THE REVELATION

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 216, 31 May 1918, Page 6

THE REVELATION

GERMAN PRINCE INDICTS HIS COUNTRY EX-AMBASSADOR'S STORY OF INTRIGUE LICHNOWSKY'S MEMOIRS IV. [The following is the concluding portion of tho text of the Licit nowsky pamphlet, in which the German ex-Ambassador at London tells tho 5 story of hoT his countrv schemed for r war, which lias been received by eablet gram from the Ministry of Informai tion, London, through ■Renter's I Agency. The pamphlet furnishes a complete answer lo Germany's ■assertion that lie was not responsible ! for the war. The following sets forth the German ex-Ambassador's comments i on the Serbian crisis and the events i of July and August, which marked I the development of tlio European war crisis.] THE SERBIAN CRISIS ] At the end of Juno I went to Kiel by 1 command of the Emperor. A few weeks prior to this I had been made an honorary D.C.Ij. of Oxfoid, an honour which had not been conferred on any German Ambassador since Herr von Bunsen. On board tho Meteor wo learned of tlw death of tho Archduke. The Emperor regretted that his efforts to win him over to his way of thinking had thus been rendered vain. I do not know whether (he plan of an active policy against Serbia had already been decided.on at the Kc'nopischt. Ar. I was not instructed about views and events in Vienna, I did not attach very great importance to this

occurrence. Later on I could only remark that among .Austrian aristocrats a feeling of relief outweighed other sentiments. On hoard the Meteor there was also an Austrian guest of the Emperor, Count Felix Thun. He had remained in his cabin all tho time, suffering fiom sea-sickness, in spite of tho splendid weather, but on receiving the news recovered. The fright or the joy lad cured him. On my Arrival in Berlin I saw the Chancellor, mid told him that I considered the state of our foreign relations very satisfactory, as we were on better terms with England than we had been fo> a long time, while in France also the Government was in the hands cf ■ a pacifist Ministry. Herr von Befhmann Hollweg did not appear to share my optimism, and complained about Russian armaments. I sought to reassure him, emphasising the fact that Russia had no interest in attacking us, and that, such an attack would never receive Anglo-French sunT>nrt, as both countries v.nnted peac?. Thereupon I went to Dr. Zimmermnnn. who was ncti'Mr for TTerr von .Tar/ow, and he told me that Russia wag about to raise WW.flrtO additional tvonns. His language betrayed unmistakable annoyance with Russia, which was "everywhere in our way." There were also difficulties in economic policy. Of course, I was not told that General von Moltkc was pressing for war, but I learned that Herr von Tschiraehky-had been reprimanded hwnuse he reported that he lind counselled moderation toward Serbia in Vienna. On my return from Silesia to London I stopped only a few hours in Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended to take steps against Serbia iu order to put an end to an impossible situation. I regret that at the moment I under-estimated the importance of the news. I thought that nothing wouli? como of it this time, cither, and matters could easily be settled, even if Russia became threatening. I now regret that I did not stay in Berlin and at once declare that I would not in a policy of this kind. Subsequently I ascertained that at tho decisive conference at Potsdam on July 5 the Vienna inquiry received tho unqualified risseirt of all the leading people, nnd with the rider that no harm would be done if a war with Russia should result. Thus it was expressed, at any rate, in the Austrian protocol which Count Mcnsdorff received' in London. Soon afterwards Herr von Jagow was in Vienna to consult Count Berchtold about all these matters. At that 'time ' I received instructions to induce the British Press to adopt a friendly attitude should Austria administer the CTmp tie grace to tile "Great Serbia" movement, and to exert my personal influence to prevent public opinion from becoming inimical to Austria. It one remembered England's attitude dur. ing the annexation crisis, when public opinion showed sympathy for the Serbian rights in Bosnia, as well as her benevolent furtherance of national movements in tho days of Lord Byron and Garibaldi, the probability that she would support tho intended punitive expedition against the murderers of the Prince nr>. pearcd so remote that I found myseit obliged to give an urgent warning. But I also warned them against the whole plan, which I characterised as adventurous and dangerous, aiid advised them to counsel the Anstrians to moderation, as I did not believe that the conflict could bo localised. Herr von Jagow replied to mo that Russia was not ready; there would probably be some fuss, but the more firmly wo took sides with Austria tho mors would Russia give, way. As- it was, Austria was accusing us of weakness, and therefore we dare not leave her in the lurch. Public opinion in Russia, on the other hand, was becoming more and more anti-German, so we must just risk it. A Faint Hope.

