THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 244, 3 July 1918, Page 7

THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR

PROBLEM CONSIDERED VIEWS OF BISHOP SPROTI THE COMMUNITY AND THE INDIVIDUAI The subject '"The Conscientious Objec ior" was dealt with at length by Bishoj Sprott iu his -address to the Anglicai nofl yesterday. "1 turn now to a subject which then is reason to believe is causing eorni Krai-clung of. heart to many people,' f«!(l His Lordship.' "From tune U lime I receive letters from various part: of Xew Zealand urging me to make aomi pronouncement iu the matter of the con seientious .objectors to military service 1 have hesitated to respond to this ap lH\i! both bccaiibo of the exceeding ditii uilly ot the subject, which J. have nol yet solved to my own satisfaction, aiu because I couul it the. duty of all citt zens iu (lie present. stress in abstain a! tar a.-, possible from any aution whicl Jiiight add to the embarrassments of th< -Vational (.loverimenl. Nevertheless, ] 'Jiink thai those of our own people wbc are perpiexed about this subject have s i ight io such guidance as t may Jie able lo give them, or, at least, to know lion 1 myself view (ho nuestiou. As the present is Hie only opportunity I have of addressing Hie whole dioccse, I desire row (u niaku some suggestions toward? solution of the problem, I shall conline niVM'lf to a consideration of the principles involved, refraining wholly Jrom expressing any opinion regarding j'llege.l abuses m the administration of iho .Military Service Act, as these allegations arc, I understand, the subject o£ •Departmental inquiry. The Problem Stated. . "And first, the friends of the conscientious objector du not seem to me always 'lilite accurately to state this problem. They seem tu n.e, in clfeet, if not iu words, somelimes to statu it thus: The ttmseicncu of the individual versus the iarco of Hie State. 'J.'ho first fault I Jiltd with tiiis stiiteiiient of the problem is not of great importance; still, [ think i l . creates a prejudice. For 'State' I tliould prefer to substitute 'community.' 'Scale,' I think, suggests to us an alien ] ower. imposed' upon us from without; ■whereas,' among English-speaking peoples ;it any rate, 'fjtale' is simply the eoiumunity considered as an organic whole. AVo are, tlio State. Much more serious is the second fault 1 find in this statement of our problem. It i» not the conscience of (he individual against tlio force of the con.niunily; but the conscience of I he individual against the conscience of the (omiuiinity. Thoro can bo a general mind of the community—a general nnaniniily of thought. Indeed, if it were not so, there could bo no community life at ull. Jf wo all thought differently on all matters of practical interest we should each go his own way, .and the cominimity would dissolve. Nor is tlfis general unanimity of thought confined to material interests aione. There can be a genera! unanimity of moral convictions as well. And when this exists, and to the extent thai, it exists, ■we nra jitstilied iu speaking of a general conscience—a conscience of the community. Coming !o tlio matter in hand, the friends of tin. conscientious objector must really admit, if only for the sake of argument, that the waging of thp present war can be with tho general community a matter of conscience. I am i;ot a,vara that any conscientious objector contends that the cause of the Allies Is nn unrighteous cause. I have understood that the Quakers, the weightiest body of objector.,, have consistently held that I lie Allied cause ia a righteous cause, simply contending that, war is not the best way, or a legitimate way, of maintaining ,i righteous cause. But if any community believes that war is a legitimate way—in the given circumstances, the oniy way—of maintaining a righteous cause, then for that' community the wagiiig of • war 'becomes' "a matter ot mora' obligation.' For a oommuuity is as much bound to do what it believes to he right as.au individual is bound. And that the Allied communities, as a whole, do believe this, tlie friends of tho conscientious objector must, as I have said, bo willing to admit. For this, reason the statement ol our problem must bo amended to run: The conscicnco of the individual versus the conscience of the community. It is then a conflict of consciences we have to deal with. Tho community, as an organic whole, feels a cortnin course of action, viz., war, to be morally binding. Certain individual members of the community judgo tho same courso of action to he morally wrong. The community Jnust call upon its members for service; thy individual dissident feels he must reinse lo render that sorvice. Such is cur problem. Tt is plain that if wo are to advance towards any solution of this problem, wc must first como lo eonie agreement as to what conscience ■really is. \\> often call conscience 'the Voice of Clod,' and in the present controversy, when tlio conscience of the community is overlooked, as it generally is, this account of conscience gives the individual objector an immense advantage.

