PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 253, 13 July 1918, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

According to a Paris message the opinion is unanimous (presumably amongst French military critics') that a resumption of the German offensive will immediately follow Kuhljiann's downfall, "which is a victory for the German command who must prove the fallacy of Kuhlmaxn's declaration that peace is not to be obtained by a military decision." This is a reasonable deduction, although its accuracy is not, of course, a matter of absolute certainty. The- expulsion of vox KuHLMANN is undoubtedly a victory for the Pan-German extremists, and any question open relates only to the use to which they will put their victory. It is; fairly obvious that as yet there is ho effective opposition in Germany to the dominant military party. This impression is hardly weakened by the reported attitude of the Reichstag majority parties, which are "indignant at the military caste for effecting . von KuhlMans's downfall and appointing his successor, and threaten to fiercely oppose its policy." In the light of events the perfervid protestations of the majority group in the Reichstag must bo considered trifles • light as air. Last year it forced through tho lieichstag ;>, resolution condemning annexations and indemnities. What the resolution was worth and t<> what extent it affected German policy the world has seen in the BrestLitovsk "peace" and in the continued exploitation of Russia, and latterly in Ihs 'enslavement of Rumania. If the latest triumph of the militaristshas importance us tending to provoke !'. reaction against militarism in Germany, it is in the German masses, and not in the 'Reichstag majority parties,, that', this, result must. 1 be looked for. ' » ■•»'■"•»■ it" '' ■ ■•'■!

The essential fact, meantime is that the military caste has aeain demonstrated very convincingly that it is the only effective power lii Germany. If this is not equivalent' to saying that the possibilities of tho Western offensive will be tested to the inmost it at least goes 'a long way in that direction. No reason appears for departing from an opinion that a speedy military victory represents to' the dominant caste- in Germany and ils supporters the only alternative to ruin and disaster. There is a good- deal in the existing situation to lower whatever confidence the German autocrats formerly felt in their ability' to force a military decision, but it is probable at least that they see no attractive alternative. Abandoning their desperate hid for victory, they would shatter the illusion of coming victory u-hich, in its effect on the minds of the jicoplo over whom thej rule, is incomparably their greatest asset. The political factors involved seem likely in such a contingency to come, earlier into operation in Austria-Hungary than in Germany. The Austrian Premier all but openly.'admitted in a speech delivered a month or two ago that a speedy and overwhelming- victory by the armicn of the. Central Powers was essential if the warring elements of the Dual Monarchy were to be kept together and in control. The prospects thus raised are of a nature to <:onfivm the German autocrats in a decision to stakc > all their hopes upon the prosecution of the Western offensive. Even if they are much less hopeful than they were of forcing a decision and arc confident of their ability to keep their own population under control, if necessary, under a policy of lengthening out tho wnr, they will hardly feel the same confidence in regard to Austria-Hungary. , On the whole political as well Vs military considerations warrant a, belief that the enemy will adhere to the offensive designs with which he Opened this year's .campaign in Western Europe. While this prospect holds some gangers and perils for the Allies, it is equally true that it raises thehrpe, granted ;■ sound defence meantime, of the enemy being brought earlier to defeat than if he were m a position to pursue a more deliberate and economical policy.

Encouraging comments on the submarine campaign arc credited today to Lord Jeuicoe and Sut Eric Geddes. Lor.n Jelmcoe sums up essential facts in a satisfactorily definite way in the statement ' that merchant ships are being built faster than they arc being sunk, while submarines are being sunk faster than they.ftre being built. It should bo noted, however, that he makes no specific reference ly ships which arc damaged, though not sunk, and put out oi action for a longer or shorter period. The temporary loss of tonnage in this way has jit-.times bulked large, and no definite statement has yet been made that both permanent and temporary losses of toi, r.age are more than covered by new construction and repairs. The First Lord of the Admiralty makes interesting reference to a new and effective method of capturing submarines, and is credited also with the important announcement that tho entrance to Zcebrugge harbour is completely blocked—apparently the Germans have thus far found'it impossible to even partly clear away tho concrete-laden ships which close the harbour mouth. Both in ham-

poring the movements of submarines and in robbing the enemy of bases for surface torpedo craft conveniently adjacent to the Allied communication;;, the blocking of Zeebruggn and the partial blocking o' Ostend must sooner or later heavily influence the trend of the submarine campaign. According to the latest available information the posititr at Ostcnd is that the harbour entrance has been made impracticable to any but small craft, and the. dredging operations necessary to keep it open have been made difficult.

Although tho presence of French and British' troops in Italy and oi Italian troops in France makes the actual position in its broad features fairly plain, no explicit statement regarding Italy's participation in the international organisation which centres in the Allied Generalissimo and in the Supreme War Council has been cabled. -Huch a statement was made by the Italian Prime Minister, SiGNon Orlando, when he was interviewed early in May by Mii.WAnD Price. "This important matter," he remarked, "was'"taken into consideration and resolved (at the Abbeville conference). You will readily understand that I cannot give precise details as to the decisions arrived at, in view of their delicate military character. I can, however, assure you that also in this exceptional matter Italy takes part in the intimate military and political union which is constantly affirming itself more strongly between the nations of tho Entente in proportion as tho menace is graver and the moment seems more decisive. Leaving details on one side, and addressing myself to the substance of the'matter, 1 can tell you that the conference of Abbeville has recognised the unity of the front from the North Sea to the Adriatic, .and that not only as an ickal aspiration, but as a concrete reality. This reality is achieving itself as best the special circumstances of the situation have suggested, but these special circumstances have been considered on the basis .of a purely technical and not a political criterion. Also on this occasion indeed it has been recognised that there does not exist an Italian point of view, just as there as not a British, French, or American point of view; there must be one single point of view for all, and for each—to.do what in the military sense best serves the one and indivisible cause of the Allies."