PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 230, 17 June 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Speculations regarding the transfer of Austrians to the West front and reports* that serious political and racial troubles arc gathering head in the Dual Monarchy should equally be tested by_the events re-to-day. At time of writing thero is no more than a bare announcement that an Austrian offensive has opened with a heavy attack on the Asiago Plateau, and that the Italians are resisting magnificently, but the form of the message suggests that the conflict is destined to develop on a big scale. The general situation on the Italian front is probably familiar. Tho Italian defences in the southern area of the Asiago Plateau, on tho ?dgc of the. mountain country, cover the northern Hank of the Piave line along which the Italians arc established to the sea. Breaking through the Italian defences in the high country and reaching the Venetian Plain, the enemy would overturn the whole Italian line. Though their lino is in this 1 sense vulnerable, however, the Italians are in many respects better off than in the closing months of last year, when they contrived to stem tho enemy onslaught and even made some headway in successful counter-attacks. Since their disasters of last year they havo had nearly six months in which to recuperate and reorganise. Moreover, they are supported by Trench and British contingents and by squadrons of Allied aircraft, which have been conspicuously successful against enemy formations. The British divisions' in Italy, when they were last heard of, were established on the Asiago Plateau, where the enemy is now attacking. _ The French were then holding portion of the Grappa massif, a range of high country between the Asiago Plateau and the Piave. An Italian message just received mentions that a considerable section of the mountain front which constitutes the northern (lank of tho Piavo line is under bombardment, but at the moment of writing no detail news is available of the development of the main olfcnsivc.

There are detailed accounts, however, of an abortive Austrian attack in the Tonale Pass, in the Western Trentino. In this region the Italians' made successful attacks a few weeks ago, and it is evident from the reports which appear today that the Austrian;;' imiiL daborate preparations to restore the situation and attempted to organise a surprise attack on the Gorman model. Their total failure is so much the more satisfactory. * * * *

It is now plain that the Germ,ins havo been heavily defeated in their latest attempt to force the Allied line in tho Western theatre. Thanks

to the tenacious defence of . the French troops, upon whom tho burden of the battle fell, and the spirited counter-attacks they drove home in its later stages, the enemy is at a standstill in the area in which lie has been attempting during the past week to reduos the Allied salient south of Montdidicr and outflank the great- forests on which the Allied line is now based east of Paris. It. is assumed that he will renew the offensive with all possible speed, since each day of delay makes his situation less promising, and the opinion seems' to be general that his next attacks will be launched on the northern front cither in the direction of Amiens or towards the Channel ports. This expectation is based on the fact that the German armies on the northern front commanded by Prixce Bwi'REcht of Bavaria have had a period of comparative rest, but it is, of course, provisional. Whatever the enemy's plans for the futur3 may be, there is no doubt that he has suffered a heavy check on the front which ex-, tends from Montdidicr to the region south of the Aisne, and for a number of reasons his defeat in this area appreciably improves tho outlook from tho Allied point of view.

The defeat inflicted on the enemy cannot bo dismissed as a passing reverse. His aim in the battle obviously was to expel the Allies from the extensive salient they held, and' still hold in great part, south of Montdidicr. Succeeding, lie would not only have outflanked the forests which cover tho approaches to Paris from the north-east, but would have straightened and greatly improved his front south-cast of Amiens. Much has been heard during tho last week or two about tho threat to the French capital, but while there is no doubt that the Germans aimed at occupying Paris, or, failing that, at making a sufficiently closc approach to subject tho city to close bombardment, the relation of tho. battle which has now ended to the position on the northern front cannot for a moment be overlooked. Considering the strategic importance of Amiens as a vital link between tho Allied armies on north and south, it would be rating the intelligence of the German commanders "very low to imagine that they were not even more intdnt upon clearing tho way for a drive on Amiens than on occupying Paris or bombarding it at comparatively close range. The point is worth emphasising because if the. Germans shortly resume their offensive on some part of the front north of Montdidicr they will do so at a material disadvantage as a result of the" defeat they have suffered between Montdidicr and the Aisne. The ground they have gained in this area will hardly counterbalance the enormous losses they have sustained in winning it. On the front from Montdidicr to the- Aisne the French are firmly established -in strong positions covering the northern ilank of their forest defences— positions from which the enemy will certainly not dislodge them without incurring iurther heavy sacrifices. The diversion south of the Aisne by which tho enemy attempted to improve his situation in the final phase of the battle, was, from his point of view, a culminating disaster. He launched five divisions in attack on tho short front between tho Aisne and the forest o£ Villers Cotterets. He. succeedcd, however, in gaining very little ground, and his losses in this enterprise are estimated at twenty thousand menmore than half the total infantry employed.

