The Dominion FRIDAY, APRIL 26, 1918. THE NAVAL OFFENSIVE

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 186, 26 April 1918, Page 4

The Dominion FRIDAY, APRIL 26, 1918. THE NAVAL OFFENSIVE

British experts, wo are told today, believe that the results of tho naval attack on Zeebruggo arc of paramount importance, not merely in sealing up that hornet's nest, but probably because of their bearing on a contemplated greater operation. ' This is a conclusion strictly reasonable in tho light of known facts and of others which may bo inferred. By breaking into tho fortified harbour of_ Zeebruggo and closing the all-important canal mouth, which tho Germans had safeguarded by every means at command, the Navy hag opened a new chapter in sea warfare—a chapter which many people, after tho experience of Galhpoli, were inclined to think never would be opened. In tho most limited view, what was accomplished at Zeebruggo constitutes a magnificent feat of arms. Tho Navy in this expedition faced and overcame deadlier hazards and infinitely more complex difficulties than ever before aroso in tho innumerable cut-ting-out achievements that adorn its record. ■ But tho exploit is still moro noteworthy as definitely supporting tho view that before this war ends the British Navy and the co-opcratin-j Allied Navies will have to be reckonod with, not only as, a great silent-working organisation holding tho seas and giving the enemy ever-diminishing scope oven for furtive attack, but as an aggressive force endowed with indefinite striking power. In a sonso tho attack on Zccbruggc marks a much more advanced dovolopment of tho British naval offensive than tho Battle of Jutland. Precisely on what' lines the naval offensivo may be expected to develop is known only to the naval chiefs and their trusted subordinates, but undoubtedly wide possibilities are opened. Regarding the naval situation as a whole, the operations just concluded on the Belgian coast aro a broad hint of what is to come, but' tho limits of offcusivo action arc far from having been set.

It is by this time fairly well understood that the appointment of Sir Eric Geddes as First Lord of tho Admiralty in 1017, and the moro recent appointment of Sir Rosslyn Wejiyss as First Sea Lord, are part and parcel of a development—almost a transformation—which the British Navy has undergono during tho war poriod. It is a development partly accounted for by the vast expansion which has taken place since- war broke out in the body of human and material resources at the disposal of tho Admiralty—an expansion notably extended -by the intervention of America—but it has involved also a profound change in tho conceptions of sea warfare which found authoritative sanction in laid and for some time afterwards. The development in its details will nofc be laid bare for a lone; time to come, but it is almost enough for our present pur-

pose that it has occurred and that it has a vital hearing upon prospeels in tho war. It is hardly necessary at this stage tp consider how far the limitations imposed on sea policy in the early stages of tho war were inevitable, and in what degree (.hoy might ' havo been averted by judgment and foresight. Tho fact which commands attention is that tho men upon whom responsibility rested in thoso early stages perforce accepted limitations which their successors, certainly with greatly enlarged opportunities and advantages, aro resolved to defy and overcome. It is no longer possible to maintain, as Mr. Winston Churchill did on one occasion, that by confining the German fleet to its ports, or thc_ shelter of its minefields, Iho British Navy has secured the essential fruits of victory. Even when this doctrine was expounded tho enemy was prosecuting tho submarine campaign, which has since developed as a struggle for supremacy bearing vitally on tho fate of tho war. The submarine campaign has supplied some striking evidence supporting the view that British sea policy must recognise no other limitation than that of the practical possibilities of offensive action, but there is no doubt that even without this stimulus the progressive spirits who aro bent upon developing the naval offensivo by every resource at command would hav,o gained the control they now exercise over our fighting forces at sea.

■ Tho attack on the Belgian coastal ports is a lato'and impressive addition to evidenoo which already warranted a belief that the Navy as a fighting organisation has developed wonderfully in the stress of war, and that as time goes on it will extend its operations in ways that would onco have been considered impossible. That evidence appears chiefly in. the sweeping reconstruction of British naval organisation which has been carried out within tho last two years, with a single eye to progress and efficiency. It is a familiar fact that Sir Eric Geddes was appointed to his present office, to tho exclusion of popular politicians, simply and solely on account of his demonstrated abilities as an administrator. Reasons for the promotion of Sir Eosslyn Wemyss over the heads of many of his brother officers also appear in his exceptional qualifications, brought to light in war service. Ho mado his reputation in conducting tho Gallipoli evacuation, and subsequently in discharging tho onerous duties involved in organis ing and controlling the naval coun-ter-offensive in the Mediterranean, 'with its several lines of communication. As a well-known English naval writer observed not long ago, the grounds for believing that Sir Eosslyn Wemyss will do better than his predecessors in getting the maximum dynamic effect, first out of tho British naval force, and then out of our Allies, against tho enemy's effort to cut bur sea communications are that, when faced by the extensive, varied, complicated, and difficult tasks with which tho Navy is called upon to grapple, he ga,yo splendid proofs of organising ability. The elevation of the First Sea Lord is typical of much that has occurred in tho Navy in tho course of a development as unprecedented as tho times and conditions in which it was accomplished. It is the root tradition of tho Navy that it should exhaust all means of bringing the onemy to action, but it is safe to say that it has never been organised to that end as it is to-day. Naval strategists and tacticians arc no longer enmeshed as they formerly woro in duties of administrative routine. They aro free to concentrate undividedly upon tble 1 problem of breaking into the enemy's defen-i sivo'organisation. With matters so ordered America has added very largely to the margin of forco already possessed by the Allies, both in tho capital ships which ultimately i guarantee command of tho seas and in tho now forms and dotails of equipment which havo been suggested or demanded by the war. 'In tho circumstances it should not b'o unduly optimistic to believe that the attack on Zecbrugge and Ostcnd is an earnest of still greater things to follow.