PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 256, 17 July 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

At the moment of writing news oi tho great battle which has opened in France goes little beyond indicating tho front attacked and conveying a general assurance that from the Allied standpoint the battle is going well. In his opening onslaught the enemy crossed the Manic on a narrow front, but as reports stand he is firmly held in tho area south of tho river. The Americans are credited with the line_ achievement in this region of rolling back the enemy, advance and capturing a thousand The only indication thus far given of tho pro-

gress made by tho Germans south of the Marne is contained in the statement that they have captured Chczv, a small town about four miles south of Chateau Thierry, but only a. mile or two from the south bank of the river, which in this locality runs generally north-east. The front on which the enemy has crossed the Marne measures about ten ■or a dozen miles from east to west. In forcing a crossing he was favoured by the fact that in the area of his attack the Marne runs in a series of northward bends. A much stronger force of artillery could, of course, bo concentrated around these bends on the north bank than could be assembled on the south bank to oppose a crossing. Allied batteries advanced into the bends would have boon exposed to a. concentration of firo from both sides and in front.

At Chezy the enemy is fifteen miles distant from the main railway which runs across France from Paris to Nancy, and no doubt this vital line of communication is his immediate objective. Apart,, however, from the fact that his attacks arc being firmly in'et on the south bank of the Marne, he cannot safely continue his thrust to the south without widening out the somewhat narrovZ-pointed salient formed by his front between the Aisne and the Marne. This he is attempting to do by violent attacks along the front between the Marno and the western edge of the Argonne Forest, more than sixty miles as the crow flies from Chateau Thierry, but his success thus far _ has been extremely limited. He is credited with an advance of four or five thousand yards on portion of tho front west of Reims, and with a smaller advance east of that city, but as a whole he does not seem to have even remotely approached the success which rewarded his efforts in tho opening stages of some of the earlier battles of the campaign. * * *' *

The possibility, of course, suggests itself that the present German attack, in spite of the length of front attacked, may be a diversion preparatory to a renewed attempt to drive west to the Channel coast. But in spite of some general considerations tending to favour that view of the matter, evidence in sight tends upon the whole to put it out of court. An attack on a front of from 50 to 55 miles can hardly have been undertaken as a diversion, more especially as it is stated that tho Germans are probably employing sixty divisions in the battle. This compares with eighty-seven enemy divisions employed from first to last in the Somme offensive (the drive on Amiens), thirty-seven in tho Lys offensive (exclusive of tho attack on Kcmmel), forty to fifty in tho drive from the Aisne, and about the same number in the attack on the Montdidier-Novon front. If the enemy has already massed sixty divisions op his present attacking front it is highly probable that he is committed to a definite attempt to smash the Franco-American organisation and open a road to Paris from the cast.

General Marsh, Chief of the American General Staff, is quoted as stating that three American army corps have been organised in France, each of a strength of from 225,000 to 250,000 men, and that the shipment of troops to France continues as in previous months; that is to say, at the rate of something over a quarter of a million men per month. The first part of his statement implies tliafc extraordinarily rapid progress has been made in the organisation of the American armies, but it would be unwise lo build too much upon a statement) of this character. That the American corps have been organised does not necessarily mean that the Allied Generalissimo contemplates employing them in the near future if that course can be avoided. Indications are rather that it is the Allied aim for the time being to postpone a decisive contest in order that the American armies may be raised to the highest possible pitch of organisation. American troops arc already tnkiiig a considerable part in tlio battle, but though this reinforcement is important it is equally important that there should be as little interfercncc as possible with the process of organisation and training which will enable America in the end to decisively sway the balance.