According to Sir Frederick Maurice, the Crows Prince, since he opened his attack on the Chemin cles Dames, has employed at least •13 of the 70 divisions which Hindenburg was holding in reserve on the West front at the end' of Mav. Accepted as reliable,' this estimate goes far to warrant General Maurice's conclusion that the German menace, though it is still formidable, is not as formidable as at the end of May. For some time yet the enemy will no doubt be able* to reconstruct his wrecked divisions fairly rapidly, but it is fairly certain that even when restored in numerical strength they will show a mater-, ial decline in-quality. An account is given to-day of the long and elaborate training of enemy troops in _ methods of open warfare which preceded the present offensive. Tho standards thus attained are bound to decline as shattered divisions arc filled up with new levies. One serious aspect of the situation to which General Maurice directs attention is that as a result of. tho enemy's attacks and occupation of additional territory the Allied front is now 70 miles longer than it was in the middle of March. So long as_ it is .left to the enemy to attack this lengthening of tho front gives him a material advantage, which is, of course, accentuated by the fact that he is manoeuvring inside a salient, and there is a danger that surprise blows, of which the attack on the Chemin des Dames is the latest example, may be repeated. It is to be assumed, however, that the Allies are least liable to be surprised in tho areas where attack would most seriously threaten the general security of their line. General Maurice to-day hazards tho theory that the attack on the Chemin des Dames was an experiment, and that a movement on Paris across the Aisne had no place in the original German plan. It seems at least possible that the departure made from the original plan may have been unwise. The enemy's initial success on the Aisne was overwhelming, and gave hirn a great deal of territory, but it also involved an expenditure of' resources which might have brought a much better return on other sections of the front. Success in his latest onslaught, between Montdidier and the Aisne, would have enabled the enemy to round off his southern success, and besides exposing Paris would have paved the way for effective action on the northern front. Instead of gaining these objects, however, the enemy has failed und failed badly. His surprise attack on the Chemin des Dames gave him a spectacular success;, but it is by no means clear that his general prospects are thereby improved.

The obscurity which shrouds tho question of reserves' is not lightened by a statement attributed to-day to Mr. llilaire Belloc. It is to the effect that the German numerical superiority in the West is as ten against seven; and that the odds will lie redressed by the Americans. but it will take four to six months' to do so. Assuming that it relates to total German and Allied strength, this statement is difiicnlt to reconcile with such facts regarding Allied and enemy strength as have lecn made available. The matter is not cleared up by assuming that Mr. Bklloc is allowing for a maximum transfer of Austrians to the Franco-British front, for Italy has

considerably more men under arms than Austria, ancl heavy Italian reinforcements \y,ould no doubt be sent to France if the Ausbrians denuded their own frout in order to second and support the German offensive. Taking it that not less than 100,000 nor more than 150,000 Americans per month will bo transported to Franco during the second half of this year, it would appear from Mr. Belloc's statement that a minimum of '100,000 or a maximum of 900,000 Americans will turn the balance of numerical strength in favour of the Allies in the Western theatre. Accepting the minimum number, it would follow that tl:e enemy now has a total available strength on tha West front of about 1,300,000 men, and that the Allies have less than a million. These figures, of course, cannot be accepted. They are much too low. Taking the maximum estimate of the number of Americans needed to redress the adverse balance—and it would be somewhat optimistic to believe that more than 000,000 Americans will be transported to France during the next six months—tho enemy would be credited with a strength of 3,000,000 in line and in reserve, ai:d tho Allies with a force of 2,100,000. Three millions may be something like the enemy's actual strength, but it is impossible to believe that the Allies have no more than 2,100,000 men at disposal even if the whole of the 800,000 Americans thus far landed in France arc ignored. It seems likely that Mb. BellocTs statement has 'been given a distorted meaning by being divorced from its context.