In view of this atlitudo, which, n's I found later, was based on reports from Count Pourtales that Russia would not move under any circumstances, and which caused us to spur Count Bcrchtold on to tho utmost energy, I hoped for salvation through British mediation, as 1 knew that Sir Edward Grey's great influonce in Petrograd could be used in the direction of peace. I therefore availert myself of my friendly relations with tho Minister to request him in confidence to advise moderation,in Russia in case Austria, as seemed likely, demanded satis, faction from Serbia. At first the English Press preserved calm, and was friendly to Austria becauso the murder was generally condemned. But gradually moro and moro voices were heard, insisting emphatically that however much the crime merited punishment its exploitation for political purposes could not be justified. Austria was strongly exhorted to use moderation. When the ultimatum was published, all the papers with tho exception of the "Standard" were unanimous in condemnation. The whole world, excepting Berlin and Vienna, realised that it meant war—indeed "the world war." The British Fleet, which happened to have assembled for a naval review, was not demobilised. My efforts were in tho first place directed toward obtaining as conciliatory a reply from Serbia as was possible, since the attitude of the Russian Government left room for no doubts about the gravity of the situation. Serbia responded favourably to the British efforts, as jr. Pasitch had really agreed to everything excepting two points, about'which) however, he declared his willingness to j negotiate. If Russia and England had wanted the war in ordor to attack us, a hint to Belgrade would have lw pn enough, and the unprecedented Note would not have been answered . Sir Edwnrd Grey. went throwrh the Serbian reply with me. and pointed out the-conciliatory attitude of the Govern-. ment of Belgrade. Thereupon we discussed his proposal of mediation, which was to include a formula acceptable to | both parties fur clearing un the two ! points. His proposal was that a com- j mittee consisting of M. Cambon, the I Marquis. Imp-riali. am! myself should assemble under his presidency, and it would have been an easy mailer for us to find an acceptable formula for (lie points at issue, which' mainly concerned the collaboration of Austrian Imperial officials at the investigations jn Belgrade. Given goodwill, everything could have been settled at one or two sittings, and iho' mere acceptance of the British proposal would have' brought about a relaxation of the tension, and would have further improved our relations with England. I therefore strongly backed the proposal, on tho ground that otherwise there was danger of tho

world war, through which we stood to gain nothing and lo lose all, but in-vain. It was derogatory lo the dignity of Austria; wo did not intend lo interfere in Serbian matters; we left these to our Ally. I was to work for 'the localisation of the conflict." Needless to say, a mere hint from Berlin would have decided Count Bcrchtold to content himself with a diplomatic success and to accept tho .Serbian reply. This hint was not given; on the coutrary, they pressed on in the direction of war; it would have been such a splendid success. After our refusal, Sir Edward Grey requested us lo submit a proposal. We insisted on war. ' I could not obtain any reply but that Austria bad shown an exceedingly "accommodating spirit" by not demanding an extension of territory. Sir Edward Grey rightly pointed out that even without an extension of territory it -is possible to reduce a Stale to a condition of vnssnlnsc and that Russia would see a humiliation in'this and would not suffer it. The impression grew stronger and stronger that we wanted war under any circumstances. It was impossible to'interpret our attitude on a question which did not directly concern us m any 'other way. The urgent requests and definite assurances of Jl. SaEOnoff, followed by the Tsar's positively bumble telegrams, the repeated proposals of Sir Edward Grey, the warnings of the llarquis San Giuliano and Signor ' Bollati, my urgent counsels, all were of no avail. Berlin persisted; Serbia :nuflt be massacred. The more I messed tho less were they inclined to come round, wero it onlv to deny me the success of averting war in'conjunction with Sir Mward Gr°y. Finally, on tho 29th, the latter decided on the famous warning. I replied that I had invariably reported that we should have to reckon with English opposition if it came to a war with France. Kcpentodly the Minister saidno mO . "If war breaks out it will lie the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen" After that events followed each other rapidly. When at last Count Be«chtoid, who up till then had. at the behest of Berlin, played the strong man, decided to come Tound, we replied to the Kussian mobilisation, after Russia had negotiated, and waited for a whole week I in vain, with the ultimatum and the <lei claration of war.

