The Dominion TUESDAY. JUNE 4. 1918. OPEN WARFARE

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 219, 4 June 1918, Page 4

The Dominion TUESDAY. JUNE 4. 1918. OPEN WARFARE

Some very confident opinions in regard to the course events are likely to take in the Western campaign have- come over the cables during the last day or two, but they are chiefly of interest as showing what widely different possibilities are open. Excluding the high '.command on either side, no one is really in a position to say meantime whether or not a decisive conflict is destined to take shape on the present battlefield, but the possibility certainly cannot bo overlooked that the main conflict may shift again to the. north. Attention is largely concentrated at present upon the prospects of directly countering the oncmy's latest thrust, but it is becoming clearer every day that practically everything depends upon the movement and effective uso ot reserves, and that in the most definite sense siege warfare has given place to a war of movement. With matters in this state it obviously cannot bo assumed that the only course open to the Allied Generalissimo is to bring the full weight of his reserves to bear in the area the enemy has selected for his latest offensive stroke. It may be that the time is near when the Allies must turn from an economical defensive to an attack of maximum power, but should this be the ca'so it is quite likoly that they may attack in an area widely removed from that in which they are now so heavily engaged. They might, for instance, elect to open a drive from the region of Arras and the Vimy Ridge against the enemy's main communications running along the Meuse to Lille. In the conditions which have been reached there arc almost 'endless possibilities of manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre, and while thee arc factors in the situation which materially favour the enemy—notably his ability to move troops rapidly round the interior lines of his salient _ front—it is equally true, as is pointed out in the official review published today, that his enterprise- is attended by serious risks. His rapid thrusts arc overwhelming in _their initial effects, but since they involve pushing forward masses of men, often_ a long way ahead of effective artillery support, they are made at such o. cost in lives as to constitute an exhausting effort which cannot be maintained for any great length of time. General Foch and his subordinates are grappling with a complex problem in at once husbanding their reserves and preventing the enemy from reaching any vital objective, but the observation in the official review that the Allied Generals are probably more than the equals of the enemy in such a war of movement and manoeuvre as is now developing is justified not only by'what is known about the respective .schools of strategy but by the experience of the war. From the day when they invaded Belgium the Germans have never once developed a strategic plan to a point of decisive, success against an enemy of anvthing like equal strength. They liavc on several occasions conspicuously failed when the odds were heavily in their favour. This was their experience at the Manic and at Verdun. They stopped a lontr way short of decisive success in Italy. They have succeeded only against minor opponents or, in the case of Russia, when their military problem was solved for thein by the political collapse of their enemy.

The experience of thd present offensive also goes to show that the Germans arc- much more formidable in siege warfare and in dealing with problems of fixed defenco than in the contest of movement and manoeuvre which in three groat battles, and more definitely in tho present battle than in those which preceded it, has followed upon the reduction of fortified lines established on dominating heights and observation points which, under the conditions that, formerly obtained, were rightly regarded as of crucial importance. In Flanders, particularly, the Germans, after they had mastered tremendously strong positions, were brought to a halt in ground which left much to be desired from the defensive point of'view. Events in Flanders and also those of the later fighting in tbo Somnie Valley lend point to some observations on the subject of open warfare lately made by an American military writer: "Experience counts, no doubt, in any form of battle; but in the open fighting now under way on the Western front there is less room for minute preparation; there is more opportunity for the native qualities of an army which, given adequate leaders, still count for victory and defeat." The immediate result of the enemy's desperate attempt to drive westward between the Oise and the Marne and outflank tho Allied lino extending to tho sea has yet to appear. As news stands no great change has been made in the state of affairs reported yesterday. But whatever its immediate _ result _ may be, the enemy's action in this battle has undoubtedly done much to hasten a decisive lest of leadership and fighting power in open warfare. The result cannot be foretold, but it certainly/ makes for confidence that the enemy has so often been outgeneral led and outfought on occasions when his success seemed all but assured.