PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 204, 17 May 1918, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

_A most interesting and informative description of that part of the Western front on which the New Zealand Division is fighting is given_ by an American correspondent in a dispatch written on April 7. As information stands our Division is still occupying the same front—roughly midway between Arras and the Somme—and the position remains in essentials as it is described by the correspondent. "Tho German efforts to-day (April 7) at Bucqupy and yesterday near Seri'o," ho observes, "wcro continuations of their strenuous attempts togct themselves out of a nasty position in which they find themselves in this region, in which they have been since tho big drive was stopped in tho last days of March. At this point the Germans are holding a very sharp salient, which bulges out into British territory along a lino roughly represented by Bucquoy, Hebuternc, C'olincamps, Auchonvillers, ami Hamel. This salient is somewhat saucer-shaped, the outer edge being on high ground. Upon these elevations the British sat down at the end of their retirement, and since then hfava succesafuly. defied tho enemy to

dislodge them. Within the salient is an inhospitable zone which formed a part of No Man's Land in the first Battle of the Somme. It is shell-torn, and altogether is an unpleasant place over which to conduct operations. Not only is the ground bad, but tho whole sector is dominated by British machine-guns, which send never-ending streams of bullets swirling down into tho enemy camps, which present excellent targots. If the Germans wore to start the second phase of their grand offensive* now and were forced to 'kick off from their present position in this salient, they wouki encounter tremendous difficulties in maintaining satisfactory communications across the desert which lies just back of their front lino. They need the high ground on the edgo of their saucer before they can begin a big attack so that they can get their guns forward, for otherwise the artillery would bo outdistanced and everything would depend upon tho infantry."

# * * * Tin; salient in which tho enemy Ib facing the New Zealanders and other troops is not of great extent. It is enclosed in a front which curves west and south from Buoquoy and thoii turns south-east to the Anore in tho vicinity of Hamol, about half a dozen miles south of Bucquoy. It amounts, thorcforo, to a bulge half a dozen miles broad from north to south and four miles deep, or slightly less, from west to cast. This section of tho front, howovor, has an importance out of all proportion to its length, and tho correspondent quoted does not exaggerate tho vital bearing of events in this region upon tho enemy's offensive plans. An obvious reason for the costly and thus far abortivo efforts made by tho Gormans to opon out the Hebuterno salient appears iu tho desire to exebahgo bad and exposed positions for tho encircling heights by which theso positions are dominated. 'But it is only necessary to look a little further afield to see that the enemy had at the same time even stronger motives for his attacks on tho New Zealanders and other troops by whom ho is held up between Buc-' quoy and Hamel.

Advancing on this front ho would not only have vastly improved his local situation, but would have taken a big stoptowards outflanking British' positions on north and south, which ho has spent tens of thousands of lives in attempting to reduce by frontal attacks. If tho enemy broko out of the Hebuterne salient tliero would be an immediate and serious threat to the positions east and south of Arras in which the British havo successfully withstood immensely formidable attacks. It is still more important that the same achievement would turn and make untenable the defences along tho Ancre which sorve a vital purpose in holding and cramping the northern flank of the enomy's thrust towards Amiens. It is thus evident that although little Ims been heard of it during the last few weeks, the "front on which the New Zealanders are assisting to pin down tho enemy in a dominated salient has a very important place in the Allied scheme of defence. Indeed tho existing state of affairs in this sector in itself lends very definite support to tho prediction that the enemy will make his next big effort between Arras and Amiens.

Reports which declare that the failure of the new big German U-boats is largely owing to their slowness in manoeuvring wear in themselves an'air of probability. A considerable increase in the power of the enemy submarines was at least a partial answer to some of the earlier counter-measures adopted by the Allies, but in recent times great additions have been made to available flotillas and squadrons of destroyers and other swift and powerful craft, which aro moro than a match for tho biggest submarine. It is on tho surface if anywhere that the big Gorman Üboats must justify their oxistcnoe, for if they arc compelled habitually to subaorgo thoy aro no moro effective, oxoept in tho matter of speed _ and that of tho number of torpedoes they aro able to carry, than the smallest submarine. Nothing, therefore, is more likely than that the development of the convoy system and the great increase in the numbers of fast and powerful craft available to the Allies for the protection of shipping and for duties of patrol and pursuit havo led to a correspondingly increased loss of the later and larger German submarines. These craft nocessarily i take a considerable timo to submerge, and yet it is only by taking risks on the surfaeo that they can turn their armament to, account. | As matters aro developing it would not be surprising if Germany reverted to the construction of somewhat smaller submarines—big and powerful enough for ocean cruising, but with no claims to be regarded as supersubmersibles.

The fact that tho powers of concealment, enjoyed by the submarine constitute its main value to tho enemy is brought out in the following passage from tho report of tho War Jabinet for tho year 1917:— "The German submarino, it is stated, has a surface speed up to 18 knot 3 and a submorged speed of 10 to 11 knots. Sho carries from 15 to 20 torpedoes; sho can travel 100 miles completely submerged; and she can remain under wator sitting on the bottom for a period up to 48 hours. A submarine attacking with a torpedo only shows about three inches of poriscopo at interval#, with tho result that few ships which are torpedood ever see the submarino which has carried out the attack. Tho range of the torpedoes fired by a submarine is anything up to five miles, and tho spcod of tho torpedo is as high as 40 knots."