources of supply; the submarine campaign was at its highest point of efficiency; the adoption of the convoy system considerably reduced the capacity of shipping facilities which, even in the most favourable circumstances, would have been totally inadequate to the demands made upon them; there were no large modem ports on the coast of France; nor was there anything Uko sufficient railway facilities to accommodate the vast stream of men and materials which must flow steadily in, with constantly increasing volume, from the date when the first detachment of United States soldiers landed ou French soil." Apart from the tremendous demands imposed upon American factories and shipyards the work in France involved such undertakings as the construction of great range's of modern docks,, a huge warehouse- system, extensive railway yards (these latter with a trackage of nearly two hundred miles), and the rapid assembling of rolling stock _ from parts fashioned in American factories. The work along the lines of communication is in keeping with what has been accomplished at the ports._ The completed part of tho system is already equal to all demands made upon it, and it is anticipated that by the middle of September the greater part of the whole vast scheme will bo in full operation. In this matter of communications, as in others, the Americans have profited substantially by the experience and ready cooperation of their Allies, and at the same time these port and railway schemes, already on an impressive scale, arc so worked out as to he capable of almost unlimited cxpanr sion. This, as .the correspondent already quoted observes, is hiphly important, for the war developments of recent months have clearly pointed tho way towards greater unity of effort by the Allies, and greater mobility of action by the French, British, and American fighting forces', The tendency (lie adds) is towards a pooling both of effort and supplies, tho natural outcome- of centralisation under a single command. This may easily resolve Hie American base ports in Prance into main reserve centres, from which their channels of distribution will radiate directly to railheads on all parts of (lie front, instead of mainly through (lie intermediate and advance area centres, which are now being constructed. These latter, in that event, would be'utilised in connection with the great and evergrowing training centres through which, for a long time to come, the American Army of 2,000,000 or more, in the making, must pass. These glimpses of the tremendous military organisation America is developing at wonderful speed, but has not yet completed, emphasise the magnitude of the reinforcement she is bringing to the Allies. They make it easy to understand also whv General Focn is still bent upon deferring the day of decisive battle, and is content, for a time, to work cautiously forward even in face of such opportunities as were opened up by his brilliant stroke at Soissons.