PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 241, 29 June 1918, Page 6

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

, There is hardly any nc\vs of events in the land theatres at time of writing, but there is every reason to behove that the Germans are prcparmg for a supreme effort-in the Western theatre, and that it will be made with all the desperation to be expected, of those who tree only one way of escape from an otherwise hopeless situation. As Genghal Maurice remarks, the importance of Germany s next effort is increased by the fact thai its failure, following upon Austria s defeat, will have the most disastrous consequences. Many questions are raised by this prospect.. I'or instance, it is by no means certain that in meeting the enemy's major effort the Allies will content themselves with 1 the defensive policy they have pursued since' March. Possibly a- mighty counter-offensive may coinciue with the enemy's onslaught, or may be launched as soon C . IS , deeply committed. But these and .other questions which arise will only he answered by events. It IS fairly certain, however, that although the Allies ha-vo some reasons tor anxiety, the enemy is far more critically placed.

Taking account of tho brilliant naval enterprises in which the Zeebrugge canal was blocked and the fairway at Ostond partly dosed, and of other factors, ic was confidently anticipated that particulars of shipping losses during May would show a marked decline. This expectation has not- been realised. For purposes of comparison the figures for May are embodied with those for the two preceding months m the following table:—

British. IWeiin. Total, ions. Tons. Tons. 5 , ra1 '. ( ! 11 210,00!) 166,<)()ft 382,000 •\P nl - •••■ 220,709 W. 393 '311.W 221.735 .130.959 ,155.091 " this js au 'adjusted a^resute."showins an increase of 0351. toiis on the figures of. British arwl foreign losses in A aril rablcil at an earlier date.

Tho return is in all respects disappointing. Losses are. at ,a very much lower.level than when the campaign was at its worst last year--in April, 1f)1.7, the aggregate losses of British and foreign shipping were, 894,000 tons—but the continued decline that was hoped for is not in evidence. The cablegram giving the May figures mentions, however, that the losses from marine risk—that is to say .from causes other than enemy action—were unduly heavy last month, so that if losses were snown in two categories the position might ap-' pear somewhat better. This relates only to the proportion' of' the lost shipping sunk by mirie and submarine. In the table given above the figures for March and April, as well as J-hosc for May, cover, losses by ordinary marine risk as wclbas those due to enemy action,

| The marked feature of the table i is the heavy increase in losses of Allied and neutral shipping during May as compared with tho preceding nionth._ There is no obvious explanation, but the fact that enemy submarines made their appearance off the American coast carlv this month and were enabled to sink a, number of ships before measures were taken to cope with them, suggests that the item of .Allied and neutral losses will also bulk large in the June return when it is made available. As the_ figures stand, there is an obvious suggestion that the losses of Allied and neutral shipping during April must, be regarded as abnormally low, but the data in sight is not sufficiently comprehensive to permit any very definite conclusion on the subject. There is 110 doubt that measures like, the blocking of Zeebruggo and the general 'and steady rise in the power and efficiency of the anti-!,ubmarinc campaign, hearing fruit in an increasing destruction of submarines, must make eventually for ?. great reduction in shippingJiKses. It is likely that the eneniy is only maintaining the destruction of shipping at its present level by an exhausting effort which cannot be prolonged for any length of time. Such a policy would (it in naturally with the course of desperation to which Germany is committed in the Western theatre. Meantime, however, ship? are stilly being sunk at a rate which is very far from being negligible. A report that the Germans are using less powerful torpedoes than

at i'.u earlier stage of the war owing to lack of explosives is interesting, in view of information already available . which suggests that the manufacture of adequate, supplies of lorpedoes in Germany is opposed by serious difficulties. The production of torpedoes' has a very important bearing on the submarine campaign, because the submarines are being compelled to rely more and more on underwater attack, and undoubtedly accept heavy risks when they venture to rely upon their guns. Recently, when Allied airmen bombed and destroyed a depot at Bruges in which torpedoes were stored it was pointed nut that the production of torpedoes has been to Germany a question second only in importance to the construction of submarines. M.u. li. Whltakkr, who not long ago made a cruise with an American destroyer llotilla in the submarine zone, referred .to this question in an article in Lund and ll aler. Coma statement by Sir Eric Guddes in regard to a heavy destruction of enemy submarines, Mr. Whitaker observed: "This great lot's was aggravated by. that oftorpedoes, which take time and money to make. Indeed, the yearly output of the United States Torpedo Works before the war was only 12. The smaller U-boats carry 10 each; the larger and later types 20. Accordingly, if one be sunk outward bound, which happens quite often, the loss of the torpedoes is greater than that of the vessel. ■ It is highly - improbable that any. U-boat goes down without carrying some torpedoes with her. It is also comforting to know that five ov six arc sliofc away for every merchant vessel sunk. The weekly liag costs the German Guvevnuiciit over a hundred thousand pounds in torpedoes alone."