' For it nt cnco suggests thai: Hie community is fighting against God. . . . Tho fuel is, couscioncu is n single word denoting a double fact. Oil the one hand, it denotes the faculty ot moral judgment, by which wo dccido that this or that course of action is right or wrong. On the other hand, it denotes the authority—expressing itself in our iunei sense'of obligation which tells lis wo ought to perform the notion wo have jndgod to bo right, and to eschew the action wo have judged to be wrong. . . . The conception, then, of conscience which we lmvo reached is this: Conscience is a dual fact—divine and human. The particular judgments regarding right nml wrong aro human—aro ours. The authority which bids us act accordingly is God's—His voice. Individual and Community Consciences. "Having decided what we mean by conscience, let us now apply our conclusions to the subjeot before us. I take tlio individual first and shall state certain things which I think the conscientious objector and his friends should bear in mind and carefully consider. (1) And, first, tlio individual objector should try to realise that it Is tlio conscience of the community, and not merely its power, that ho is opposing. Now it is quite true, upon our principles, that the com-munity-conscience is liable to err, and that not seldom nations have been guilty ut great crimes, which ot the tiino were generally approved. But 011 tlio other hand, it must be remembered that the verdicts of the general conscience are free from those personal and private idiosyncracies which may deflect the judgment of the individual. Moreover, it tho individual dissents from the general conscience he must bo prepared to show on what ground he assumes himself to i bo bettor informed than his fellows, and that error is more likely to be 011 their side than on his. To attach 110 weight to a general consensus coiues perilously near general scepticism, unless the indniduul has good ground for believing tnnt lie is free from these infirmities of judgment which beset other men. And 111 Ihe matter of the present war it must bo remembered that tlio consensus is much moro than that of a. single community; it is the consensus of a harm I>art ot the civilised world. Tho individual dissentient must surely admit that this general consensus is ut least worthy ot grave consideration. (2) I wonder whether, , n deciding to withhold from the community the service demanded ol i»ui. lie gnvo full consideration to the claims which tlio cmnmunitv has upon him. In other words, to his indebtedness to the community. This indebtedness 011 the part of rndi of us is manifold and extends to every department oi We. a) It through the community tho individual derives his life Ho did not create himself, nor was ho croatod by Divino fiat. He was born out of and into a family. mid. if that family wore traced through all its generations, its roots would bo found widespread through tho community. That a man has sprung from one community rather than from another makes an incalculable differenco 'to him. It is in no wiso duo to the conscientious objector that lie was born, of a British community rather 'than of a community of Central African pygmies; yet what a iinge differenco it make 3. (b) To the community ho owes nil that makes lifo possible nml comfortable. His food clothing housing, protection, :,ro not tho result of his own unaided efforts, but ot tho general industry and good government of tho community. ( c ) But it is not only Ins physical life that is thus dependent upon tho community, his intellectual lifo is equally dependent, Tho ho spoaks comes to him throuirli tho community. Ho has not himself invented a single word. Had ho grown lip in the sohtudo of a desert island ho would probably liavo no language at nil; but would _ be imitating the inarticulate sounds of Nature. Were ho an African pygmy his speech would bo littlo moro than a series of 'clicks.' And language, wo must remomber, is not merely an instrument for expressing thought, it is also the instrument by which we think. Wo 'think in words, and tho range of our thought is limited by the scouo of our language. A complete train of thought, writes Darwin, can no mora Im> carried on without the aid of words spoken or silent, than a..long calculation without the aid of figures or symbols, tlis education likowiso coniw to him through the community. .No doubt he inust contribute to his own education, but tlio instruments of education, litnru'y, ecienific, technical, have not been discovered or provided by him; ho revived them through the community, (d) His moral life is likewise mediated through the community. His very conscience has been developed through 6oeial relations and activities. Had 110 been a solitary- 'desert-dweller from infancy, conscience would still be asleep within liim. His moral ideas and rules of conduct have m the lirsfc instance como to him through the community. JJo did not tn childhood discover for himsolf a single moral principle or 0 single rule m conduct, .lie did not work out for himself that it was wrong to lie or to steal or to kill. Ho inherited, readyMade, all the great laws of conduct. Had lie been born in Turkey his moral ideal ind moral code would in some important respects differ from that which he now confesses. If ho happpn to bo a moral genius lie may, possibly, in the :ourso of Jiia lifo, discover somo new ind fruitful application of some moral pnnoiplo already recognised; it is unlikely he will discover any entirely new principle, (e). His religions lil'o likewise nimo to him throngh the community lie did not work out for himself the idea of God or of immortality. Had his

lot been cast even as near at hand us tlio ilclaiiesian" Island?, his religion would have ly-HMV quite other than it is. Had ho lived from infancy in the solitude of a desert, lie would probablv have had no religious ideas at alt; or, 'if surrounding nature had awnkened in him some dim conception of Being other than himself, it would have been nil vague and indefinite, 'as of a dumb immensity.'

