THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 193, 4 May 1918, Page 7

THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA

♦ EXTRAORDINARY AND PUZZLING ENTERPRISE ... A QUEST FOR FOOD (From the New York "Evening Post.") "What nro Germany and Iter allies -going to get out of the present extraordinary German invasion of Russia, ■ tho peaco ivitli the Ukraine, and the surrender of the Bolsheviki, alter their pathetically futile call-of the labouring men to arms? The German' Chancellor that Germany is moving "in llio name <it"' humanity." The 'Austrian Premier declares that the only purposo is "to provide our heroic population with the foodstuffs which, by reason of i(is lon's privations, it deserves." 'l'he question is, then,-will he Teutonic invaders get the Russian foodstuffs, and, mora particularly, how.,much is there for them to get? ' ' : a Of the magnitude of Kussia'6 tangible resources in food and other produce, during time peace, there was never any question. Tho statisticians estimated, in 1913 that . thei'o .' wero 256,000,000 acr&y under cultivation for cereal crops, ot which 197,000,000 were in European Russia. Her wheat crop of that year, 830,000,000 bushels, was the largest ever liarvested in any country up to that time. It was sixty million bushels greater tiian tho same year's crop in the United States, although that was for us a "rec-ord-breaker," and itiias never been surpassed except by our own harvests of 1914 and 1916. In ;hat last year of European pence, it was calculated that there were 34,000,000' horses and. 139,000,000 other cattle in Russin, whereas the United States, with its huge areas of scientific cattle-raising, reported only 189,000,• 000 of both in the same year. Has Russia Great Reserves of Food? What has happened to those .enormous reserves of produce during tho war? Has the Russian fanner gon& on raising his crops and animals; and, if so, does there exist, somewhere in Russia, a prodigiously great accumulation of such products, on which the- German army, and the German Government will presently lay then- hands? The question is one of the -liiosfc' peculiar in* Ibe history of agriculture. • • " : ihc war did not. necessarily niean suspension of farming operations in Russin, any more than it did in France or Germany. lrobably Russia called up moro of its citizens for military servieo than any other country; but thou,her population before tho war was 171,000 000 i"H st Germany's 04.000,000 and' Urn 40,000,000 of I ranee. The problem of real obscurity is net that of ivar-ui«o /apacity for production. . In peaco times, ■Russia was accustomed to send abroad lully 40 per cent, of her enormous wheat crops; but tho German bloekado of tho Baltic ami the closing of the .Dardanelles put an end to that as soon as the wur began. What has happened since theaP mil" 6 au " leu tic information. lhe grain trade's usually accepted figures report that 705,000,000 bushels of wiieat were 'harvested in European Russia during 1914, and that 834,000,000 wero produced in 1915. 767.000.000 in 1910, and 650,000,000 even last year. But these j figures are utterly incredible, when ono considers that since the summer of 1914 the Bussiau. farmer, with tho . export market closed to him, has been able in any event lo sell no more than the 0(1 I per cent, of .his cron. which used to iio consumed in Russia. Nor is that all. During at. lonst tho two past years, re- | ports from the Russian cities have told I of extreme scarcity of .food supplies; | therefore, even home consumption could I not have been what it used to be. I I Famine in a Producing State, | This condition of famine was undonbt- ! edly duo in-largo mcasuro to thebreakI down of tho, railways; .it is also'(rue j that reports liavo been current of grainI growers refusing to sell in tho depreciated Russian currency unless tho Government doubled the maximum price I which it ,had fixed. But if tho farmer simply kept his grain in his own possession, what then ? No such four years' accumulation as would theoretically bo suggested could _benin to bo cared'for, j even ill the grain-elovntor system of the ! United Slates; and Russia is worse proj vided'with slorago facilities than «ny | other great country in tho world. ! It is difficult to avoid the. conclusion ! that no largo crops have been raised in | Russia, sinco the war began; that tho I estimates commonly given out are altoI gother extravagant; that the farmer—at. | any rato since 1915—has planted and harvested only us much as he was euro 1 of selling in Russia, and that even ol' fins, a great part must have rotted on the ground for lack of transportation. suppose that, in the faco of all theso discouragements—disappearance of ex. port market, difficulty of getting labour, depreciation of tho currency, and inability to bo sure either of storage or transportation—the Russian farmer has been regularly raising larger crops than tho average of the decado before the war, is inconceivable. Ilow much, then, will the German food problem bo immediately helped by tho subduing and virtual occupation of Rus. sia? It is doubtful if ovon the German Government, knows. The ease is not. even what it would have been, if tho Germans had entered the Ukraine and North Russia in tho autumn,'just after tho harvest. Russia, is now almost, at (he season <i[ normally minimum grain reserves. As lo how large tho reserves were, even in .luly or October (t.lio harvest dates of southern and norlhern Russia) that will remain for a good while-a matter of conjecture. Even imagining the. grain to bo there, tho railways are not in condition to ro'inovo it. Meantime (though this consideration may not appeal to ii German commander) Russia, itself is also in a staio ot famine.