PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 239, 27 June 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

An announcement lately madethat the Italians h'ad captured 45,000 prisoners in the Piavo battle is the subject of a material correction to-day. The actual number, it is explained, was 4500—a number, which by this time has been considerably increased. The erroneous return now corrected may have given a somewhat exaggerated impression of the magnitude of the disaster that has overtaken the Austrians, but it would be a. great mistake to suppose that because the number of prisoners is comparatively small the enemy disaster and the accompanying success of the Italian armies are of minor importance. That undoubtedly would bo to go from one cxfcreino to the other. There is ample ovidence that the enemy suffered very heavy losses in his difficult and disorderly retreat across the Piave, but whatever the prcciso volume of his losses may be the Italians are certainly to be credited with an achievement of great and far-reaching importance in utterly defeating an offensive pressed with the whole strength of the Aus-' tro-Hungarian armies. For reasons that have recently been touched upon at some length, the Italians arc unlikely in existing conditions to advance eastward of the Piave. Probably they will attempt no such enterprise until the Allies arc ready to undertake a general offensive. As matters stand, reports which: speak of the prospective envelopment of Austrian armies arc obviously baseless. But the Italians have fought a splendidly successful defensive battle, and rounded it off with a punishing counter-stroke. In its total effect what they have accomplished is a material contribution to ultimate Allied victory. Oh *h *

Even n6w reports aro not complete or explicit regarding the losses iu men and material the enemy has suffered on the Piave, but it is definitely stated that along" the whole length of tho river line lie has been driven back to the positions in which he opened his offensive: The Italians have, now followed up their victory in the low country and at Montello hill by a successful attack in the vicinity of Mont Grappa, at tho eastern end of the mountain front, where they have gained important ground and. gathered in more than thirteen hundred prisoners. A counter-offensive on the mountain front is faced by great immediato difficulties, hut it will serve a double purpose It will weaken tho enemy and it will strengthen the Italian front where it is most vulnerable. There is thus every reason to believe that the Italians arc pursuing a much sounder policy than iE they set the chance of a_ spectacular success against thu risks involved in an immediate advance over the low country east of the Piave.

With the German armies still at a halt in France and Flanders, though they aro believed tn be. on tho ovo of another attack, von KuiiuiANN lias delivered a speech in I/ho JleicliHtag which is evidently intended to open ft new peace offensive or to revive the campaign for u German peace which has been more or lesa persistently developed during tho Inst year or two Examined in itii leading details, the latest effort of Uio .K/iisun's Korean Minister mlkiwh no feature tliat can' ho' callod novel or original. It is tho old familiar mixture of bluster, bombast, and (muffling hypocrisy, and as usual there is a studious avoidance of concrete peace proposals, in which Germany would to some extent show her hand. If the speech has any particular significance it .is as indicating that Ger-

many feels it necessary at this time to make tho most of cither weapons than military force. Until they are stricken with madness, tho Allies can make no other reply to such advances, if that word is applicablp, than a resolute defiance and tho most powerful military efforts of which they are capable. With tho alliance against Germany sound and firmly knit, as wo have every reason to believe it is, von Kuhlmass's speech raises no practical issue, but it is of some interest as a clear, though unintentional, exposure of the methods by which Germany hopes to gain the cuds she is unable to gain by purely military means.

The clumsy artifices by which von Kuhlmann attempts to cloak his design only make his real purpose the more apparent. He created a sensation in the Reichstag, we are told, by expressing a doubt if the war would end even in 1919. From this fere is a natural transition to a pious hope that the enemies of Germany will realise that it is a dream that they can fight successfully against the counter-measures which are at Germany's disposal. The gem of tho whole speech is the declaration that nobody believes that Germany strives after world domination or even the domination of Europe. Herb Kuhlmann shows a really touching faith that reasonable people will nofc allow themselves to be deceived by appearances into imagining that Germany dreams of domination. It is true, of course, that during the last fifty years the idea that it is Germany's destiny, to dominate Europe and the world has been taught in German schools and universities, preached in German churches, and popularised ■Hid made familiar by every agency the German Government could utilise and control. Also, it is not to be denied that in this war Germany has sought by every means at her command, including the most, brutal and inhuman atrocities of which a nation has ever been guilty, to subjugate her peaceful and unoffending neighbours, and that in furtherance of her schemes she has sounded unheard of depths of baseness in criminal intrigues and has compassed the apparently impossible feat of intensifying the degradation of ucsts of decadence avid corruption, like the Ottoman Empire. Here Kuhlmann, however, is confident that this evidence and all that might be cited with it to sheet home the charge that Germany has sought and is seeking by every means of violence, fraud, and crime to gain domination over the rest of the world will be brushed aside. No one, he considers, believes that Germany is striving after world domination, or even domination over Europe. It is painful to consider how completely his faith and confidence are misplaced!

He is too trustful first of all in believing that the Allies can be intimidated by words into believing that it is beyond their power to crush Germany and that the beat they can hope for is to indefinitely prolong the war. His peace talk will fall still-born because the Allies, much encouraged by late events, are confident ni their ability to win decisive victory, and were never less inclined than they arc to-day to enter a German-directed peace conference where Prussian generals and junkers would tell them what to do and what they must agree to.