The Dominion. THURSDAY, MAY 30, 1918. THE BATTLE IN FRANCE

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 215, 30 May 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. THURSDAY, MAY 30, 1918. THE BATTLE IN FRANCE

The early events of the battle which opened along the Aisne front on Monday morning are now more clearly defined than they were yesterday. It is plain enough that by his now familiar methods of massed attack and at the price in lives which these methods entail, the enemy has gained an important tactical success. As yet, however, no reason appears for dissenting from tho view expresed by M. Clemenceau that this battle is only a diversion and that the main attack has still to come. The enemy, as information stands, has mastered the heights of tho Aisnc, and in addition has crossed the Aisnc on a front of about seventeen miles extending cast from Vailly, a town nine miles east of Soissons, to Berry-au-Bac, northwest of Reims. He has pressed forward also in the low country farther cast.* _ Obviously, this is 'not a j minor achievement. The Germans have strengthened the southern face of tho great salient they hold in Prance. They are very much better placed than they were to undertake a drive in the direction of Paris and against the important railways in rear of the Allied line. But while the enemy has gained initial advantages which may possibly tempt him to extend and expand his efforts on the Aisne front, there is another side of the story. A glance itt the map will show that from the standpoint of approach to a strategic object the enemy's latest achievement is very far from comparing with his swift drive towards Amiens in the opening phase of his offensive. On the Aisne front, as Geneuai, Maurice points out to-day, the enemy would have to greatly extend his present advance to seriously threaten the stability of the present Allied line. In order to reach an objective strategically as important as Amiens he must traverse a wide extent of rolling, wooded country, broken by river valleys and lending , itself in an exceptional degree to defence.

To this it is to be added that al-though-it would bo, foolish to attempt to predict the course of events, the enemy has evidently won no such sweeping success in the Aisne region as he did in Picardy two months ago. It is admitted that the Allied lino was thinly held, and that an unyielding- defence against such a concentration as the Germans brought to bear was out of tho question. On the other hand, not only is there no suggestion on this occasion that the Allied organisation was in any respect found wanting, but evidence to the contrary already seems conclusive. The Allied troops retired methodically, in perfect order, and presenting an unbroken front to the enemy. As reports stand they are repelling attacks on the wooded plateaux between the Aisno and the Vesle, a river which along a considerable part of the battlefront pursues a course parallel to the Aisite at a distauce of live miles to (ho south. Apparently tho Allies still hold a considerable' part of the ground between the rivers, and according to one of the later messages in hand their reserves are massing in rear of the plateaux. It may bo the intention of the Allies to counter-attack, when these reserves arc in line, with a view to driving the enemy out of the limited foothold ho has thus far gained south of the Aisne and utilising that river as a defensive barrier. All such questions are open meantime, but it is clear that if the Allies elect instead to fight a retiring defensive battle in this region they have a considerable margin of territory to work upon. French soil will'not lightly be given up, but should strategic,plans demand it a wide belt of territory smith of the Aisnc might be evacuated in a fighting retreat without jeopardising the prospects of ultimate Allied victory. It is so much the more likely 'th.it the enemy attack is a, diversion and not his main effort, and that the Allied command has shown wisdom

; in preferring to sacrifice territory rather than draw unduly upon reserves in meeting it. Orio commentator observes to-day that there is nothing yot to indicate _ that the enemy's reserves are moving, and if he is right an attack of maximum power may open at any time on some part of the original battle front. But it is fairly certain that the Allies also possess a big strategic reserve which lias yet to lie thrown into the scale. The presence of a British army on the A isne front is the latest of many indications that the Allies arc prepared to go far in opposing tho enemy's hammer-blows in relatively ■ light force. On any other assumption than that the- Allies arc holding strong forces in reserve the events of the campaign to the present date would constitute a puzzle defying solution. As an American military expert pointed out recently, tha only reasonable explanation is that the Allies have created an independent army under .t'ocii, "for him to keep goal while the Hail; and Petain forwards do their best to smash or hold the German charge.' .

We can imagine tlic British anil Vrcneii Governments saying I the Saul's writer continues) "It is for you, Haig, and I'm , you, Pctain, to hold the enemy with tin; reserves you havn in lnuu!. In diiv necessity we'pledge ourselves to supply you with new reserves, biiL these must not come from Foch's pencrnl rostTn*. That is set apart for a special purpose, and can only be used in the l'nce nl' threatened catastrophe." Under I his plan we can imagine how Lloyd Cieoriye might find himsL'li short of men at. the sumo lime that British troops under lVh were held back for a special mission. . . . By imagining Foch outside of this battleline with sixty- divisions, wo can understand how tho Germans, while nnly slightly superior numerically lo I lie Allies as a whole, should Ik yet overwhelmingly superior on tho front of contact. Our information on the subject of th=! Allied reserves and their disposition is fragmentary, but though tho observations just quoted are in the nature of conjecture they probably get fairly near to the truth. On becoming aware of tho enemy's intention of striking with all his power for an early decision, the Allies had to choose between a stonewall defence or a mobile defence. Tho course of events makes it evident that their decision was cast for a scheme of mobile defence under which they are content that the aggressor shall make initial gains until his purpose is fully revealed and ho is committed without hope of retreat to a defined course, of action. Only when that stage has been reached will the time come for the Allies to throw their full weight into the scale.