The Dominion MONDAY, MAY 20, 1918. FIGHTING STRENGTH

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 206, 20 May 1918, Page 4

The Dominion MONDAY, MAY 20, 1918. FIGHTING STRENGTH

In some respects events in the "Western theatre since the Germans opened their'offensive havo modified standards formerly accepted or made them obsolete, but it is as true as it has ever been that as tending to determine- the trend and fate oi'j the struggle , tho factor of numbers is only less important than that of national resolution. It must bo obvious, cvon to tho most casual observer, that at the stago rcacned in Franco and Flanders much more depends upon the effective strength engaged on cither side, or available in reserve, than upon such factors as the position of tho contending: armies. This being so. it is fortunate that there are tho strongest reasons for believing that the Allies are much better off in the matter of relativo strength than many recent reports on tho subject would, imply. Misconceptions in tho matter are to be explained in part by the introduction of an element of camouflage into references to numbers in the field lately made by responsible authorities in Allied countries. But they seeiri to ho also duo in part to the confusion of two distinctly separate sets of facts. It has been emphasised that in coping with tho Gorman offensive as far as it has gono tho Allies havo elected to oppose tho enemy masses in inferior numerical strength. It has been laid down as clearly that tho Allies arc playing a waiting game, and depend upon America, to give them the decisive superiority which will enable them to recover the initiative and strike for victory. Somo commentators, bringing these facts together, have inferred that the enemy enjoys meantime a marked numerical superiority in the Western theatre, and a number of official statements touching on relative strength have, no doubt advisedly, loft the matter in doubt. No real evidence has been offered, however, that the enemy is in a position, taking the front as a whole, to bring superior forces to bear on the Western front, and there is very definite evidence to the contrary. Some of the most recent Alliod pronouncements regarding numbers in themselves discredit thoso of earlier date. For instance, tho British official review of operations issued a littlo over a week ago stated, amongst other things, that: "To tho sledge-hammer use of masses by tho enemy the Allies are opposing the strategy of meeting the blow with the smallest force capable of standing up to tho shock, while keeping the_ strongest reserve possible." The claim that the Allies arc holding strong reserves thus carries official sanotion, and available information in regard to the existing balance of strength is sufficiently explicit to warrant a belief that the enemy cannot now, by drawing upon his'existing armioß and reserves, attaiD

numerical superiority on tho "Western front.

No authoritative, estimate has credited tho enemy with an effective strength of more than 3,500,000 men in Franco and Flanders. One recent message spoke of a somewhat larger number, but it was unofficial and carried no particular authority. Facts and comments submitted from time to time- By recognised authorities, including tho French General Staff, suggest that it is doubtful whether Germany can, at the outsido, mass more than 3,500,000 fighting men in the Western theatre. .By drawing directly or indirectly upon Austria she might reach, or somewhat exceed, a strength of 3,500,000—5h0 might oven reach four millions—but even then the Allies should tie definitely superior. This contention rests upon ovidonco which can hardly be questioned. Speaking in January last upon the introduction of tho Man-Power Bill—a measure designed to largely augment tho British reserves then available—Silt Auckland Geddes stated that the British Army at that time had on its rolls over four million men. Making all necessary allowances for the arraios in Asiatic theatres and in the Balkans, for tho divisions in Italy, for men in hospital, convalescent, or under training or retained for tho defence of tho British Isles, the British strength available for the • Western theatre- can hardly, in view of tho total named by the Minister of National Servico, bo far short of two million mon. Certainly tho addition of tho Belgians and Portuguese to the British armies should give a total of two millions. As to the strength of the French armies, wo havo a statement by M. Andre Tα kmeu (French High Commissioner in tho United States): "Officers and soldiers mobilised on January 1, 1918, not including tho native troops from tho colonies and tho workmen in tho factories, amount to 4,725,000 men, of whom nearly 3,000,000 arc in tho Army zone." At their faro value the official statements quoted should mean that even if the rap-idly-expanding American armies arb ignored, tho Allies havo about four and a half million fighting men in tho Western theatre or availablo as reserves—a very different thing, of course-, from having that number engaged—and that even if she obtained all possible support from Austria it is doubtful whether Germany could attain numerical superiority in Franco and Flanders. It is possiblo, though unlikely, that in this computation insufficient account has been taken of the loss of strength on tho West front resulting from the transfer of Franco-British reinforcomonts to Italy. Apart, however, from the fact-that Italy has reciprocated by sending a strong force to France, America's contribution already goes far to make good the reduction in strength involved in sending French and British divisions to Italy.

Some- reasons for the policy the Allies hiivo followed in holding great forces in reserve and at the same- time permitting exaggerated estimates of the enemy's strength to gain free and almost unchallenged publicity are fairly obvious. They are no doubt anxious to lead the enemy on and involve him as definitely as -possible in an exhausting struggle. There are also such possibilities as were recently outlined by tho New York Evening a journal which shows an exceptionally competent grasp of the essential facts and perspective of the war. In tho article referred to, it observes that if in spite of tho known balance of strength in their favour th." Allies arc still fighting a defensive battle and calling to America for haste, the explanation must bo that the Allied leadership is not thinking of to-day only.

Foch, Haig, and Petain (it continues) aro aware that they aro facing tho supremo Gorman effort. They, rnuet count boyond the two and a half millions with which Hindenburg l>egim tho battlo, boyond tho million reeervee ■which Germany may soon bring up, to a crifris when Germany will throw in everything sho has and can scrapo together—her now classci, Austrianfl, Bulgarians, if it conies to that. To-day tho ratio of soldiors to population line passed far beyond the point tho experts considered possible. Germany, playing for everything, will do everything. What the Allies must figureon is a remorsoleee flow of the Kaiser's cannon-fodder. They must think of a German army of four or five millions beforo tko end of iho campaign.

Those may scorn extreme possibilities, but they should not bo overlooked. Germany is faced by a hundred difficulties opposing oven the organisation of such an effort for victory as is hem outlined. As reports stand she is finding it difficult to extort effective, aid from Austria,, ami Bulgaria is likely to prove- still less amenable to persuasion—tho more so as the mobilisation of a Greek Army_ of three, hundred thousand men is rapidly approaching completion. In Austria and in tho occupied regions! of Russia., tho brutal treatment and exploitation of the Slav races by the "Central Empires have stimulated a spirit of revolt which would in an enormous degree impede any attempt Germany might make to recruit Slavs to reinforce her Western armies. Tho, possibilities of coercing and intimidating vast enslaved populations have not yet, however, been fully tested, and tho Allies are bound to talm account of the contingency that Germany may contrive- by such means to largely increase hor present effective .strength. Available evidence indicates that tho Entente Powers are working upon a margin of strength which would enable them to cope with such a development, and this evidonco, at a narrower view, materially brightens the immediate outlook in the Western campaign.