THE U-BOAT WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 205, 18 May 1918, Page 8

THE U-BOAT WAR

SOMETHING ABOUT THE LOSSES

TONNAGE FIGURES PUBLISHED

An important paper was issued by the British War Cabinet a few weeks ago on the subject of shipping losses, and new construction. "Hitherto," runs the memorandum, "the Board of Admiralty have been averse from any publication other than that contained in the weekly return of losses, although it has frequently been pressed upon them that the whole tonnage facts should be made public. So long as such publication would encourage tho enemy and would stimulate his energies in a dangerous direction, they have not been able to concur in the proposal. Tho figures to-day will not stimulate the enemy, and the Admiralty recognise that the policy of silence, necessary as they believe it to haye been fronr a naval point of view, has had (his serious defect—that it failed sufficiently to impress upon the people of this country the vital necessity for individual and united effort on their part to make good the losses caused by euemy submarines." The ljoard therefore decided that in order to bring homo to the people the gravity of the position, the losses during the war, the gain of tonnage through tho conversion of captured enemy ships, and the gain through now construction should be set out in detail.

World's Losses. The striking fact brought out in the tables of the memorandum is that the ; aggregate world losses of shipping through ; enemy action and marine risks from the I outbreak of war to the end of 1917 i amounted to no less than 11,827,572 tons, of which 7,079,-192 tons were British. From this total have, however, to be deducted new construction and ejnemy tonnage captured, amounting together to 9,195,275. Hence the net world loss at the end of last year was 2,632,297 tons. From the outbreak of war to that date British shipyards produced 3,031,555 tons, whilo enemy vessels captured added 780,000 tons. A total of 3,811,555 tons has, therefore, to ho deducted from the 7,079,492 tons lost, leaving a net wastage for the country of 3,267,937 tons. In the memorandum the world position at the end of 1917 is thus summarised:— British. World. Tons Tons, losses 7,079,492. 11,827,572 GainsNew construction 3,031,555 6,606,275 Enemy tonnage captured 780,000 2,589,000 Total gains... 3,811,555 9,195,275 Net loss (world) ... 2,632,297 The first table gives the merchant tonnage of Britain and of r.ll non-tneniy countries lost through enemy action and marine risks since the outbreak of war:— United Total for Kingdom. World. ' 1914. Gross tons. Gross tons. Aug. and Sept 314,000 399,947' Fourth quarter 151,728 281,116 ' 1915. First quarter 215,905 320,447 Second quarter .... 223,676 380,419 Third quarter 356,059 529,481 Fourth quarter .... 307,139 494,878 1916. , • First' quarter 825,237 524,195 Second quarto .... 270,690. 522,289 Third quarter 284,:»8 ' 592,039 Fourth quarter .... • 617,563 1,159,343 1917. First quarter (111,340 1,619,373 Second quarter 1,361,870 2.236,934 Third quarter 352,938 1,494,473 Fourth quarter 782,880 1,2J2,943 Totals 7,079,492 11,827,572 "This figure includes 152.829 gross tonnage interned in enemy |>orts. The Output. There follows a table showing the output of merchant ships building for Britain and for all non-enemy countries:— United Total for Kingdom. World. 1914. Gioss tons. Gross tons. Aug. and Sept. ... 353,290) 1,012,920 Fourth quarter .... 422,320) 1915. First quarter 266,267) Second quarter ... 140,870) 1,202,000 Third quarter 145,070) Fourth quarter .... 112,712) 1916. First quarter 95,566) Second quarter .... 107,693) 1,658,000 Third quarter 121,961) ' Fourth quarter .... 213,332) 1917. ■ First quarter 246,239 528,439 Second quarter 249,331 626,440 Third quarter 248,283 616,453 Fourth quarter .... 419,621 932,023

Totals 3,031.555 6,C0G,275 A third table gives the details of captured enemy tonnago "On the subject of losses," says the memorandum, "the Admiralty disclaim any desire to prophesy about so uncertain a think as war in* its submarine phase. The results of the past year have shown the ability of our seamen to get upon terms with the submarine menaco and gradually to gain the upper hand. This result has been achieved in spite of an imperfect knowledge of a new and barbarous method of warfare, and of a scarcity of suitable material. Our material resources for this warfare are alroady improved and are being rapidly augmented, whilst science is placing at our disposal means of offence and defence of which wo have been in need. With regard to the other factor, a rapid and continuous increase in t'lio output of merchant tonnage will inevitably follow the united efforts of all engaged in merchant shipbuilding in this country. The recent production, however, of merchant ships in the United Kingdom, even making the .most generous allowance for weather conditions, fell so , far below the rate of output in the preceding quarter that, if improvement is not speedily made, the point where production balances losses will be postponed to a dangerous extent, and even when thai; point is reached we.shall still have in make good the losses of the pßst. During the critical period that confronts ns we must rely to a large extent on our own shipyards and on ourselves. Our partners in the war are making every effort to increase their production of ships, but a considerable time must elapse before the desired output is secured."