PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 234, 21 June 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

To-day's messages discount the somewhat alarming reports which carao through yesterday, regarding events on the Italian front It now seems clear that instead of having captured the Montollo Ridge, and so being in a position to break through the Italian line, the Austrians have gained only a portion of that elevation, and are Firmly held. Moreover, one of yesterday's messages, 'which indicated that the Austrians had captured thirty thousand prisoners in an advance through the marshy country in the coastal zone, towards the mouth of the Piavc, is now shown to have, been quite misleading. Thirty thousand.is the total number of prisoners captured by the enemy on all sections' of the fr'unt since he opened his offensive on Saturday. Against these losses the '' Italians, though standing generally on the defensive, have captured nine, thou-' sand prisoners. They have captured also many guns, and though their losses of artillery are no doubt greater than these captures, they are not of serious magnitude. As a whole, news in hand at the moment of_ writing suggests that the Austrian offensive will rank as one of the costliest failures of the war, and there is nothing at present to indicate that the failure is likely to bo retrieved. On the contrary, while tho Austrian armies are betraying some signs of demoralisation, the deeds of the Italian troops and the supporting Allied contingents give full weight to the proud declaration made to-day in an official messago: "From the Stclvio Pass (that is to say, from the Swiss frontier) to the sea every man understood that the enemy absolutely must not pass."

As news stands, if the position is at any point critical it is at the Montcllo Ridge. Precisely ,\vhat importance attaches to the foothold the enemy has gained west of the Piave on this part of tho front it is not easy to say, but to take the oourso of events on the mountain

front farther west as a. guide is to find obvious reasons for confidence. It was in the mounfoin area, notably on the Asiago Plateau and on Mont Grappa, that tho Italian front was most seriously menaced. fu this area, where a break-through would enable the enemy to decisively outflank the Italian lino in tho low country and compel a, general retreat, he has made no perceptible headway. The Italians and the supporting Franco-British troops have maintained their positions by a rock-firm defence, supplemented where necessary by counter-attacks. That the enemy's thrusts were parried in this fashion where they were most dangerous gives the strongest grounds for believing that he will not easily gain any "decisive advantage in the jVlontcllo sector.

The miserable failure of tho Austrian offensive as far as it has gone lends colour to the suggestion made to-day that the Germans will launch another big attack in France or Flanders at the earliest possible moment. Ad Mr. Frank Simonds points out, tho fact that seventy-two i Austrian* _ divisions are engaged in the offensive disposes of the possibility of large Austrian forces participating in the warfare on the West front. Moreover, there are indications that the Austrian effort, though it must, of course, still he regarded as holding dangers, is likely to be short-lived. As a military enterprise the offensive is faring badly; the internal disorders of the Dual Monarchy—in particular the growing spirit of revolt among its Slav troops and civil _ populationmake for military failure, and at the samo time are likely to be intensified and aggravated by military failure. It would seem that if Gerhopes to profit in her main offensive by .the diversion in her favour resulting from the Austrian attack on the Italian section of tho single front to which the authority of the Allied Generalissimo now extends she must-act with all possiblo speed. A week or two hence it may bo manifest that Austria is in no condition to co-operate effectually with her ally, and the Entente may be in a position to move considerable forces out of Italy into France. The mere possibility is calculated to influence the policy of tho German command. The poor success of the Austrian offensivo is the last of a series of factors all tending to impel the Germans to the most desperate efforts to compass a decisive success beforo their last hopo Itas disappeared.

ft * * * In a speech reported yesterday, Mb. Bonar Law observed that the Allied Staff knew where the enemy's reserves were, but that his railway communications were so good that it was impossible to foretell where the next blow would fall. It is, of course, mainly because the Germans are in a position to rapidly move troops and guns on their inner lines, and have a somewhat wide choice of objectives, each one of which the Allies must safeguard, that the position remains critical. As the line of contact runs to-day tho Germans are forty miles from Calais and twenty-six miles from Dunkirk. They arc thus a little closer to these ports than they were at the height of their advance in 1914. Farther south they are a long way short of the line reached in 1914, but they are no moro than eight miles distant from Amiens, a railway junction the Allies are bound to defend at all costs, and it is not impossible that they may resume the attempt to move down the valley of the Oise towards Paris in which they lately suffered heavy defeat. Tho general opinion meantime seems to Go that the enemy will launch his next attack in the Lvs salient, making Calais his goal. Ono of to-day's messages speaks of an unnatural stillness oh the British front, and generally of such conditions as arc likely to give place at any moment to a tempest of battle. Bu£ while these portents cannot be ignored, it is evident that if the enemy makes his next big effort in Flanders and Northern France, or in the Sommo valley, he will leave his affairs farther south in a decidedly unsatisfactory state. He has sacrificed many lives and expended tremendous efforts in order to reach tho Manic and effect a limited advance in the valley of the Oise, but as matters stand this outlay his brought no commensurate return. It would have been justified only if he had developed his success to the point of outflanking the _ forest barriers north-east of Paris and straightening his front south of the Sommc below Montdidier. He is, in fact, a long way short of these results, and on the southern section of the front is by no means well placed to resist ah Allied counter-offensive if it should bo undertaken. Should he now concentrate his main efforts in the north his action will suggest, if it does not imply, an admission that his efforts since he attacked the Chomin des Dames havo been extremely disappointing so far as the approach to his essential military objects is concerned.

Much conflicting-evidence is afloat in regard to the relative numerical strength of the Allied and enemy armies, hut Senator Bbrengek, who is* quoted on tho subject to-day, is probably not far wide of the mark in his statement_that the Allies are not appreciably inferior in numbers to the enemy. He emphasises one aspect of a very important fact in his observation that tho apparent superiority of tho enemy is due to his massing men at points' he has selected to bo attacked. No fact is better established than that tho Allies, since the enemy opened his offensive, have opposed him almost invariably in markedly inferior numbers. Assuming, as seems reasonable, that the Allies are not appreciably inferior to tho enemy in numerical strength when account is taken of tho total resources available on either side, if, would follow that they are opposing him repeatedly and habitually in inferior force not so much as a matter of necessity as in pursuance of a deliberate policy. The Germans admittedly have an advantage in the salient formation of their front and in the excellent railway communications inside the salient, which enable them to move forces from point to point more rapidly than the Allies. _ But it is equally clear that the Allies, if they have forces approximately equal to those of the enemy, arc not oxhausting the possibilities of retaliatory action in massing men and guns as rapidly as possible on whatever section of front the enemy has elected to attack. They havo tho alternative of attacking' on their own account in any area they may select, and so in a measure controlling the enemy's dispositions. That tjUcy have taken no such action in the three months since the enemy opened his offensive could bo regarded as a bad sign only if it were assumed that they have no reserves available for a counter-offensive

' If, as Senator Berenger states, tho Allies are not appreciably inferior to the enemy in numerical strength, the reserves which would make a coun-ter-offensive possiblo are undoubtedly available, and the Allies arc refraining from a counter-offensive not as a matter of necessity, but as a matter ot choice, and because the Generalissimo is satisfied that the policy of an economical defensive- is sound, and makes ultimate victory more certain than would a policy marked apparently by greater initiative. * tt tt # Thb later messages relating to Italy confirm the impression that the Allies are making a sound defensive stand on all sections of the line. In such conditions as are described, with the enemy precariously clinging to bridgeheads west of tho Piavc. exposed to a devastating lire and with a swollen river behind him impeding the ilow of supplies, the Italians obviously have no immediate incentive to strive to recover the limited areas they have lost._ They can very well afford to continue the battle in the conditions now reigning.