PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 249, 9 July 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Considering the prospects of the decisive campaign which is now running its course in the Western theatre, it is a material fact to bear in mind that although the enemy in succeeding battles has attacked different sections of the Allied frotit he has had throughout only asingle object in view—an object which all his efforts arc intended to servo. That object is, of course, to break the Allied, front and overwhelm the Allied armies. The fighting on the West front since the .Germans opened their drive towards Amiens on March 21 divides into four great battles, but there is no reason to suppose that these several attacks imply as 'many changes', or any change at all, in tho enemy's general plan. It has been repeatedly and justly emphasised that the principal factor in his favour under existing conditions is an advantage in formation of line and in .communications which enables him, at all events while he holds the initiative, to mass men and guns on a given front at a speed the Allies are incapable of emulating. Wo are bound to assume that the German Command took full account of these advantages in shaping its plans for the campaign, and that from tlio outset it contemplated rapidly shifting the point of attack. 1 As an English writer observed recently, "surprise by weight rather than by direction has been a leading motive with the German Higher Command over since the attack on Verdun." It is chiefly by these tactics that thc s enemy has gained the measure of success that has rewarded his efforts since he launched his offensive in March.

Lv tho light of these ruling considerations tho German _ attack which created the Lys salient and gave rise to the second great battle of the campaign must bo regarded not as an alternative to the. formidable though abortive_ drive towards Amiens in the opening battle, but rather as a normal development of the offensive. Each attack had tho same general object, and it is evident that in the second the enemy hoped to profit directly by whafcho had accomplished in the first. He had compelled a partial concentration of Allied reserves on the front covering Amiens, and he hoped to find the front farther north which directly covers the Channel ports weak and vulnerable. Tho lino of continuity was unbroken fn tho later offensives on the Aisnc and on the Montdidier-Noyon front. At an immodiate but limited view the first of theso two onslaughts represented an attompt by the enemy to intimidate the French by threatening and if possible invading their capital. Such an explanation.if it were accepted would imply that the enemy had departed, temporarily perhaps, but definitely, from the general plan with which he opened his offensive. But the more rational explanation is available that the enemy's essential object in this operation was to draw away the Allied reserves from the northern front and so make it vulnerable, and that tho threat to Paris, though far from unimportant, was secondary to this _ vital object, lloaching his objectives in his attack on the Montdidier-Noyon front, the enemv would have altered the situation to his advantage in several ways. By outflanking the forost defences north-east of Paris he would have given tho Allies a weaker front to defend, and so would have increased the' value of his southward thrust as tending to draw away Allied reserves from the still more" vital front to the north. At the same time lie would have straightened his front south-east of Amiens, and so would have been much better placed to open a new drive on that objective.

These objects, however, tho enemy failed to gain. It is not more evident that he has worked throughout to a consecutive plan in which lie has striven methodically to make the most of his advantages of initiative, position, and communica-

tions than that he. has attacked, ou the whole, with diminishing success and with diminishing' returns for a given effort. It is true that in his thrust from the Aisnc to the Mamo ho gained a great deal _ of ground, but he did not in anything like the same degree improve his general strategic position. The proof appears in the poor success of his efforts on the MonldidierNo.voh front and in the long delay that has followed. It i:; agreed on all hands that the enemy is now maturing preparations for the most formidable attack of which ho is capable, but, without discounting the dangers still to be faced, it is possible to draw a. great deal of encouragement from the past events of the campaign. Had tho enemy's plans its they have taken shape developed prosperously, each succeeding attack on a new front would have found tho Allies more and more demoralised and less able to offer effective resistance. It may be said with little material qualification that actual developments have taken an exactly opposite course.

There is not the slightest doubt that the enemy, as an alternative to the early and overwhelming success which he- regarded as possible, though perhaps unlikely, based his hopes upon the cumulative effect of an unbroken series of immensely powerful attacks, and believed that under this treatment tho resisting powers of the Allied armies would break down. These hopes and beliefs were clearly stated by the military correspondent of the Hamburger Xav-hrichlcn (Major ScuitEilSEßsnpFEx) in an article published towards the end- of last April. "A great part," he wrote, "and that the best part, of tho enemy forces has been defeated and destroyed. Thereby the reservoir at the disposal of the enemy command has become more and more exhausted, and wc have got considerably nearer to the time when it will yield nothing more. : The work which is before us will also become increasingly easy because the moral factors make themselves more and more felt, and exert a more and more unfavourable influence upon tho position of our enemies. No army, however efficient it may be, and however resolute its leadership, can perpetually escape the effect of constant defeats. The history of war shows that a great success is usually followed by ■ further successes, and that a defeat is very soon followed by other defeats. ... In tho present case Foch, in spite of putting in his reserves, has not produced any change; his countermeasures have remained without effect, and have led only to further defeats and losses. There are also many .indications that the fighting value 'of the troops now brought up is beginning to diminish, and that their moral value is reduced. Battle weariness is increasing. If the enemy is given no rest, and if the German offensive continues to flow without a break, even the physical efficiency of the troops jnust give way."

As an _ English commentator remarked in words which hold even greater force now than when they were written, "it would be interesting to know what Major von Senreibershofen now thinks about the unbroken flow of the offensive." Tho contrast between actual events and conditions and those he pictured as making for German victory is a measure of the leeway the enemy is called upon to make up in resuming his offensive. Grounds for careless confidence do not exist, and the enemy's next bjow, when it falls, will no doubt bo formidable) in proportion to the time taken to prepare it. Duo account must >bc taken also of the fact that on -some sections oi their front the Allies could not concede more than a very limited area of ground without finding them selves in a desperately critical situ ation. But the enemy's manifest, and undoubted failure to realise theexpectations with which he opened tho offensive distinctly brightens the outlook and says much for. tho valour of the Allied armies and tho ability of their commanders.

Comparatively few events in the war theatres arc reported at time of writing, but the Australians have made another addition to the extending list of successful local attacks conducted by the Allies on tko West front. On this occasion tho ground gained was limited in area, but is very important since it gives observation for three miles down a valley north-cast of Villers Brettonnoux._ An enemy avenue of communication on a_ vital section of the front is thus laid open to effective bombardment. Interesting accounts are given of tho operations near tho mouth of the Piavo in which the Italians have very thoroughly rounded off their recent victory, at once taking heavy toll of the enemy in men and material and re-estab-lishing a sound defensive line which incidentally affords a greater margin of security to Venice.