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A NAVAL OFFENSIVE

Desire rather, than belief must have prompted the, bombast on the subject of a German naval offensive with which Admiral von Tirpitz was credited in a cablegram published yesterday. He told an interviewer, it is stated, that: "Germany is in 'A position to measure herself with fche British Fleet. After our land forces push the French and British back to the other side of Paris it will be the Kaiser's turn to drive the .British' off the seas." Talk of this kind will hardly go clown even in tho Fatherland, where the significance- of Allied naval supremacy aud mastery of the seas is upon the whole fairly well recognised. Captain Persius, the- foremost German naval critic, has lately been warning his countrymen that it is foolish to expect decisive results from the submarine campaign, and evidence that even larger and more vital aspects of the naval situation are also appreciated in Germany is afforded in such comments as were made not long ago by the Frankfurter Xeitwig. After admitting that the Germans "have a better view than before of tho true position of the sea war," and are seeking a decision on land, it goes on to remark : ; While, it depends upon the military situation whother the English Meot and tho English blockade will later on have tho strategic value which to-day, in spilo of tho Gorman counter-blockade, indisputably belongs to them, it will, on tho other hand, always bo the nature of German peace policy that will decide whei-her the Anglo-American coalition shall fed it necessary to call out its last ship to fight against the German 1 peace- conditions.*

There is here a plain though grudging admission that Allied sea-power is and will remain a decisive factor in tho war, and probably not many Gentians are ill-informed enough to believe that Germany is in a position "to measure herself with the British Fleet." The truth, of course, is that Germany has escaped the ultimate penalties of naval defeat only by keeping her fighting ships under the shelter of minefields and shore defences, and that the Allied sea blockade would still hold her in an iron grip no matter what,victories she gained on land. The submarine calnpaigμ is definitely a- failure, although its depredations have not yet been reduced to the point at which the Allies could regard them with indifference, and Germany has not the resources in surface- ships \vbich would encourage her to attempt a transformation of existing conditions at sea. It is unlikely that by taking over ships of the Russian Baltic Fleet or in any other way she has appreciably reduced _ the- considerable margin of superiority possessed by the British Navy, and taking account of the American capital ships which arc now co-operating with our own Grand Fleet it is certain that the Allied blockade is supported and maintained by an overwhelming body of force.

Attempting, to break the blockade, Germany would simply give tho Allied Hects,' and particularly the British Navy, tho opportunity"which has been long and eagerly awaited. On the other hand it is by no means improbable that she may send out tho High Seas Fleet in a forlorn hope attack upon the Allied sea communications between England and France. This, no doubt, is the possibility envisaged in a message which states to-day that a considerable body of British naval opinion supports M. Marcel Hum's view that a. sea battle may synchronise with.the next great attack on the north front. It is believed, the message adds, that if the Germans think they are winning they will risk everything in a wild effort to increaso the strain everywhere and break down the' Allies' nerve. Probably it would be more correct to .say that if the Germans see even faint prospects of obtaining such results by using or sacrificing their fleet as would suffice to turn the scale on land they may be tempted to risk a naval sortie. Such an enterprise would have nothing in common with an attempt to challenge Allied supremacy at sea. It would represent instead an attempt to disorganise the Allied sea communications by a surprise blow to such an exterit as would compensate for tho probable loss of the attacking fleet, Like every other form of offensive action open to the enemy.an attack on these lines would raiso cortain dangers to tho Allies, but it is more important that such an attempt by the High Sens Fleet would givo'lhwu an opportunity they would eagerly seize. Tho British Navy has splendidly demonstrated thai it is governed by no limited conception ofi tho obligations involved in gaining and maintaining command of the seas. Tho spirit and organisation which have'enabled it to coop up the enemy's fighting ships in their ports, to sweep his traffic from the seas, and to successfully attack forraidably fortified and supposedly impregnable coastal bases like Zeebrugge and' Ostend will assuredly not fail it should tho enemy venture to force tho pace of naval warfare in order to supplement his efforts, on land. Tho confidence inspired by the proud record of the. British Navy is, of course,' strengthened by ' the knowledge that American battleships havo joined forces with it in European waters. A glimpse of what this cooperation means was sriven recently when <i party of American delegate's visited some of the North Sea bases. The delegates were told, according to a report in the London Times, that the United States naval units were doing tho same work as that of the British Fleet, that the relations of the two navies were of th© closest and friendliest character, and that there would be a "whoop of joy" when the United States arm had an opportunity of engaging the common enemy. When nne'of the party told the commander of ■ an American battleship that ho was glad to see American ships assistin? the British 'Navy, the officer replied :

No, that won't do fit nil. The fact is we now look upon ourselves as part of the British Navy, and we have every reason to do so. The whole relations between us aio of the most amicable kind. Everything 'runs smoothly, easily, and nicely everywhere, and nothing could 1)0 better than the way in which wo are cooperating. Except in purely technical matters, there is nothing whatever to distinguish the two navies.

There is no doubt that'the enemy has a strong incentivo to use his fleet in supplementing and supporting his operations on land, but it is equally clear that the considerations calculated to dissuade him from such an enterprise are of such a nature that only desperate necessity will tempt him to disregard them. A fleet enervated by_ long confinement, to harbour is in no condition to" try conclusions with the combined British and American Navies —in their aggregate strength by far the greatest as well as the most efficient naval force the world has ever seen.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19180614.2.16

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 228, 14 June 1918, Page 4

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,151

A NAVAL OFFENSIVE Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 228, 14 June 1918, Page 4

A NAVAL OFFENSIVE Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 228, 14 June 1918, Page 4

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