THE LICHNOWSKY REVELATIONS

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 224, 10 June 1918, Page 6

THE LICHNOWSKY REVELATIONS

HERR VOH JAGOW'S COMMENT

NEW ADMISSIONS

German newspapers which recently reached London contain the lengthy "observations" of Kerr von Jagow on Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum. It will be romemborert that Herr von Jagow, formerly German Ambassador in Home, was Foreign Secretary from January, 1913, until nearly tile end of 1916. His "observations" aro dated from Munich on March 20, and several passages indicate, that he wrote them from memory, without reference to documents. As Herr von Jagow's "observations" aro published by the German Government, his methods are no doubt deliberate and not due to tho quarrels connected with his own dismissal.

Herr von Jagow writes with studied caution, and a great deal of what ho says has little or nothing to do with the real points of the Lichnowsky memorandum. In one point of fact ho corrects Prince Lichnowsky; ho denies that he himself visited Vienna at any timo between the spring of 1913 and the outbreak of war. Ho confirms "as far as he remembers" all the expressions attributed to him by Lichnowsky. Curiously enough, his only reference to the Potsdam Council of July 5, 1911, is not a denial that the meeting took place, but the single sentence "On July 5 I was absent from Berlin." In regard to Lichnowsky's main charge?, Jagow uses such expressions as "an unheard-of assertion," "a mass of inaccuracies and perversions," and so on, but'ho does not meet the charges with any fresh arguments whatever, and he merely refers to the former publications of the German. Gov-, eminent. Concerning the conversations which took place in Juno, Mil, between tho Kaiser and the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, Jagow says-.— "At Konopischt no plan was laid down (festgetegft for an active policy against Serbia. Tho Archduke Francis Ferdinand was not at all the advocate of a policy leading to war, although he was often reckoned as sneh. During the London Conference ho advised moderation and avoidance of war."

It will bo seen that Herr von Jagow carefully avoids the issue. Prince Lichnowsky \did not say that a definite schemo wits arranged at Konopisoht, and ho indicated, not that the Archduke Ferdinand was in .favour of war, but that his death was a positive relief to the advocates of war.

Much more interesting than tho otlVr parts of the "observations'' is Herr yon Jagow's new account of his own policy, especially towards England. Ha says:— "When, in January, 1013, I was appointed Secretary of Stnto I regarded an Anglo-German rapprochenwnt as desirable, and an agreement about tho points at which our interests touched or crossed as obtainable. In any case, I wanted to try to work in. this sense. A main point for us was'tho Mesopotamia-Asia Minor question—tho so-called Bagdad policy—because it had become for us a question of prestige. If England wanted to push us out there, a conflict seemed, indeed, to mo to be hardly avoidable. As soon, .as possible I took up in Berlin tho settlement, abnut tho Bagdad railway. Wo found the English Government 'ready to meet us, and the result sas tho agreement which had almost been completed when the world-war broko out. . ~ ~ "At the same time the negotiations about tho Portuguese colonies, which had been begum, bv Count Mcttormch and continued by Baron Marachall were resumed by Prince Lichnowsky. I intended to begin later on-when tip Bagdad railway question, in my opinion the most important question, had been settledfurther agreements about other questions, iu t.ho Far East, for example. .Tagow says that he, like Lichnowsky, deliberately avoided the naval question, and he briefly delends the raising of the Albanian question on tho ground that Germany was bound to defend Austria, and could not disinterest herself in. the Balkans to the extent recommendod by Lichnovsky. „ At tlio end of his "observations Herr von Jagow restates his policy as lot-

°' V 'l'also pursued a policy which aimed at an agreement with Enghnd, because I was of tho opinion that this was the only road by which we could get out 01 the unfavourable situation into which tho unequal distribution of strength and the weakness of the Triple Alliance had broueht us. . . .' ~,,,,■ 1 " 'Political marriages until death us clo part,' are, as Prince Lichnowsky says, impossible in international relations. But in tiic existing state of affairs in Europe isolation's are equally impossible. Ihe 'history of Europe is composed of coalitions, some of which have led to the avoidance of wars and some to violent conflicts. A loosening and final dissolution of old unions-which no longer satisfy all the conditions cannot be recommended until new constellations are within reach. That was the aim of ouV policy of rapprochement with England (sic;. As long as this policy did sot provide trustworthy guarantees we could not abandon the old sccuntiesand the obligations which they involved. "Our Morocco poljicy has led to a political defeat. Happily this had been avoided in the Bosnian crisis, and (it Hie London Conference. A fresh diminution of our prestige was intolerable for our position in Europe and in the world. The prosperity of States, and their politicnl and economic successes, depend upon the prestigo which tliey enjoy in tho Thus H"rr Ton Jagow indicates that the aim ,of Germany was. first to break up the Triple Entente and to draw England into trm G»rm<m ' nrrnt. and then to abandon the Triple Alliance! Incidentally, Herr von Jagow remarks:— -> , . , "1 am by no means willing to i" low the opinion, which is at present widelv Md in G'-rmnnv. that Maud laid all the mines which caused tlio war: on the contrary. T belike in Sir.TVWd. Grey s love of peace and in his serious wish to Teach an agreement with us. But he hnd involved liimsflf tn« deeplv in tli» net of Frnnoo-T)u=sian policy. He coiihl no lonwr fi«d the mv out. and ned«" not prevent the world war-as he could hnve done. Amon* the English wm e also the war was not popular, er.fl ael--rinip l'"d to serve as a-b«Hl''fi»ld. Tot Herr von Jmrow was foroism Reoretarv durh- the first two v»ars of war and wni therefore responsible for the vVle German camwiism of li«s a limit England, and especinllv about the policy and personality of Sir Edward .Grey.