The Dominion MONDAY, APRIL 29, 1918. THE QUESTION OF RESERVES

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 188, 29 April 1918, Page 4

The Dominion MONDAY, APRIL 29, 1918. THE QUESTION OF RESERVES

It is quite possible that tliq Germans have'paid a ruinous price in lives for every yard of ground won in the Western theatre, but today's reports leave no roora> for doubt in regard to the terrific strain under which the Allied armids aio fighting. These reports show that in tho latest battles the Allies made a determined attempt to solidly block' the enemys advance, and that in Flanders gallant efforts to . this end havo for the tiino at least been only partly successful. In the south there is a different tale to tell. Attacks ■made at great cost south of the Somme had given the enemy possession of the village of Villers Bretonneux, with high ground commanding both sides of the Sommc Valley to a point beyond Ameins, but tho position in this area has been retrieved by a counter-stroke which in any other war than this would have commanded the astonishment and admiration of the whole world as an astounding feat of arms. Thanks to the Australians, who took tho leading part in this enterprise, and to the other British troops engaged, the Allies are again in full mastery of the gateway through which the enemy must break in order to reach Amiens. , A less satisfactory state of affairs is reported in Flanders. When the German offensive opened the Allies were established on a chain of ridges in Flanders, and Northern Franco, extending from the southern,fringe of the inundated front in Flanders to the Messines Ridge, and then turning west from the latter elevation through Flanders and Northern Franco to Oassel, 18 miles west of Messines. On' these ridges the Allied armies overlooked a wide extent of the Flanders plain to the east, and to the south the low country on both sides of the Lys, in which tho enemy has thus far chiefly developed his northorn oliensi've. A valuable elemont in this chain of high ground waa lost when the Messines Itidge was captured by the enemy. The Passchondaclo llidge, to tho northeast, was soon afterwards given up. It is the- pith of to-day's news of tho northern operations that the enomy has captured Mont Kemmel, which continues tho chain westward from Messines, and is striving desperately to extend his grip to high ground still further west. As a result not only Ypres' itself but tho low country west of that place are imminently threatened. It is quite true, as one correspondent points out, that the Ypres salient was chiefly valuable as jumping off ground for the recovery of tho Flemish coast, and that the salient is of secondary importance now that this objective is tor the time- being out of roach. Tho Flanders ridges arn worth much less to-day than when there were prospects of n.n early British advanco threatening not only the Flemish coast but the main communications at Lille. But these facts have greater weighb as they apply to the positions in which the- Allies have hitherto ken faciug east into Flanders than in reference to the losses reported to-day. The loss of Mont Kemmel—assuming that this bill is for tho time heing_ firmly held by the enemy—has seriously weakened the Allied position from Lhe defensive point of view. I

.Biifc while, tfiero can bo no doubt in regard to tlio tenuion ox the existing situation ami tlio clangers it holds, it is certain that the determining factor is not the ability of tho Germans to win this or that position at a prico, but the strength and numbers of the resorves availablo on cither side. Leaving out of account the vagaries of fortune

which sometimes influence the fate of battles, tho enemy will not really approach success in his offensive unless he _ compels the Allies to use up their reserves more rapidly tliiiri lie is simultaneously using up his own. To an extent the relative position in regard to reserves is a matter of conjecture, but what information is available on the subject warrants a decidedly more confident outlook than could bo based at present on the actual trend of the battle. Wo are told to-day by tho British "High Military Authority" that so far-Focif. has'used only a small portion of his reserves. It is not in doubt that, given time, (.lie Allics_arc capable of esfablishing a decisive superiority in numbers, as in other factors of fighting strength. The- immediate issue at stake is whether the enemy is capable of developing an attack formidable enough to give him victory before the Allies are- enabled, by a-de-velopment of their resources in which America has a big part to play, to recover the initiative and resume the offensive in superior strength. . At its face value the assurance that General Foch has not yet-made any serious inroads upon his reserves heavily discounts the otherwise somewhat unpromising aspect of the battle, and the assurance is in harmony with information from other sources. Apart from French, British, and Italian troops, the reserves at General Foch's disposal include practically tho whole of the American units thus far sent to France. At a modcrate estimate, at least a quarter of a million American troops should now ho available for service, and since- the Americans arc- in part brigaded with French and British formations, the fact that they have not yet taken any important part in the i campaign in itself affords conclui sive evidence that the Allied Gen- | eralissimo is holding heavy forces lin reserve. -At a wider view, GerI many i s ill placed to enter upon a contest of endurance with tho Allies By calling up in the ordinary way I and by combing out she has' made i much deeper inroads, into her manpower than either France or Britain, and she is more than a year ahead of France in prematurely calling up her annual classes of recruits. She has nothing to set against the vast resources of America but tho hope of forcing a decision before they can bo brought to bear. As information stands she is receiving no great assistance in her Western campaign from her allies. It is asserted to-day that there are some Bulgarian troops in tho Western theatre, but the Norlh German Gazelle is quoted as denying that, large masses of Austrians have been sent to the West front. Ihero is certainly no definite indication as yet that Germany has received, or can rely upon receiving, any large measure, of outsido aid, except perhaps in the matter of Austrian artillery. It is distinctly possible that if the whole truth in regard to reserves were laid hare the battle would be seen to be developing much less favourably from the enemy's point of view than late events, at an immediate view, would suggest.