THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 262, 24 July 1918, Page 4

THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN

In spite of the instant success it attained, the Allied counter-offen-sive in the Western theatre was at first regarded as more important, in its local effects than in its bearing on the, campaign as a whole. I'rom the outset it promised to definitely confirm the defeat of the offensive which the enemy opened between tho Marne and the Argonnc on July 15, and such a defeat was bound to more or less seriously alfect his general plans. It was commonly assumed, however, that in spite of tho heavy check he had sustained the enemy would still be ablo to renew the offensive at his cwii time and place. The later events of tho battle in the Marne salient, and such information as is available in regard to tho movement of_ enemy reserves, suggest that this_ was an unduly moderate estimate of the effect of the Allied stroke and of the difficulties into which the enemy has been thrown. It is somewhat early to accept unreservedly the statement made by a, correspondent yesterday that by a single stroke the Allied Generalissimo seized the initiative _ of tho whole situation and has driven the Bochc Kick to tho defensive everywhere, but there is no doubt that the Allies, for the tirao being at least, arc setting the pace and direction of the campaign, and that each day that passes \inder the conditions now ruling makes a considerable addition to the leeway the enemy will have to overtake in order to recover tho initiative. It is of particular good promise that the German High Command is finding it necessary to support and reinforce its shaken armies in the Marne salient by making increasing calls , upon the reserves of the northern army group, under Prince Rupprecht ok Bavaria, which now constitutes its main striking force. A New York message to-day states that the German CnotvN Prikce, who exercises general command over the armies between Montdidior and Verdun, has called upon Rupprecht to support him with reserves. As a matter of fact, a number of divisions from the northern armies were cmnloyed in the enemy offensive of July la. At its faca value the news now transmitted mams that a fur-

ther call has bMn made upon these armies in an area in which the main problem engaging the attention of the enemy High Command is that of securing a safe retreat. If this is the actual state of affairs, it is

reasonable to suppose jfchat the enemy has abstained from an attack on the northern front only because his hands arc too full, to permit him to attempt it. The inaction of Iris northern armies is hardly to be explained on any other ground. It is obvious that if he held' the necessary resources the difficulties with which he is grappling in the Marnc salient would give him the strongest possible incentive to forthwith launch an attack on the British front. Such an attack would conform strictly to his general offensive plan and at Hie same time would create a diversion calculated to case thf predicament of his menaced armies in the south. It is impossible to suppose that he would have renounced these advantages had they been within his grasp, and if they are not the reason must bo that the battle area- between the Aisne and the Marnc makes such heavy demands upon his strength that offensive action elsewhere on a big scale is -meantime out of the question.

With its features of promise tlip situation as it stands holds, of course, distinctly open possibilities. But bettor reasons are appearing day by day for believing that tho Allied counter-stroke has accomplished fiir more than to subject the enemy to local defeat. One fact which seems already to he quite clearly established is that in the conditions ruling it is impossible for tho Ucrmans to escape from their predicament by a swift and orderly retreat. It is fairly certain that had such a retreat bem feasible the enemy would ere now have made it as «i preliminary to resuming the offensive elsewhere. The suggestion uppermost at present is that ho is intent instead upon a powerful ef-

fort to retrieve his defeat in the present battle area. There is no reason to doubt that, tlif Allies) are well prepared to meet and cope with such an effort. There is mention of British as well, a3 German reserves moving south, but although some intcrw6a,ving of Allied reserves is natural under tho unified com-

mane! it is a possibility to bear in .iiind that the British armies may find the opportune,* , tncy aro waiting for without moving from thvir present front. The overshadowing feature of the situation at this time is that the- Allies have definitely and in all likelihood finally departed from tfe policy of tho passive defensive they were constrained to adopt in the opening monthsof this year's campaign. Their policy has nothing in common with tho enemy's reckless bid for early-vic-tory, but they arc nevertheless in a very real sense grasping the initiative. They have shown themselves capable of'brilliant initiative at tho moment when the outlook was most threatening. Taking amount also of the reinforcement of vigorous manhood which America is now bringing to boar, and will rapidly expand from this time forward, wo may with all confidence hail the first great check to the German offensive as containing the certain promise of even butter things.