THE REVELATION

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 208, 22 May 1918, Page 8

THE REVELATION

GERMAN PRINCE INDICTS HIS COUNTRY EX-AMBASSADOR'S- STORY OF INTRIGUE LICHNOWSKY'S MEMOIRS I, [The following text of- the Lichuowsky pamphlet, in which the Gorimm ex-Ambassador at London tells tho story of how his country schemed for war, has been received by cablo from tho Ministry of Information, London, through .Editor's Agency. Tho pamphlet is of considerable length, but is of such commanding importance as an authoritative indictment of Gorman diplomatic Irickery before tho war, and fiirnjulies such a complete answer to Germany's assertion that she was not rcs|K>imiblo for the- war. that it is deemed desirable to publish it, by instalments, in full.l . EXPLANATORY NOTE

Tho author of the following pages, Karl Max Prince Liclinowsky, is a member of a family which holds estates both in Gcrmun and Austrian Silesia, and has an hereditary seat in the Upper House of the Prussian Diet. The father of tho present prince, and his predecessor in the title, was a Prussian cavalry general who at the end of' his life sat for somo years in the Moichstag as a member of the free Conservative Party. His uncle, Princo Felix, was elected in 18-18 to represent Ratibor in tho German Nnlional Assembly at Frankfoit-on-Maiii. tlo was au active member of the Conservative wing, and during the September rising, while riding witlj General Auerdwald in tho neighbourhood of the city, was attacked and murdered by the mob. The present priuce, after serving in the Prussian army, in which ho holds the nuiK of major, entered tho diplomatic service He was in 188,") for a short time attached to the German Embassy in London, and aftenvards became Councillor of the Embassey in Vienna. From 1899 to ISO! ho was employed in the German Foreign Office, ami received the rank and title of Minister Plenipotentiary. In I'JO-t ho retired to his Silesian estates, and, as ho informs us, lived for eight years the life of a eountry gentleman; but read iiulus. triously, and published cecasional political articles. He himself recounts the circumstances in which he was appointed Ambassador in London on the death of Baron Marschall von Bieberatein. Karon Marschali. who had been Secretary for Foreign Affairs under tho Chancellorships of Count Caprivi and for a time under Prince Hohenlohe, had achieved great success as Ambassador at Constantinople, and also, from the German point of view, as chief German plenipotentiary at the second Hague Conference in 1007. Baron Marschall was, to use an expression of Bismarck's, "the best horse in Germany's diplomatic stable," and great, things were expected of him in Lon-' don, But, he lived only a few months after his appointment. Prince Lichnowsky's high social rank, his agreeable manners, and the generous/ hospitality which lie showed in London gave him a position in English society which facilitated the negotiations between England and Germany and did much to diminish the friction -that had arisen during tho time that Prineo Bulow held the post of German Chancellor. The pamphlet, which is here translated, gives an account 01 , his London mission. After his return to Germany ho lived in retirement in tho country, but has contributed occasional articles to the Press. The pamphlet, which was written in August, I'JIG, was jiot intended for publication, but was distributed confidentially to a few friends. The existence of it had long been known, but it was only in March of this year that for tho first time extracts irom it were published' in tho Swedish paper "Politiken." Longer extracts have since appeared in tho London Press. For the first timo a complete translation, made from the German original, is now placed before tho public.

MY APPOINTMENT In September, 1912, Baron Atarschall died after Uo had been at his pwt in London I'or a few mouths only. His appointment, which no doubt was principally due to his ago and the desire of his subordinate to go to London, was one of tho many mistakes of our policy. In spite of hie striking personality and great reputation, he was 100 old and too tired to adjust himself to the AngloSaxon world, which was completely alien to him. He was rather an,oiiicial and a Jasvyer thau a diplomat and (statesman. From the very beginning he was at great pains to convince the English of tho hanniossness of our fleet, and naturalli' this only produced the contrary effect. Much to my surprise 1 was offered the post in October. I had retired to the country as a "personal referent" after many years of activity, there being then no suitable post available for me. 1 passed my lime between ilax and turnips, iiiiiong horses and meadows, read extensively, and occasionally published politic-il essays. Tims I had spent eight years, and it was thirteen years since I had loft the Embassy at Vienna with rhe rank of Envoy. .' "Hint h'ad hum my last real sphere of politi* cal activity, ae in those days such activity was unless one ps prepared to heip a half-crazy-chief indrafting Ins crocliety orders with their crabbed instruction's. ' I do not know who >ras rcsjioiirible for my being appointed to London. It was ccrtainlv not duo to tho Emperor alone—l was not ono of Inn intimates, 1 though he was at all times gracious to me. 1 also know by experience that his nominees generally mot wilb successful opposition. Herr von Kiderien had really wanted to send Herr von Siumm to London! He immediately manifested unmistakable ill-will towards me, and undeiivonred to intimidato me by his incivility. Herr von Bethmann-HollweK. was at that tune kindly disposed towards me, and had paid "too a visit to i Grafs', only ? short time before. I am .therefore inclined to think that'they all agreed on me because no other candidate was arnilnblc at the moment. But for Baron Marshall's unexpected death I should no more have been called out of retirement then than at any other time during all those previous years.

