PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 251, 11 July 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

The French roport an attack on a 'front of two and a half miles west of Antheuil, between Montdidier and the Oise. The region is that in which the enemy made his maximum advance, towards Compiegne junction, on the occasion of the last big-scale offensive. Antheuil, on the railway from Peronno to Compiegne and at a distance of a little over six miles from the latter place, is the ape-x of an enemy salient. Tho French' advance, in places to a depth of a mile, ha-8 given them an improved position on rising ground. They are thus much better placed than they were to bring effective pressure to bear on tho enemy salient threatening Gompiegne. The capture of some five hundred unwounded prisoners points to the swift and overwhelming success of an attack which is more important in its tactical results than tnc comparatively narrow front on which ib took shape would indicate.

French military writers, it is stated in a message from Paris, distrust circumstantial rumours that Ludendorff is abandoning the offensive- in the West in favour of a tremendous thrust on the Italian front. In this extreme form the rumours hardly seem to merit attention. The Western offensive is not an enterprise the Germans can continue or abandon at will, but one upon which their whole future depends. They must either speedily defeat the Allied armies in France and Flanders or expect to be themselves attacked in overwhelming power in the not distant future. Even such a success against Italy as would put that country out of the war would be too dearly bought by the enemy if it were gained at the cost of laying himself open in the theatre where his vital interests wntrc. Time, also, is a very important factor. Months rather than weeks would-be needed to transfer any large part of the German strategic reserves from France to the Trentino. But while there is no reason to believe that the enemy will shift his main offensive from the Franco-British to the Italian front, the possibility of a powerful thrust from the Trentino with some German divisions participating, remains in clear sight and cannot be lightly regarded. The Italians overwhelmingly defeated the Aus-tro-Hungarian offensive and have added to that brilliant achievement in swiftly re-establishing their former line, but it remains as true as ever that they have an exceedingly vulnerable flank to defend in the north. It is by no means unlikely that the enemy contemplates another attempt to break into tho plain west of the Piave line, and that German divisions have been sent to tho Trentino to co-operate. Though it would involve some weakening of their forces in France and Flanders such an entorpriso may

commend itself to the Germans as usefully seconding their main offensive and as being calculated if it succeeded to revive their drooping ally. Handicapped as they are by the enemy's advantage of position, the Italians, however, should be reasonably well placed to resist any possible onslaught. It is obvious .that in their recent operations, and notably in refraining from any attempt to pursuo the enemy east of the Piave, they have acted with prudent regard to the fact that they may yet bo called upon to cope with a German-aided offensive which would be more fo"inidable than the one thev defeated last month.

Further reports to-day show that Italian and other forces, with British monitors co-operating from the sea, arc making good headway in an advance in Southern Albania which has already yielded valuable ground and 1300 prisoners._ One result, and perhaps the most important meantime, will bo k> give the Allies improved facilities for communication between the Adriatic and their front in Macedonia. Extended use of these communications will, of course, correspondingly reduce the necessity of transporting supplies over a longer sea voyage, and one in which ships arc more dangerously exposed to submarine attack than' in crossing the Adriatic.