'■ i Tho English Declaration of War. '! Sir Edward Grey was still looking for 1 : new ways of avoiding the catastrophe. 1 Sir AV. Tyrrell, his secretary, called on ' me on the morning of August 1 to tell • me that his chief still hoped to, find a way out. Would we remain neutral if ■ Franco did? I took this to mean that we should then agree to spare Franco, but ho had meant that we should re- • main altogether neutral—toward Paissia • also. That was the well-known "misunderstanding." Sir Edward Grey had asked me to call in the afternoon. As he was at a meeting of the Cabinet, ho called me up on the telephone, Sir W. Tyrrell having hurried to him at once. In tho afternoon, ■ (however, he talked enly about Belgian neutrality and the possibility thnt wo and France might force ono another into arms without attacking. TJius this was not a proposal at all, but a question without any lif&ility, as our interview, which I have mentioned before, was to take place soon afterwards. Berlin, however, without waiting for the interview, made this leport tho foundation for far-reaching measures. Then there came M. Poincarc's letter, Bonar Law's letter, King Albert's telegram. Tho waverers in t ! Cabinet—excepting three members who resigned—were converted. Till tho very last moment I had hoped that England would adopt a waiting attitude. Nor did my French colleague feel at all confident, as I heard from a private source. Even on August 1 the King had given the President an evasive reply. But England was already mentioned as an opponent in the telegram from Berlin announcing the imminent ganger of war. Berlin was therefore already reckoning on war with England. "Before my departuro Sir Edward Grey received me on August sat his house. I had been called at his request. Ho was deeply moved. He told nit ho would always be prepared to mediate. "Wo don't want to crush Germany." Unfortunately, this confidential interview was mado public, and Herr von Bethniann Hollweg thus destroyed the last chance of gaining peace through England. The arrangements for our departure were perfectly dignified .and quiet. The King had pi-bviuusly sent his Equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to express his regrets at my departure, and that ho could not see me himself. Princess Louiso wrote to me that tho whole family were sorry we were leaving. Mrs. Asquith and other friends came to the Embassy to lake leave. A special train took us to Harwich, where a guard' of honour was drawn up for me. I 'Aas treated like a departing Sovereign. ' Such was the end of my London mission. Tt was wrecked not ]>y the perfidy of tlio British, but by thnt of our own policy. Count Mensdorff and his staff had como to the station in London. He was cheerful, and gave me to understand that perhaps lie would remain there, but he told the English that wo and not Austria wanted the war. Retrospect. Looking back after two years I come to the conclusion that I realised too late that there was no room for me in a 'system that for years had lived on routine and traditions alone, and that' only tolerated representatives who reported what their superiors wished to read, ,■ Absence of prejudico and an independent judgment are resented. Laok of ability and want of character are praised and esteemed, while successes met with disfavour and excito alarm. I had given up - ny opposition to tho insane Triple Alliance policy, as I realised that it was useless, and thnt my warnings were aUributed to "Austrcphobia," to my idle fix (idee fixe?). In politics, which are neither acrobatics.nor a game of red tape, but tho main business of the firm, there is no "nhil" or

