JAPAN'S ARMY IN THE FIELD

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 191, 2 May 1918, Page 6

JAPAN'S ARMY IN THE FIELD

+ IS A.MARCH TO THE WEST FEASIBLE? HOW JAPANESE FORCES MIGHT HELP (By the Military Critic of the Now York "Evening Post.") Though tho question of Japanese intervention- is Siberia has been posed as a Far Eastern problem, popular opinion has accepted its implicat'.uus as extending into European Russia. The need of saieguarding the Allied military (.tores at Vladivostok, or even of preventing tho establishment of a German U-boat base on Russia's Pacific Coast, may appear sufficient justification to the export mind, but it will seem fairly romoto to the man in tho street. What tho plain citizen is thinking of is not tho occupation of tho eastern section of the TransSiberian against tho 'contingency of a German advance, but'of the arrival of a Japanese nrniy somewhere within striking distance of "Germany. For any other purpose it would hardly bo worth whilo incurring the risks which a Japanese entrance into Siberia would involve—tho awakening of Russian resentment, tho diversion of Japanese shipping and military supplies to a distant theatre, and the bestowal upon Germany of an opportunity to assume the role of champion of the white races against tho yellow peril. Just to visualise the problem of a clash between the armed forces of the Kaiser and tho Mikado in its simplest terms, let us imagine for the moment that Russia does not enter into tho problem. That is to say, let us suppose tho 5500-milo stretch of territory between Vladivostok and Petrograd as either Japanese or German territory or both, with no political obstacles in the wav of a direct contact between the two armies. We should then have a parallelto tho Russo-Japaneso war of fourteen years ago, with this important difference -that Japan would bo playing the role of Russia in ISO 4 and Germany tho role of Japan. Like tho armies of the lsar in 1904 Japan would havo to_ carry on the war at tho end of a thin, lino ot railway, 5500 miles long, against an army fighting virtually outside its own doorstep. AVith all allowances for tho difference between -Japanese efficiency and Russian efficiency, the undertaking at onco suggests itself as a titanic enterprise for which wo would have to seek a parallel in tho history of warfare.

Communications 4500 Miles Long. Tho odds against Japan would be lessened, of course, if the German armies came forward to dispute the Japanese advance. But it is idle to suppose that Von Hindenburg would adopt such a strategy of adventure. More tnan enough lor German purposes to make a stand anywhere west of the Urals and await development*. 'Hie situation as we have visuahoed it would impose the imUative upon he Japanese. They could not hope establish contact with the enemy wiin Siberia, and that means a line ot commutations 1500 miles long. Merely to foguard such a stretch of railway would be an enormous undertaking, let some thins of the sort would bo the Japanese a if the Mikado's armies ore to mate hemsdves directly felt in the pr«*»t war, as General Foch, lor example, medium-is ou,t of the question Ru»u sßTssSsvw o Russia. And if.we assume, that he mysterious Slav soul is capable, ot that Nletachment, it Is-all o*™»g •' Germany would have her iay. Ha. iiifc i wed peace with Germany, the Kitea Gomwncnt would ibe neutral 'UGermany would (all upon Russia Mend nor neutrality against, ~ JapSBtrSKHHS ■tL H,« \ll c> I cause by drawing upon VJliat Russia Must o°. Flags'tftrp s situation We need only think ol a S, 0 "' armv-or for that mafter, ot Japanese aim>'- » } m , CIUISD [ ! * ii^l"he co.ope4.ion of the Russian [ with the oo uiJLim mpiins a reGer- , neiVi ,l iit KIM*. 'J nol Van, how- ' ' n ' U " y u I temp l% tho B«* ,ia . n , G ,°- V " ever, is an Mt *} l V\ " } , re .esiablhsi tlie ' U ra r l aS somewhere l trout gainst . imngme int !3v SA i 8 «"?£ ■as [losaioiy '.i 1.-nntiese army ,„,!,,. „ ;«>™v», ££'« sib..*, :.;s\iins:~i.ssK *»»«;;; national consciousness aw ak ns awl 1 Sins H"»v=S ; in I'le again. And as always in such n - ;, i hn eslf the experiment does not fail 5 itv-b ginning, the effect becomes c- ! I u•it ve Siberia of the Russians wou d t ! move for the reconquest of the count.y f^ettS^seforthe^rmans | meanwhile would be lo cnji «W**£ 1 ! "ver Russian Government exiss to taU ' ' in) arms against the Japanese w*™\I'bVk, as we aasuinb i that Government is convincedl tl at the ' | Siberian-Japanese advance is for Uo n ■ eration of Russia, the answer to the lei ■ I man demand would lie a refusal Such 1 ! a Russian Government would only 1. vo ' : to offer nas=ive resistance and so pie :,'<ent tie Germans with tt* aWcrua bve i o driv ng the Russians to hatHcxapmtet ior of themselves ndvancing to meet ; ! „| t ack from Siberia. In either case tnc ! Gemans Would be embarked upon a. i enterprise that would consume mo.e ! I ~~ on the eastern front U tl e., - | IIRVC ' 1,,1 d there, since lie 1; «^-" * ~ bade in the sprimr o 1!IU I>' ,^ (l ■ ! cnviclion inlHln«»« J-', march of Japanese troons liom biUUiv ' iisbnvcd on an Allied pledged v ,| teKritrniidimlppcndei.ee of jJamUhemai.Ke-in.eof^.e.ol.. ! i-d %°Japanese'a'nu Ihe war in Europe, where, after all. « 1 must be won. ~~—