MOROCCO POLICY It was certainly the right moment for a new effort to establish bettor relations with' England. Our enigmatic Morocco policy had repeatedly shaken confidence in our pacific intentions. At •the- very least it had given vise to the suspicion that we did not finite know what we wanted, or that it was our object to keep Europe on the <|iii vivo, and, when opportunity offered, to humiliate France." An Austrian colleague who had Von in Paris for a long lime said to me: "Whenever the French begin to forget about 'revanche' you always remind them of it with a jack-.bont." Afer we had repulsed M. Delca'sr's effort? to arrive at an understanding with us about Morocco, and prior to that had fouunlly drclwttl that w<f had no political interests 'there, which conformed tn the traditions of the .Bismarckian policy, we suddenly discovered a second h'Vm;'c- in Alwlul Ar»:. W» assured him also, like the Boers, of the protect ion of, the mighty German Empire, with tlio saWt display, and with the panto result. Both demonstrations hrniinoted with our retreat, as (hey were hound to do if we had not already made up n'ir minds to embark on Ibn world war. T 1 " , distressing congress at Algeeiras could not rlmizp Hii? in any way, still Ip?* the foil of JF. n-lrwe. Our %l«lMf'o promoted the Uii-'sn-.TnnnnPPP. nml. laN\ Hip Anglo-KusMan vaivi»i-ri>"inp-it. 1" f-ifp )f "Hi" r'n,.,,,,,,, ,„>,.;!" ..'! »!) lr - ( i:ff-.... ences faded into Ihe The nowib'Hty of a'new Frnwn-Ovrnim w: .iv li'iul become nnpnrn'it. and F"ch » war could not. as in 'S7O. 'cav- either n r T,n?'nnrl unn (T fT | "d. 'I'he iiKel"?snpss of th" Tripln AHifliicr h-1 ii'vcndy bo-n shown at Alsecirns, while thnt «f Hip a'ireenieiiH a'Tivp'l at there was»ilemoi'stratetl nft»r\vnrfls by Hin oollans" cif Hi? Rultanntp. which, of -onniw. could not be prevented Among the Ger-

man peoplo, however, the belief gained ground tliat our foreign policy was loeblu and was giving way before tho 'oneircle-lninf'-luat Ligli-soimdiuir phriisee wero succeeded J)y ijusillanimous surrender. It is to the credit of Jlorr von Jvulorlon, who is otherwise overnitnd as .1 statesman, that ho wound up our Moroccan inheritance and auccptwl as they vero Iho fuels that could no longer liu altered. Whether, indeed, it was necessary to fllurra tho world by tlio Agiidir incident I will lmve others to say. it whs jubiliititly acclaimed m Germany, but it liiiil caused nil tho moro disquiet in England Ixtouso the CJovcrimient was ltopt waiting for tbrep weeks tor an explanation <>r our intentions. Lloyd George's speech, which, was meant as a warning to us, was the coiiferi'ienro. lieffirt- TMciisho'h fall unci before Algeeiroe wo might liavo had a linrjioiir and territory on tho west roast, but niter thoso evenin it was impossible.

Sir Edward Groy's Programme.