"pliobe," but only the interest of the community. A policy, however, that is based only on Austrians, Magyars, and Turks, must come into conflict with Russia, and finally lead to a catastrophe. In spite of former mistakes, all might still have been put right in July, 19W. An understanding with England had been reached. We ought to have sent a representative to Petrograd who' was at least of average political capacity, and to have convinced Russia that we wished neither to control the Straits nor to strangle Sorbin. "Drop Austria and we will drop the French," M. Sazanoff said to us. And If. Canibon told Herr von Jagow, "Von need not follow Austria everywhere." We needed- neither wars nor alliances; we needed only treaties that would safeguard us and others, and secure our economic development, which was without its like in history, it Russia had hcen freed in the West she could again turn to the East, and the Anglo-Russian rivalry would have been' re-established automatically, and without one intervention, and not less certainly also the Russo-Japanese. We could also have considered the question of the reduction of armaments, and need no longer have troubled ourselves about Austrian complications. Then Austria would liave become tho vassal of the German Empire without any alliance—and especially without our seeking hec good graces, a proceeding ultimately leading to war for the liberation of Poland and the destruction of Serbia, although German interest demanded the "xnut contrary. I had to support in London a policy the heresy of which I recognised. That brought down vengeai'cp.-on me, because it was a sin against tho Holy Ghost. My Return.

As soon as I arrived in Berlin I sawthat I was to be made the scapegoat for the catastrophe f c' which our Government had made itself responsible against mV advice and warnings. The report was deliberately circulated by official mierters that I hwl allowed myself to be d«coivd V Sir Edward Grey, becauso if he had not wanted war Russia would not mobilise. Count Porlales, whose reports could be relied .in, was to be pro cried, not the least on account of his relationship. He had conducted hiniscll mnsrnilicenl.lv"; ho was praised enthusiastically and T «-as blamed the more severely "Wh.it -locs Serbia mailer ro Iviis--4"" this statesman said lo me after eight year? m office in Petrograd. Tho Whole thing was a . British trick that I had not noticed. At tho Foreign Office they told me that war would in any case have come inilMO. Then Russia would have been read}, therefore it was better now. The Question of Responsibility. As-is evident from-all official public,".-1

tions—and -this is not refuted by our \\ hi to Hook, which, owing to lli'o poverty of its contents and to' its omissions, is a gravely self-accusing document— Wo encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although German interests were not involved, and the danger of a world war must have liecii known to us. Whether wo wero aware of the wording of the ultimatum is completely immaterial. During tiio time between July 23 and 30, VJll, when M. Sazonoff emphatically declared that ho would not tolerato any attack on Serbia, we rejected the Brjtish proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Kussian and British pressure, had accepted almost Iho whole of tho ultimatum, • annVnlthongh an agreement about tho two points at issue could easily have l»cn reached, and Count Berchtold was even prepared to content himself with the Serbian reply. On July 30 Count Bcrchtold wanted to coino to terms. We sent an ultimatum to ' TMrograd merely because of the. Kussian mobilisation, although Austriahad not been attacked; and on July 31 we. declared war on Russia, altnoiigh the Tsar pledged his word that bo would not order a man to march as long as negotiations were proceeding—thus deliberately destroying the possibility of a peaceful settlement. Tn view of the above undeniable facts, it is no wonder that the whole of the civilised world outside Germany places tite entire responsibility for the worldwar upon our shoulders. "Our Future."

After two years' fighting it is obvious that we dare not hope for an unconditional victory over the Russians, English, French, Italians, Rumanians, and Americans, or reckon on Hoing able to wear our enemies down. But we can obtain a peace by compromise only by evacuating the occupied territory, (lie retention of which would in any event be a burden and rausc of weakness to us. and would involve the Anglo-Saxon wi;l to dominate them. France, exhausted by the .war, will only attach herself still moro closely to Great Britain, nor will Spain continue to resist for long. And in Asia the Russians and the Japanese will spread, and will carry their customs with their frontiers, and tho south will remain to the British. The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxons. Russians and Japanese, and the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His rule will be that of Hiouglit nnd of commerce, not that of the bureaucrat and 'ho aoldier. He made his appearance too Into, and his last chance of making good the past, that of founding n colonial empire, was annihilated bv the world war. For we shall not sunplant the sons of Tchwe. Then will bo realised the plan of the great Rhodes, who saw the* salvation of humanity in tlie expansion of Britondom—in British Imperialism. > .