The Dominion. FRIDAY, JULY 5, 1918. THE ALLIED WAR PLAN

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 246, 5 July 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. FRIDAY, JULY 5, 1918. THE ALLIED WAR PLAN

In view of America's magnificent achievement in sending a million men to Franco while the European 'summer is still young, it may seem strange that Britain should be under the necessity of rapidly mobilising all available men and sending thorn across the Channel—possibly to the front—after a barp. tbvee months' training. Ministerial statements made in the House of Commons a day or two ago show that Britain is going to all possible lengths in raising reinforcements, and is withdrawing from essential industries men who can 'bo ill spared. Agriculture, shipbuilding, and coal-mining arc cous'pieuous examples of industries which could easily absorb large numbers of male workers additional to those now available, and are called upon instead to release men for the Army at a time when tho production of food and coal and the construction of. new shipping aro only second in importance to maintaining the fighting forces of the Empire on land and sea. The Munitions Department. also, is releasing a steady stream of men for military service, though it is called upon not merely to maintain, but to constantly increase, the volume of production. As' has been said, it may appear strange that_ Britain is called upon for such an intense recruiting effort now that America is pouring men into Frame at a rate which exceeds all expectations. <There is a logical explanation of this apparent anomaly, however. It was supplied in general terms by Mr. Bonar Law when he said: "Don't think we are in the last ditch. But the whole of the German strategy is based on an attempt to wear out our reserves. It is the. Government's duty to mako certain that we will not suffer such a defeat as will render the 1918 campaign useless." These observations, together with what is now made known about the general progress of Allied reinforcement, serve in an important degree to throw light upon the position reached in the Western campaign. The principal fact emphasised is that though the Allies are' reasonably confident of their ability to' checkmate the enemy's bid for victory, tbe.y ".re still under the necessity of making unsparing efforts in order that whatever thev accomplish this year may tell with maximum effect in paving the way tot the final offensive for which they are building up their strength. • This, of course, is saying no more f.han that the Allied plans and preparations are based ilnon a rational perception of the fact that the dofeat of the enemy's attempt to force a decision this year represents only the initial stage of the task by wmch they are still confronted, -hey have elected meantime to stand on the defensive, believing that they will ultimately be enabled to attack the enemy with the odds of strength and fighting power heavily in their favour, but this policy involves present dangers and risks against which all possible provision must be made. The danger is not so much that the Allied armiqs may be overwhelmed as that they may be so weakened in a defensive campaign as to postpone the decisive offensive for which the Allies intend this campaign to pave the way. The Allies arc playing a waiting game with definite objects in view. They look to the time when a powerful American army, organised,as an independent force (except in the sense that it will be under the supreme control of the Allied Generalissimo) will co-operate with the French, British, Belgian, and Portuguese armies now in the field. At present the American army in France is holding a short front, largely for instructional purposes, although ii account is taken in addition of troops brigaded with French am British units, America is already bearing an appreciable part of the burden of the campaign. With more than a million troops actually in France or on board transports bound for that country, America no doubt could easily expand her immediate assistance to the Allies. Substituting her own men for British recruits she might, for instance, obviate the necessity of further draining_ the existing labour force in essential British industries. But these ends would bo gained at the cost of delaying the independent organisation of the American army.

It has been stated, and no doubt truly, that instead of asking for a great expansion of the assistance the United States is rendering by supplying troop details to be incorporated in French and British divisions, the Allies aim at the eavliesfc possible release of troops already serving in this way, in order ti.r.fc the organisation of the American army may proceed with all practicable speed. With matters so ordered, France, Britain, and the other Allied countries are called upon to shoulder a heavy burden, but they do it inspired and upheld by the knowledge that their present efforts and sacrifices, though they are not easily compassed alter four years of war, arc making it possible for America to throw her full weight into tho scale with the minimum of delay.

It is decidedly the most encouraging feature of tho war situation at its presont stage that the Allies arc able in this way to adapt and subordinate their immediate policy to tho supremo object of creating a decisive superiority of fighting power. There are other features of the situation which justify a hopeful outlook. . Though hia blows have not been without damaging effect, the enemy is at all points short of his objectives. He set out with the expectation of shattering and demoralising the Allied armies by the cumulativc effect of a i:eries of unbroken victories. These expectations have been bitterly disappointed. The enemy's efforts have upon the whole declined rapidly from' the standards he set in the opening phase of his offensive. In succccaing battles he has been more and more effectively mot, .and has secured an ever diminishing return for a given outlay in lives and material. Latterly, in his efforts to prepare another formidable onslaught, he- has been of necessity much hampered as well as seriously disconcerted by the disastrous defeat of his Ausfcro-Hiui-garian allies in an offensive upon which they entered with high hopes. In aerial _ warfare, again, the enemy is being defeated day by day, and is paying the penalty of defeat, though not yet tho penalty that will be cxacted when tho Allied aerial forces have reached something like full development. In spite of the checks and defeats he I has already suffered, tho enemy will undoubtedly strive desperately for victory in the remaining time in which he is permitted to exercise the initiative, and ordinary common sense bids us recognise that there are critical days still to be faced. But with its dangers the situation holds much to warrant confidence, and it is in nothing more promising tnan in the plain evidence afforded that_ the Allies are making every possible effort and sacrifice in order that America may be given the freest possible scope in developing her enormous powers, and that her blow, when it falls, may fall with deadly cffcct. No better evidence could be desired that the Allied commanders are proudly confident of the ability of their armies to meet and ropol the enemy's desperate efforts to force a decision, and it is hero/ too, that we sec most plainly that tho Allies, though they have critical days yet to face, are resolutely following out a boldly-con-ceived war plan in which all else is subordinated to the consideration of final victory.