What the Community Should Rocoflnise. "Let us now consider what. should be tho aliunde of the community towards tlio conscientious objector. Is the couscioutious objector entitled to any consideration at vim hami.s of tlie rouuiiiinitv'! 1 That question is, of course, only part of the larger question: .Is uw individual conscience ever entitled In any consideration when n; contacts with t lie general conscience? There are those who, «» far "s tlio conscientious objector to military service is concerned, would give an immediate and tiuite plain answer. 'I'hey would say., tluit, however lionest and however otherwise estimable, lie is entilled to uo consideration whatever. Those who lake this position should make it clear to themselves whether limy mean Unit the individual cojiscienco is* never to bo considered wlion it conflicts with the general conscience; and if they do not quite mean this, then tliey should ask themselves upon what principle they would differentiate between various cafes. The uncompromising position was, you romember, that taken by Tho Lower liouso of Parliament when the Military Service .Act was iiist introduced. Other counsels subsequently prevailed. I think tilt! second thoughts ol' Parliament were wiser'than (he first. J think the claims of the individual conscience aro entitled to serious consideration, however difficult it may be to determine just to what extent these claims should be allowed. .1 cannot think that any thoughtful people are quite prepared to maintain the contrary. "1 think, then, the Parliaments of England and .New /.calami have done wisely .in recognising in their war legislation tho principle of safeguarding the freedom of tho individual conscience to tho extent of providing alternative forms ot' service for certain classes of those wno conscientiously object t<> bearing arms. J. am aware Unit it is alleged that this legislation does not cover nil tlio eases of real conscientious difficulty which m>.y and do arise; that there aro quite genuine eases of conscientious difficulty unprovided for. I think this is quite likely. But the friends of conscientious objectois should retuomber the exceeding difficulty of the position. Governments cannot read tho hearts of men. it was essential that, as far as possible, tho shirker and tho coward should not bo allowed to escape burdens which other nion were bravely bearing. Above all, it wan essential, as the genuine conscientious objiaitor should be the first to admit, thai the shirker and the coward bhould not bo allowed to disguise themsulvcs as martyrs of conscience. Nothing could bo more fatal to the cause Me truo 01.jector holds dear-nothing more i'atal to human progress—than llrat conscience should be brought into general contempt. It is possible, then, Unit the cnterlm adopted to distinguish the genuine conscientious objector i'rom .tlio i'rauumuit exploiter of conscience is rather rough and ready than strictly logical ana accurate. But seeing that the wiucipm ol recognising tlio individual conscience lias been admitted in our war legislation, I am inclined to think that it had been well if in one respect the recognition had been more generous, viz., by providing for the withdrawal of the conscientious objector from military control ami tho placing of him under the civil authority. It must bo remembered that what iia objects to is tlio very existence of military authority, not merely, perhaps in smno cases not at all, to tl-o disciplino it exercises. Would it inflict any real injury upon tho community if this withdrawal wcro made? Could not tlio civil authority be empowered lo exercise disciplino just as strict and lo supervise and enforce the rendering ot Bucli services as it may count; of real value to the community? Were this done, I think all would bo done that the individual citizen could with any snow of reason expect. Wo liavo reached llie end of this discussion.

"No Wholly Satisfactory Way Out," "1 admit it is not' tin entirely satisfactory conclusion. ...Wo arc left ivitii the possibility of irrcconcilablc conflict between tlio conscience of tho individual and the conscience of tho community. Kadi may lake opposite viows, in a matter of tho gravest practical import, ami where tho gravest interests aro at stake, of what ia morally binding. Neither can wholly give way, l'or each must oo what it believes to ho right. 1 seo to wholly satisfactory way out of the great dilomma. The nineteenth century, in its easy-going toleranco,,liad thought that this dilemma could never arise again; that it bolonged to those dark ages iroiu which sccular progress had finally delivered \is. But tho loleraMti of tins nineteenth century was often nothing better than indifference born of a shallow optimism and an equally shallow scepticism. Whenever communities and men are morally earnest, and' great practical interests aro at fltako, oar problem is all too likely to arise. I have suggested mediating considerations; hut. J cannot find a complete solution. Tho contest is, of course, unequal. The individual must Buffer some inconvenience, some disability, but he will'probably not suffer move than those other servants of conscience who are in tho trenches. But he is not without consolation. History tells us how time and again the unpopular cause, at first championed only bv one or by a few, lina ultimately triumphed. If it were a true and right cause, its ultimate victory is not difficult to explain. After all, other men have consciences, which may be. asleep, indeed but which aro not dead, and the impassioned appeal, tho courageous example, the unflinching endurance, awaken response at last. And there is perhaps a subtler power at work. Ave Imvo learnt iii these days that telepathy is a real, if as yet littlo understood, law or function of human miltire. In hidden unknown ways the thought, tho feel ; ng. the purpose that are in one mind may ipass to other minds. There can be telepathy of conscience. The moral con vlction originating in one conscience m?y pass to another, and yet another, till jl. becomes the conviction of tho mass. But lie who would tako this consolation to himself, must remember that it the voice, which now speaks in his own solitary conscience, is thus to reverberate through the consciences of his fellow-men, it must not only lie-sincere, it must not only be strong; it must also be true lo tho moral unchangeable order of the world and to the will of God."