PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 261, 23 July 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Some of the larger possibilities raised by the Allied co.untcr-offen-civf. between the Aisnc and the Marnu may not be resolved for a considerable time to come, but meanlime the Allies arc steadily enlarging their initial success. Along a •;Teat part of tho western face of 'he German salient thrust south to the Marnc—that is to say, un a line extending south from the region of Soissons—the French and Americans have advanced from six to nine miles. In the Manic valley they have driven the enemy out of Chateau Thierry, and gained ground well to the eastward of that place. The highroad and main railway running south from Soissons which prior to the Allied attack constituted the enomy's best communications

serving the forward area of the salient arc not only under bombardment at Soissons, but arc dominated, or very closely threatened, in areas farther south. A German retreat from all the ground occupied south of the Manic was admitted yesterday, but the fuller details supplied to-day show that the enemy retreat was in fact the rescue of remnants from a dtath-trnp. Still pressing their attacks on the western face of the enemy salient, tho Allies are now attacking also in the area southwest of Reims, where British troops are co-operating- with French and Italian forces. The powerful attack which is being developed in this quarter promises to add materially to the enemy's difficulties in extricating his forces from tho imperilled salient and restoring tho stability of his line. Unless the withdrawal of about half the strength of the eight divisions he succeeded at the height of his offensive in passing over the Marnc can be regarded in that light, the enemy has nowhere succeeded in improving bis general situation since the French made their lightning thrust at Soissons. On the contrary, his affairs have gone from bad to worse. As reports stand, he is drawing freely upon his reserves and fighting hard, but the height of hi 3 achievement has been to slow the progress of the attacks the Allies arc. vigorously developing on either flank of his southern line.

It is no doubt a matter of common prudence to nssumo that the enemy is maturing preparations to renew the offensive, but visible facts certainly suggest that his campaign plans as a whole have been thrown into serious disarray. The possibility of a great attack on the British front remains in clear sight, but before the French delivered their counter-stroke the enemy had drawn rather heavily upon the reserves of his northern armies for tho purposes of his offensive between tho Marnc and tho Argonnc. The additional reserves be has thrown into the Aisnc-Mamo battle during the last few days were presumably also transferred from the northern front. It should follow that although an attack on the Amiens sector or farther north is possible the enemy would undertake it with much poorer prospects than if ho had given it priority over his disastrous venture on the approaches to Paris. A cautious disinclination to exaggerate the significance and effect of the enemy defeat should not be allowed to obscure the fact that it definitely impairs his general prospects.

German comments on the situation, though they aim as a whole at minimising the defeat, distinctly suggest that it is ruefully regarded bv the enemy as of far-reaching importance. The Color/tie Gazelle, for instance, finds somewhat cold comfort in misrepresenting the whole character of the battle. It concede-'' the loss of prisoners and guns, but contends that "the enemy's leading idea, the break-through, is not attained. Tho counter-offensive was held up before it attained any strategic advance worth mentioning." Even in Germany this will hardly.go down. The German people have been buoyed up with promises that their armies will in tho near future gain overwhelming victory. They will take little enough comfort in assurances* that the French and Americans have failed, as a detail move in a defensive battle, to hrcak through tho German front. The comments of the German semi-official organ, though little entitled on their merits to attention, arc decidedly interesting as indicating tho inability of the German authorities to in any satisfactory fashion explain away their defeat. The absurdity of the contention that the Allied counter-stroke has achieved no strategic object worth mentioning is of course obvious. Apart from the heavy captures of men and material effected, the German offensive towards Paris has been smashed,' and must cither ho abandoned or begun anew considerably short of the starting point of July 15. In addition it seems all but certain that the effect of the skilfully directed Allied blow will not be spent until the Germans have effected a costly retreat from a considerable part of the ground they still hold between the Aisne and tho Marnc.

A German semi-official review of the situation which appeared yesterday is equally noteworthy- as indicating that the enemy has been thrown into _ more than local confusion by his defeat. It alleged that tho object of the. first crossing of the Marno was to divert French forces. This having been achieved it was unnecessary to hold ground south of the .river, and the troops were therefore withdrawn to "fulfil important tasl<3." The story of what the German divisions which crossed the Marno endured is told to-day in some detail. In _ the. five days during which tho bridgehead wa'« maintained they were exposed without respite to murderous artillery and atrial bombardment, and it is evident that their enterprise, costly as it was, counted for practically nothing as a diversion. The idea that the Allies have been compelled to mass an. undue proportion of their reserves in tho area in which the Germans are now striving desperately to set limits to their defeat ,is one the enemy command would probably bi> much less anxious to exploit on paper if it had any foundation in fact. Comparatively littlo is, of course, known about the disposition of either' Allied or enemy reserves. It seems fairly certain, however, .that whatever effect late events have had upon 'he disposition of reserves has been heavily to the enemy's disadvantage and that the claims he is making on this point arc diametrically opposed to the facts.

As yet the Allies dn not scorn to have made any extended progress in the attacks la : tcly opened between Reims and the Manic, though they have in sonic nlaces advanced for a. mile or two. The explanation offers, however, thsit these attacks arc ciuile subsidiary, for the time at least, to '(ho operations further west, between Soissonsand Chateau Thierry.-'-.•hero a better opening for attack exists. The Inter messages in hand rhow that the- French ore acain imshing forward into the western rrea of the German salient at n ?Moed which recalls the events of 'heir initial surprise attack, and flint the enemy is beinc increasingly harried in hi:.' retreat.