The Dominion. FRIDAY, JULY 19, 1918. THE BATTLE AND THE OUTLOOK

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 258, 19 July 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. FRIDAY, JULY 19, 1918. THE BATTLE AND THE OUTLOOK

To-day's news from the West front confirms the impression that the Germans have suffered a defeat which is not only damaging in its immediate results, but is calculated to seriously derange-their offensive plans as a whole. Tho latest reports dealing with the number of enemy divisions engaged indicate that since the battle opened on Monday a greater force has been employed in attack than in any other battle of the campaign except the first. Taking account of the magnitude of the effort and of the insignificant gains secured it is evident that though the German command has. not yet shown its _ full hand it has no cause to be satisfied with the results of its opening move. At the moment ib is uncertain whether tho enemy intends to renew his hitherto unsuccessful attacks in the Marne valley and the plains of Champagne or to cut his loss in the hopo of faring better in a new attack. The opinion seems to be general that he has freedom of choice in the matter, and that it is open to him to withdraw from the present battle in order to attack in the Amiens sector or clscwhcro, but no doubt this opinion is basod largely on the consideration that' the Allies and Germany arc facing the problems of the campaign from widely different standpoints. It is tho enemy's, object to force a decision, and if he fails to do it m the comparatively near future his last hope of winning the war will disappear. Tho Allies, on the other hand, havo much to gain by delay, provided always that it is not purchased tit too high a price. It is fairly certain that if the enemy s impatienco to bring about a dccisivo conflict were shared by the Allies he would not be as free as he now is to set the pace and direction of tho campaign. Wo are told in reference to the present battlo that the enemy has drawn freely on his northern armies in order to develop his offensive between the Manic and the Argonrtc. According to one message it is definitely ascertained that von Arnih's army, located not long ago on tho British front, has been thrown into the battlo east of

Bcims. At the same time, it i stated, presumably with reference ti the battle as a whole, that th French stopped the Germans with out calling on extra reserves. Thi is not complete or explicit informa lion on the subject of Allied anc enemy dispositions, but for what i is' worth it manifestly suggests tha the enemy': is .taking risks on tin British front in order to speed am support the offensive now in pro gress up to the present ha: been to all intents and purposes ; total failure. Such a drain as th< enemy is said to have imposed or his northern armies should mcai not only that he is unable to maki a simultaneous attempt elsewhcn on anything like a similar scale, bu that the Allies are offered an oppor tunity of striking a countcr-blo\i under reasonably favourable condi tions. There is fairly definite cvi dence that the, German nortlicrr front has been weakened to an ex tent which in other circumstance, would suggest and invite attack Tho remarks of Allied commenta tors show, however, that no earl counter-offensive by ' the Britis: armies is anticipated. Tho inference to be drawn i: plain. It is simply that the Allie: are_ adhering steadfastly to tin policy which the Americans havi called "keeping goal," and are dc termincd to limit their efforts a: far as possible until American rein forcement has been carried to sucl a point as to enable them to strik< with full effect, The essential fact: of the situation were well broughi out by the New York Evening Pos m a recent editorial. It point out that, taking due account o American reinforcement and of it< bearing on war prospects, it is pos siblc to trace the present strategy oi the Allies back to a date preceding the establishment of the Versailles Counciland the creation of a general Allied reserve and the appointment of General Foch a 3 Generalissimo—in fact to the early spring of_ 1917, immediately after the failure of Nivelle's offensive on the Aisne..

I hat great disappointment (it adds) emphasised a state of. mind, a: demand which had already made itself manifest, namely that France must henceforth practise inexorable thrift with her man-power. In the Chamber of Deputies it was asserted that England i,iust take up .a larger share of the burden of the front, fho number of French dead was not far behind the German. It was France's duty and her right to save something of her young manhood for the rebuilding of her life after the war. In a moro'special sense France must be thrifty with her army as a nucleus for future Allied armies and as a rcsorve; a role for which the French Army was designated by its superior efficiency and experience. When America carao into the war, the argument took tin added force. With a now reservoir of fighting power opened up, it was more than ever just for Franco to sparo herself and more than ever necessary to keep the French Army intact as a framework and a 'training school for the millions, from America.

Looking only at the military factors involved, though no one can be indifferent to the plea that France as a nation is entitled to profit to the utmost from the accession of American man-power, it is evidently of capital importance that the Allied armies as they are now organised should be as nearly as possible maintained intact, and should not exhaust their strength in inconclusive enterprises. This applies with particular force to the French Army with its highly-perfected organisation and its reserve of skilled leadership. Other considerations apart, it looks like sound military policy to maintain the French Army at the highest possible strength in order that by its comradeship and guidance it may'give effectiveness to America's new'levies. The assurance of a great and growing tide of reinforcements from America would not in any case- justify the Allies in rashly squandering their strength, but the case for a prudent waiting policy is very greatly strengthened when it is considered how much the success or failure of the decisive effort to which the plans of the Allies ultimately tend must depend' upon factors of training, experience, and leadership, as well .as upon the native valour with which the Americans have shown themselves richly endowed. That the Allies are pursuing such a policy means that limits must be set to the expectations which otherwise might he based on such events as have lately been witnessed in the Western theatre. The result is at once to obscure the real gravity of the enemy's defeat and to limit its immediate consequences. But the events of this battle to its present stage nevertheless distinctly support a belief that the Allies archusbanding their resources not in weakness but in strength and in order that their blow, when they are ready to strike, may fall with decisive effect.