THE CONFESSION

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 205, 18 May 1918, Page 7

THE CONFESSION

lIOW GERMANY PLAYED FOR WAR

PRINCE LICHNOWSKYS' MEMORANDUM

Eeferonco has Jjeen made in the cablegrams to the confidential memorandum in which Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, explained the origin oi' the war. Prince Lichnowsky represented Germany in London at tho time when the movements that brought about the war -were ' taking place, and lie saw events from the inside. His memorandum, written in 1916,' was intended explain and justify his conduct to his personal friends, and it was expected to be treated as confidential. But a copy of it reached (he ICaistr, with the result that the Prince was punished for his frank statement of tho truth. Since then tho document-has become public property, and -has been published in British and European newspapers. Its genuineness lias not been disputed even by tho rulers cf Germany.

i Prince Lichnowsky went to London in 1 1912 avowedly to carry out liethmann I Hollweg's 'policy of securing a general underslunding with England. The memorandum ..begins with n recital of the circuii'Mances which led to his being appointed to London after many years of from diplomacy, and -a description of the European position, as he then found it. . The moment, lie believes, "was undoubtedly favourable for a new attempt to get on a bettor footing with England. /Our enigmatical Moroccan policy had repeatedly shaken confidence in our peaceful disposition, and arousea the suspicion that we were not cjuito sure what wo wanted, or that our intention was to keep Europe in suspense, and, wheii occasion sirved, to humiliate the .French. Aii Austrian colleague, who was long in Paris, said to me, 'If the French begin to forget revanche, you. regularly remind them of it by treading heavily on their toes.' . ■ . "After rejecting M. Dtleasse's attempt to come to an agreement with us in regard to Morocco, and declaring that wo had no political interests tiierf—air attitude which was in full accordance with the traditions of the Bismarckian policy '—we suddenly recognised ill -Abdul' Aziz a Ivru'ger No. 2. To him, also, like the Boers, we promised, the powerful support of the. German .Empire—at the same cost and with the' same result. For both, affairs ended, as they had to .end, unless we w;re already then resolved to undertake a world-war—namely, in withdrawal.

"Oitr attitude promoted J.he Jiusso.Ta'paness and the Russo-British rapprochements. In' ftice of the German peril all other conflicts fell into the background. The 'possibility of a'new Franec-Germah war had become evident."

j Earl Haldanes Mission. j After describing the futility of Ger- | many's Moroccan policy, I'rinco Lichnowsky goes on:— I "When I arrived in' London, in N.ovcmi ber,. 1912, public opinion had calmed ! about the Morocco question. Mr. Ilalj itane's mission hudcortainiy failed; since j, we had demanded a promise of neutral; ity, instead of satisfying ourselves .with a compact which would secure us against a British attack or an ?;.'tack with British support. Sir Edward Grey, however, had not given up the idea of reaching an agreement with us, and, as n beginning, made an attempt in this direction in the economic and colonial spheres. AVitli Herr vori Kuhlmann as expert intermediary an exchange of views took plaoo.concerning the renewal of the Portuguese Colonial .Agreement and tho Bagdad railway, the object of which was to "divide tho aforesaid colonies, as well as Asia Minor, into spheres'of interest. . "The British statesmen desired, since the old disputes with France and Russia were settled, to reach a corresponding agreement with us. His aim was not. to isolate us, but to get. us to take part'in the already established concert. Having succeeded in throwing a bridge across the Franco-British . and. Russo-Briti.sh divisions, he wished .also, as far as possible, to remove-the causes of friction between England' and' Germany,' and,- by a network of agreements—to which might well eventually have been added an agreement on the- unfortunate naval .question —to secure the peace of the world. "Tins was Sir Edward Grey's programme. In his own words: 'Without prejudice to the existing friendly understandings with -France and Russia, which pursued no aggressive aims, and involved in themselves for England no binding obligations, to reach a friendly rapprochement and understanding with Germany.' lit short, to bring the two groups nearer together.''' . • I'rincc Lichnowsky goes on to describe the situation during ,the Balkan War. There, were two policies, he says, open to Germany—to act as an impartial mediator and seek i l , stable settlement in accordance with the wishes of the Balkan peoples, or to conduct a strict Triple Alliance jKflicy. He' himself recommended the former," but the Wilhelmstrasse determined on the latter. Austria wished to keep Serbia from the Adriatic.; Italy wished to prevent the Greeks from reaching Avlonnj..Russia supported the Serbs, France supported the Greeks. Germany: had no motive whatever for supporting her allies, and- tlius bringing about .a bad settlement, except the desire to consolidate what, iu Prince Lichnowsky's opinion, was u palpably worthless allianceworthless, because it was obvious that July would break from the alliance in the event of war,'while Austria was absolutely dependent on Germany in peace and war without? an. alliance.

The best way to-'increase Austria's dependence was to'cultivate friendly relations ' between Germany and liussia. The Kaiser, for dynastic reasons, was .in favour of the division of Albania between Greece and Sorbin, but "when I, in a letter to him, urged this solution, I' received from the Chancellor a severe reprimand to the effect that I was supporting 'Austria's enemies, and should refrain from'direct correspondence with the Emperor." Thus Germany decided (o take her stand on the side of tl:e Turkish and Magyar oppressors for the sake of the Triple Alliance—a fatal blunder, which Princc Lichnowsky describes as "AH the more striking since a sudden FrancoRussian assault —the enly hypothesis which could justify the Triple Alliance policy—could, in fact, be ruled out of our calculations."

A Dangerous f.ine. "It was not only unnecessary," lie declares, "but dangerous, to pay attention lo Austria's wishes, siuco to l&vlr at the Eastern question through Austrian spectacles must lead to a collision with Kussia,' and a world war. Sncli a-policy, moreover, wis bound to alienate sympathy among the young, strong and aspiring communities of the Balkan Peninsula, who were ready to turn to us and to open their markets to us. The opposition between courts and peoples, between the dynastic'and democratic idea of tlie State," was clearly defined, and, as usual,- we fitood on the wrong side, . . .

Tn Serbia, against, our own economic interests, we supported the Austrian policy of strangulation. We have always ridden horses whoso collapse could b" foreseen—Kruger, -Abdul Aziz. Abdul Tlamil, aiui AVilliam nf Wicd—and finally wo came to trrief in Berchlold's stable."

Prince f.ichnowslcy proceeds to describe the Conference nf Ambassadors in London in 11)13. and the liniluentia] and conciliatory part played ' I hero by fiir Edward firi'v, wlin always, he says, found a way out of every anparcnt deadlock. "But we, instead of taking up a position analogous to Km I: of Eosr'niid. invariably espoused tlie standpoint of Vienna. Con tit Mcnsdorft' led_ the Triple Alliance in London: I was. his second. My (ask consisted in supporting his pvnnosnls. In Herlin (lie prudent and experienced Count.Szogen.v was in control. '.Hero tlie casus foederis" arises.' was his constant refrain, and when I once ventured to (iiicsiioii tlie correctness of this conclusion T was seriously warned Tor Austronhobia.. At all points wo accepted and supported'the views of Austria and Tlaiy. Sir Edward fire.v. on the other hand, Tactically never sided with Russia or "France. Usually, indeed, lie took the side of our group, sn as not lo provide any pretext for conflict. That pretext was eupplierl later by a. dead Archduke.'" •