BETTING ON LICENSED PREMISES

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 258, 19 July 1918, Page 7

BETTING ON LICENSED PREMISES

IMPORTANT DECISION CONVICTION QUASHED The Full Court—His Honour tho Chief Justice (.Sir Ito.bert Stout). His Honour Air. Justice Chapman, and His Honour Mr. Justice Hordnmn—delivered reserved judgment yesterday in a case of somo public interest. It was on the caso on appeal by F. J. Oakes, licensee- of tho Iluko of Edinburgh Hotel, from a conviction by Mr. S. 10. M.'Cnrlhy, S.M., for permitting gambling on his licensed premises. His Honour tho Chief Justice read t'ho judgment of the .Court, and fiaid the evidence did not discloso that the appellant was personally present when the betting took place, but thero was betting on horses on his premises to the knowledge of his barman, ami a bet was made with his barman. The appellant hnd issued to his employees in 11)1(1 an order which was afterwards kept in a book opeu'lo his employees. ; Thero was a direction that no betting .should bo ..permitted on the premises, and if such took placo the appellant was at onco to be notified thereof. That order was not obeyed by the'barman. There were two questions raised by the appellant: (1) Is betting on a horse raco gambling within the meaning of tho. section ? (2) Was the appellant liable for the. act of his barman P There, were provisions in England regarding tho conduct of- licensed houses. The dilferenco was that tho word "gaming" was used in the English section, whereas in the New Zealand section the word

•'gambling" was .used. An appellate Court decided in England that hotting dul not tome within tho teiiu gaming. There- had been two - decisions in 'New Zealand on the section: All that was determined was that the words gambling and gaming were synonymous, and that Iho playiug of a game for money was gambling. It was not determined that betting was gambling, nor' was it determined that it was not gambling. In tho (Jaming Act, 1908, "gaming-house", was stated to indudo "betting-house," but there- was no'definition of gambling in the Licensing Act. The proper meaning must therefore bo applied to- the word,- and after quoting definitions of gamble,-;' as given iu Webster's and Murray's"Oxford Dictionaries, His Honour said-that iu neither of these dictionaries was it. said ,that the word "gambling" included "betting." Colloquially it was used in this Dominion no doubt in a way that would includo betting, but it would also include other transactions that were of a risky nature, such as the purchasing of shares in companies, or oven tramcking _in land. Was the Court in this .statute justified in holding tliat the primary and ordinary meaning "of tho word "gambling" was to be departed from and'ai wider moaning applied? If tho wider meaning were applied, then all things called in a loose way "gambling," such as wild and speculative transactions on the Stock Exchange, rash purchases of land or goods, wheat options (to use nn American phrase), would all come under the term "gambling,'' and- an innkeeper would be liable if he knew of men in his hotel rashly buying shares or personal property, etc. Where the Legislature has thought "betting" should be deemed 'gaming" it had made provision, as iu the Gaming Act. There was no such provision in the Licensing Act. As to the second question, there was authority for holding that if an "innkeeper entrusted the management oi his hotel to a servant" lie would be: liable if that servant committed a breach of the statute. Mere orders to the servant not to break thc law would not destroy that 'liability. It was unnecessary to 'deal with tho second question further than to say Hint in his opinion the barman might not have been entrusted with Hie management of tho hotel so as to nmke the innkeeper liable. Further, lie saw no reason lo doubt Hie bona fides of the innkeeper in his desire-to preveiil belling in his li censed house. The appeal,'in his;opinion, should be allowed, and the conviction quashed. The other Judges concurred, and judgment was 'entered accordingly.

At I he hearing Mr. M, Myers appeared for the appellant, and 'Mr. J. Prendcviile for the respondent.