When I camo lo London in November, Wi, Iho excitement over Morocco had subsided, as tin agreement with France had been reached in Berlin. It is true that lindane's mission had failed, as we lind required (lie icwiirnnco of neutrnlily instead of being content with a treaty ncciiring us ngninsl, British (?) attacks with lirilish mipport. Yet Sir Edward Grey hud not relinquished the idea ot arriving at an understanding with ns. am', in the first placo tried to do this in colonial and economic questions. Conversations were in progress through the medium of the enpablo and businesslike envoy, Von Kuhlmnhn, concerning the renewal of tho Portuguese colonial agreement and tho Mesopotamia-Bagdad railway, the uniivowed object of which was to "divide both tiio. colonies and Asia Minor into spheres of influence The British statesman, iiflrr having settled all outstanding points of difference with franco and Ifiwsia, wished to make similar agreements with us. It was not Jm object to isolate us, but to the best of his power to make us partners in tho existing association. As he had succeeded in overcoming Anglo-French and Aiißlo-Kiissian differences, so he also wished to do his best to eliminate the AngloGerman, and by a network of treaties which would in the end, no doubt, havo included an agreement about the troublesome question of naval armaments, to ensure tho poaeo of the world after our previous policy had led to an association —tho Entente—which represented a mutual insurance against tho risk of war. This was Sir Edward Grey's plan. In his own words: Without interfering with our existing friendship with France and Eussia, which has no nggressive. aims and does not entail any binding obligations on England, to arrive at a friendly rapprochement and understanding with Germany "to bring tho two groups nearer." As with Uβ, there were two parties in England at that time, the optimists, who believed in an understanding, and the pessimists, who thought that sooner or later war was inevitable. The former embraced Mr. H. H. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the Ministers in tho • Radical Cabinet, also the leading Liberal papers, such as "The Westminster Gazette," 'The Manchester Guardian," and "Tho Daily Chronicle." The pessimists were mainly Conservative politicians like MY. A. J. Balfour, who repeatedly made this clear to me, also

leading Army men like Lord Roberts, who pointed out the necessity of universal military service—"the writing on tho wall"; further, tho Northcliffe Press and Ihe eminent English journalist, Mr. ,T. L. Garvin, of "The Observer." During my period of office, however, they abstained from all attacks and maintained both personally and politically a friendly attitude. But our naval policy, and our attitude in 13.05, 1908, and 1911 had aroused in them the conviction that after nJI ,it would eomo day come to v/ar. Just as it is with us, the former are now being accused in England of short-sightedness rind, simplicity, whereas the latter are looked on as tho true prophets.

The Balkans. Tho first Balkan war had led to the collapse of Turkey, and thus to a defeat for our [jolicy which had been identified with Turkey for a number of yeai'3, Since Turkey in Europe could no,longer bo saved, there woro two ways in which we could deal with the inheritance! either wo could declare our complete disinterestedness with regard to the frontier delimitations in the Balkan? and leave tho Balkan Powers to settle them, or wo could support our "allies" and carry on a Triple Alliance policy in the Near .East, thus giving up the rnle of mediator. I'rom. the very beginning I advocated tho former course, but tho Foreign Office emphatically favoured the latter. The vital point was tho Albanian miration. Our allies desired the establishment of an independent Albanian Stato, as tho Austi'ians did not want the Serbs to obtain access tp tho Adriatic and the Italians did not want the Greeks to Ret to Valona, or even to the north of Corfu. As opposed to this, llussia, as is known, was backing Serbia's wishes antt I'rance backing chose of Greece. My advice was rq treat this question as outside the scope of the alliance, and to support neither the Austrian nor the Italian claims. Without our aid it would have been impossible to set up an independent Albania, which, as anyone could foresee, -had no prospect of survlying; Serbia would have extended to the sea, 'and the present world ivar would have been, ivoided. France nnd Italy would have quarrelled over Greece, and if tho Italians had not wanted to light I'rance unaided they wotiiv! have been compelled to acquiesce in Greece's cxpniision to the north of Duvazxo. The greater part, of Albania is Hellenic. The towns in the south aro entirely so, and during the conference of ambassadors delegations from tho principal towns arrived in London to obtain annexation to Greece. Even in the present doy tfrecco there aro Albanian elements and the soculled Greek national dress is.of Albanian origin. The inclusion of the Aibunian3, tt-ho me principally Orthodox and Moslem, in tho body of the Greek State was therefore tho best and most natural solution if you left Scutari and tho north to thf Serbs and Montenegrins. For dynastic reasons the Emperor was also in Ciivoui- of this solution. When I supported this view in a letter to the monarch f received agitated reproaches from the Chancellor; he said that I had the reputation of being "an opponent of Austria," owl I was to abstain from such interference and direct correspondence.

