The Dominion. TUESDAY, MAY 28, 1918. BATTLE PROSPECTS

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 213, 28 May 1918, Page 4

The Dominion. TUESDAY, MAY 28, 1918. BATTLE PROSPECTS

About six weeks ago Mr. Bonar ! Law said in the House of Commons that the most critical period of the Western campaign upon the course of which the fate of the war plainly depends would be the end of May and June. ' In Edinburgh a few days ago Mr. Lloyd Geokge, after observing that another great attack by the enemy was imminent, declared that those who best knew the prospects felt confident of'the result, and that he felt happier than he had felt since the commencement of the war. The British Prime Minister thus finds himself able to affirm his' confidence in the outlook on the immediate eve of the period to which his colleague pointed six weeks ago as the most critical of the campaign. At a reasonable interpretation, Mr. Lloyd George's words carry a plain suggestion that in the interval the general position of the Allies has been notably changed' for the better,_ and that their prospects are brightened accordingly. A number of detail factors visibly support such an estimate of the outlook,. Since the enemy camo practically to a halt in his offensive four weeks ago his armies have been heavily reinforced, but the Allies, also have added largely- to their available man-power—yesterday we had a' statement from fcho French Minister of Marine that during April more than 400,000 Allied soldiers were landed in France—and, taking account of the brigading of American troops with French and British units, it is unlikely that from the point of view of relative numerical strength the enemy will eaiu much by bis present delay. Meantime, while he has lost a precious month iu land # operations, his affairs have been going disastrously from bad to worse at sea and in the air. April witnessed a big drop in Allied losses of shipping tonnage; it witnessed, also, a record destruction of submarines, and according to the French Minister just mioted the total for Mkv under this head promises to exceed that of April. An «ven more notable contribution to the enemy's ultimate defeat has been made simultaneously by the Allied aerial forces. The war has witnessed no achievement' more impressive or of better promise than that of the Allied aviators during the last month or two in overwhelming and destroying the enemy's air forces and destructively bombarding his'lines of communication and war factories. It is extremely probable, as a correspondent suggests to-day, that Germany's aerial weakness' and the penalties it invites are the chief cause of delay in resuming the offensive. Looking to the future, there are as good grounds for believing that as the campaign develops the Allied air squadrons will be able to isolate considerable enemy masses as completely as if they had been outflanked and encircled in operations on land. This does not exhaust the possibilities of an aerial offensive, but action on these lines may heavily influence the trend of events in the Western theatre in thci near future.

Such factors as have been touched upon, and not least the phenomena] development of the Allied aerial offensive, tend obviously to justify the confidence of the British Prime Minister, but ifc is evident from his speech that at bottom his hopeful, outlook is based not upon any single war factor, but upon the rcorganisjation of the Allied command,_ now successfully accomplished, which ho regards as an assurance that every form of striking force available to-

' tho Allies will henceforth be used to the best possible effect. It is plain enough that ho felt himself to be dealing with the heart of the matter when he said that unity of command was now a fact, and that it added mightily to the Allied fighting strength. In spite of the partial obscurity that still enshrouds the events of tho present crucial campaign in the Western theatre as far as it has developed there is littlp doubt that in establishing a unified command the Allies took tho only course that will enable them to v defeat an enemy who is in a position by reason of his autocratic traditions and institutions to treat armies as pawns. It may bo some time before the full magnitude of the change the Allies were compelled to_ effect in their military organisation at the crisis of the war is realised, but some light is thrown upon the questions involved in a speech delivered by Mr. Bonar Law in a debate upon the Military Service Hill—-tho measure in which the British Government took authority to enrol men from 45 to 50 in the Army, and if need be men of 50 to 55, and to enforco conscription in Ireland. Dealing in the first'place \vith tho conditions whicli .obtained last year, when the Western Allies admittedly were in superior strength, 1b observed : —

It is obvious now that a successful effort against entrenched positions could bo made only by throwing the full weight of tho whole Allied Army into the attack. That was attempted by General Nivelle. lam soing to say nothing whatever about the result, but I say to the House of Commons that there is this difference between armies led and belonging to countries with Parliamentary institutions and those of our enemies, that we must be affected by the casualties, but that our enemies make up their minds to fro through with a course, and, whatever tho casualties, they go right on without regard to the initial step. That makes a great difference.

Tho Chancellor of _ the Exchequer next went on to point out in some detail that Allied armies under separate command were necessarily and inevitably under a heavy disadvantage in meeting the attacks of an enemy who literally treats men as cannon-fodder.

But (ho added) if those tiro Annies hail been ono Army, whoever was responsible for that Army would know what lie had to do; he would foresee the intention of the enemy, make up his mind where tho ■attack was going- to take place, and, whether it was right or wrong, risk everything on judging it rightly. As the Prime Minister pointed out, that is an almost impossible thing under existing conditions. [Prior to ,the appointment of General Foch.l I am not admitting or suggesting that anyone, was to blame for it. It was ouoof the inherent difficulties of our position as compared with that of the enemy. All I will say about the position to-dliy is, that in our belief—l am now expressing better opinions than my own—if we' can get the whole Allied Army used as one, and treated as one in every respect, what is eo dangerous may be- changed to the advantage of the Allies. Remember, it was a, grout risk for our enemy, and if he fails iu what he is trying now, cue vesult will be very serious for him,

It is tho brightest feature in the outlook to-day that the conditions laid clown by the Chancellor of the Exchequer have 'heen created. Mr. Lloyd George's . statement that unity of command is a fact cannot he taken to mean less than that General Foch is invested with full and unrestricted powers to direct the Allied armies as a single army, and to employ reserves of all nationalities in accordance with a bold and, comprehensive plan. _As much had heen .assumed, but it is a fairly safe conclusion that the supreme advantage derived by the Allies from the delay of the last four weeks has been the opportunity of perfecting the'machinery of unified command. The one really convincing explanation of the unexampled success achieved by the enemy _ in the opening weeks of the offensive is that he caught the Allies at the critical stage- of transition when they had definitely departed from separate national organisation, but had yet to take tho final step in creating a supreme command. In these circumstances the Allies, were of necessity fearfully handicapped. They had weakened their individual armies to create a general reservo, but hacf not rounded off the organisation under which such a reserve may he turned to the best account. Development from theso conditions to an efficient co-ordin-ation of the Allied forces under the undivided control of one of tho ablest strategists of the ago may •well mark a great -turning point in the campaign and, in the war.