THE NAVY'S WORK

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 229, 15 June 1918, Page 3

THE NAVY'S WORK

FIGHTING THE SUBMARINES

WAR CABINET SURVEY

"Tlio naval operations for the year fall ns usual under the fivo main objects which it is the purpose of tho Navy to achieve," states the report of the \Vnr Council for the year 1917. "The first is to meet and if possible annihilate the enemy's armed forces; the second to prevent supplies reaching the enemy; the third to ensifre that supplies come to this country; tho fourth to stop- invasion or raids on the British coast; the fifth to maintain the sea communications of the armios fighting on the various fronts. "The Battle of Jutland had not changed the general situation. The enemy fleet still maintained a tlefeneivo policy, remaining in the security provided by elaborate minefields, supported by a system of coast defence far more complete than is to bo found in any other part of the world, as an adjunct to which they had their outpost in the strongly defended island of Heligoland, the lattor, also serving as nn advanced base for their destroyers, submarines, aircraft, and patrols. In these circumstances it has not been possible to make an attack on the Hisfh Sea Fleet in the past year, and all the Grand Pleet has been nble to do is to maintnin an incessant watch that no opportunity may be missed of bringing the enemy's fleet to action or attacking any of its unite that may venture to sea. * ,

"Condemned to inactivity in its primary duly, the Navy has unceasingly pursued the other objects of naval poticy. The Wockade has been tightened. The intervention of the United Statas in April. 1917. both facilitated tho work of the Navy and relieved il; of a, measure of the heavy responsibility which it had hitherto supported. From time to time statements have been made in Parliament on behalf of the Ministry of Blockade have clearly indicated the increasing success with which this economic pressure' lias been applied to the enemy. At the same time the Fleet has oeen responsible for conditions at sea which have, not encouragpd the enemy 1.0 make any attempt to invade these islands or the territory of any of our Allies, or to recover any of his lost possessions. "All this work has been comparatively simple. The Navy's most arduous task has been the incessant struggle to guard our lines both military and economic, and no work it has ever had to perform has called for more exacting toil and devotion, or higher technical skill. Tim result has been to defeat the enemy's purpose. In the opening months of the year he announced that ho had decided to resort lo unlimited submarine warfare . . . After delivering a, justification of the now policv to tho .Reichstag, Herr von Bethniiuin-liollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, received a number of German politicians, who apparently still felt some doubt as to tho wisdom of tho course adopted. Asked whether Germany would not lose more than she could gain by_ her new policy, the Chancellor replied-, 'The blockade must succeed within a limited number of weeks, »• ithin which America cannot effectively participate in.tlie operations.' And lie. added that the decision to apply submarines unshrinkingly was based on the Admiralty's' calculations that tho world tonnage, which was practically all at the disposal of the Entente, had reached the minimum below which the Entente could not continue the war.

•'The now policy of the enemy thus announced added materially to the responsibilities of the Navy. To moot this new a.nd serious step drastic measures had to bo taken to supplement those adopted iu the previous December and January. Tho Admiralty realised from the first tho character of the emergency, and the Anti-Subniaxiue Department was very largely expaaded and strengthened. At tho same time more aid was eonght of mechanical engineers and physicists, and the host scientific brains were brought to bear on (ho problem. From all parts of the world suggestions were received as to new methods which might bo employed in combating the tmbninrine, and all these suggestions wore investigated, either at the Admiralty or by the Board of Investigation and Bcscarch, under Lord Fisher. Attention was also directed to the adoption of further means for the protection of merchant ships.

"For effective measures against the submarine overy device, both offensive and defensive, had to J>o utilised, and their elaboration was a matter of time. In many cases scientific research, '.extending over ninny months, was necessary before action could be taken. In other instances the devices adopted involved extensive work in the shipyards and workshops of the country. Day by day the Naval Department specially concerned gained fresh eiporience of tho manner in which the enemy was conducting his operations, and i'resh expedients were examined. In circumstances of much difficulty the Admiralty adopted measures of nil kinds with the object of roducing the lossee of merchant ships at sea, and eventually of overcoming entirely the submarine menace." Prompt and vigorous actiou was taken to push on with the arming of merchant ships, which often involved tie strengthening of j the ships, and therefore took time; instructional cln-:ses for officers and men of the merchant navy were also started at selected ports, the object beini' to inform merchant officers of tho best methods of detecting and eluding the enemy's underwater craft in various ways, and to train dock hands in the use of the guns and other weapons and devices which they would have to handle at sea. By common consent tho greatest- benefit has resulted from those classes. Tho grenter purt of tho merchant fleet has been defensively armed during the past year, owing to the great efforts that have been made by nil concerned in the direction, supply and manufacture, and a largo proportion of the persunnel has received socialised in-! struction." The report refers to the growth of tho auxiliary patrol and mine-sweeping (leet, which numbered about 3500 vessels at the end of the year, , and to the success of the convoy system. "The general rosuits of the various measures adopted by the Admiralty to combat tho submarine menace are sufficiently known from the weekly returns of shipping losses," it added. "But this is not the whole of the account, for the Admiralty have good reason to believe that since the beginning of the war betwton 10 and 50 par cent, of the German submarines which have operated in home waters havo been captured, sunk, or otherwise destroyed. ! What this measure of success has cost in effort, skill, and persistence "" ° R b' be realised by fixing attention en the formidable cupnbilitice of tho new wtapon in its recent developments. Tho tierman submarine hue a surface speed up to 18 knots and a submerged spcr-l of from 10 to 11 knots. She carries from 15 to i! 0 torpedoes; she cm travel 100 miles completely submerged; and she can remain under wntcr sitting on tlm bottom for a period up to ■Iβ hours. A submarine attacking with a torpedo only N shows about three inches of periscope at intervals, with the result that fow nl:ius which arc torpedoed ever 6ee the submarine which carried out Ihe attack. The range of the lorpedoes lirod by a siibmarino is anything up to " v <> miles, and the speed of the torpedo ik ae high ns 40 knots. . . . Vol. in spite of thn insidious and far-reaching powers of tho attack, its effect has been fur below : what tho German people were promised."