The Near East and the Policy of the Triple Alliance, ■ We ought at last to have broken with the fatal tradition , of pursuing a Triple Alliance policy in the Near East also, and have recognised our mistake, which lay iu identifying ourselves in the south with tho Turks and in the north with the Austro-Magyars. For the continuance of this policy, upon which we had entered at the Berlin Congress, and which we had actively pursued ever since, was bound to lead in time to a conflict with Russia and to the world war, more especially if the requisite cleverness were lacking in high places. Instead of coming lo terms with Russia on a basis of the independence of the Sultan, wnom even Peuograd did not wish to eject from Constantinople, and of confining ourselves to our economic - interest in the Near East and to the partitioning of Asia Minor into spheres of influence, while renouncing any intention of military or political interference, it was our political airibitiqn to dominate on the Bosphorus. In Russia they oeUan to think that the road to Constantinople and the Mediterranean lay via Berlin. Instead of supporting tho active development of the Ballcan Stales—which, once liberated, are anything rather than Russian, and with which our experiences had been very satisfactory—we took sides with the Turkish and Magyar oppressors. The fatal mistake of our Triple Alliance and isYar East policy—which had forced iiiisoiii, our natural best friend and neighbour, into tho arms of France and England, and away from its policy o? Asiatic i : xpansioii—was the more apparent as a Franco-Russian attack, which w:>s Ilii , "so'ip" hyi)iitli"sis thai justified a Triple Alliance policy, could bo left out of our calculations. The value of Hie Ihlian alliance needs no further reference. Italy will want our money and our tourists'even alter IV war. with or without an Thnt this latter would fail us in i'u- <■■!- :>i war «:>-

•-'«iil' lwforHiand., I'-"'-! , I'"' Alliance had "no value." Au.-tri.t -.ktils,' our prol'.'ction in war as in pence, and has no other support. Her dependence on us is based on palilioi), natiniial, nr-rt economic considerations, aud is the "renter the more intimate our relations with Russia are. The Bosnian crisis taught us this. Since (he days of Count. Beust no Vienna Minister has adopted

such a. eelf-confident attitude toward us 11s Count Aeiirenllial during tne later years of his life. If German policy id conducted on right lines, cultivating relalions with ltussia, Austria-l£uugar,y is our vassal, and dependent on us, even without an alliance or recompense, if it is wrongly conducted, then wo are dependent on Austria. Hento there was "no reason" fur thu Alliance. 1 knew Austria too well not tu be aware that a return to Ihe policy of l'rineo i'ciix Se-hwaiv-enbe-rg or Count Alonts Eslerhaay was inconceivable there. Little- a-, til;.. Slavs vuere love us, just as litthi do they wish, to return into a German Empire, even- with a Jlapsburg-Lorraiufc Luiper.or at its head. They are slriung lor a lideration in Austria on national lines, 11 state of things which would have even less chance of being realised within tiio German Einpfre tihan under the double eagle. 'J'iie Germans of Austria, however, acknowledge Berlin as tho 'centre of German might ami culture, and are well aware that Austria ca.ll never again be .the lending Power. They wish for as intimuto a connection with the German Empire as possible, not for an antilii:ni!itn policy. Sine- the seventies tho position has fundamentally changed in Austria, much as in Bavaria. As in the latter, a return to the great German separatism and old Bavarian policy is not to be feared, so with the former a resuscitation of tho policy of Prince Kaunitis and Kchwurzuibcrf* was not to be expected. By a federation with Aus r tria, however, which resembles a bie Bvlgiwn since its population oven without Galicia and Bnlniatla, is only aJxmt half Germanic, our interests would suffer as much as if we subordinated our policy to tho viow of Vienna or Budapest, thus espousing Austria's quarrels. ILtnce we were not obliged to take any notice of tho desires of our Ally They were not only unnecessary, but also dangerous as they would lead to ft conflict with Buseift if we looked at Oriental question? through Austrian spectacles. The development of tho Alliance from a union standed on a single specific purpose into a general and unlimited association, a pooling of interests in all sphtres. war the test way of producing what such a binding contract was designed to prevent—war. Such an "alliance policy" was also calculated to alienate from us the sympathies of the- strong- young rising communities in (he Balkans, who were prepared to turn <to us and to open their markets to us. Tho diffev«ico between , the power of a niliiiir house and a national Stnto, between dj , - nnstic and democratic ideas of government, had to be decided, and. , as usual, we were on. the wrong sid* King Carol of Rumania told one of our reprenontatives that ho had entered into the alliance with us on the assumption that we retained the leadership,, but if this passed to Austria Hint would alter the foundations of the relationship, and under such circumstances ho -would not bo able to ( go on with it. Things wero similar in Serbin, where contrary to our own economic interests, w<? were =nnnorting the Austrian policy of. strangulation. Every time ire have backed the wrong horse, whoso breakdown could have hecn foreseen: Imiger, Adbul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, "Wilhelm of. Wied, endmost fatal of all jnisfoilcfs— with the great plunse on the Revdhtold stable. (To bo continued.)